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This thesis seeks to answer how the availability of credit default swaps (CDSs) affects 
the economy and its participants. As a sort of financial innovation, CDSs transfer 
default risk among investors. For each transaction, the CDS buyer pays the seller a 
premium and, in exchange, receives compensation if a specified credit event happens. 
In the process, the risk taker has been changed. This alteration subtly affects the 
incentives of creditors and borrowers and the underlying economic logic merits better 
understanding. 
 
Our research firstly explores the impact of credit default swaps on the yield spread 
between corporate and Treasury bonds. Since CDSs can affect debt pricing in both 
negative and positive ways, we attempt to separate these two opposite forces. Using 
both theoretical and empirical approaches, we show how firm-specific CDSs affect the 
yield spread under different bond issuing conditions. Specifically, we find that the 
aggregate CDS effect depends on firms’ credit strengths when bonds are issued and the 
yield spread shrinks (expands), after the start of CDS trading, with good (poor) firm 
credit. 
 
The second motivation of this thesis is to investigate changes in a firm’s investment 
and its investment-cash flow sensitivity following the introduction of CDS trading. We 
find that reference firms reduce their investments, on average, after introducing credit 
default swaps and their investment-cash flow sensitivities increase simultaneously. 
However, these effects are dependent on firms’ qualities. For firms with high liquidity 
or integrity, investments are increased and they rely less on cash flows while firms with 
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low liquidity or integrity cut down investments and exhibit higher dependence. 
 
Finally, we extend our research to the CDS effects on corporate dividend policy, the 
signaling role of dividends and stock responses to dividend announcements. As vehicles 
for transferring risk, CDSs weaken third-party protection for minority shareholders. 
This, in turn, can affect managers’ incentives and the setting of dividend policy. We 
find that firms are more likely to pay, increase and continue to pay dividends after their 
debts are referenced by CDSs especially for firms with higher free cash flows, older 
firms and larger firms. The connotation changes too: the relationship between dividends 
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1.1 Background and Motivation 
 
The basic mechanism between creditor and debtor is performed in a simple way: one 
party supplies capital and holds risk while the other (the counterparty) conducts 
business and pays a stipulated return. Under this framework, a creditor cannot separate 
beneficial right from risk exposure, and this contributes to the creditor’s interest in 
monitoring and the legal protection for him in the event of financial distress. However, 
this may not optimal for both sides. From a creditor’s perspective, lending is costly due 
to ex post supervisions, capital requirements and expenses if there is a debt 
renegotiation or a court case. On the other hand, a debtor may find it hard to raise 
external funds and these are also more expensive than internal funds. Against this 
background, credit default swaps (CDSs) emerged. The first credit default swap was 
created by Bankers Trust in 1991 and widely developed by J.P. Morgan thereafter. 
Initially, the trading volume of CDSs was negligible. Data from the Bank for 
International Settlements (www.bis.org) show that the notional amount of credit 
derivatives including CDSs was only 0.7 trillion US dollars in 2001. From 2004, the 
notional amount of CDSs was independently calculated and the number rose 
explosively to 58.24 trillion of US dollars at the end of 2007. With such a surge in 
market value, CDSs have received great deal of attention from both academia and 
industry. After the financial crisis, some blamed them for increasing the systemic risk 
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of whole market and a series of interests arose in exploring how the availability of CDSs 
affects the economy and entities in it.  
 
Credit default swaps (CDSs) are contracts signed by two parties for transferring default 
risk. In most cases, they reference a specific debt of a firm or sovereign called a 
“reference entity”. The reference entity is neither the buyer nor the seller of a CDS and 
plays no role in the procedure of its creation. For each CDS transaction, the buyer pays 
the seller a premium in exchange for protection. The payment of the premium continues 
until either the default event or the expiry date of CDS contact, whichever comes first. 
If no default event happens, the CDS seller pays nothing to the buyer. However, in the 
event of default, the seller has the duty to compensate for the loss between insured 
principal and recovered amount or pay the face value of the bond, with physical debt 
delivery. Default events may be defined as failure to pay, bankruptcy, restructuring, 
rating downgrade and so on. Some CDSs might contain several or even all credit default 
events mentioned above. CDSs are similar to insurance contracts in which sellers can 
receive premiums and are required to give indemnities when losses occur. Nevertheless, 
there are several differences. First and foremost, a buyer of insurance should be the one 
suffering risk while a CDS buyer can have nothing to do with the credit event in the 
contract. Additionally, insurance companies are always regulated entities whereas CDS 
sellers may not be. Last, a reserve for covering sold protection is required for insurance 
but not for a CDS. 
 
Single-name CDSs are the most popular and liquid device among various credit 
derivatives and account for a large portion of the whole credit derivatives market. Banks 
and lenders can use CDSs to reduce capital requirements asked by central banks, 
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maintain relationship with clients, develop new business and even produce portfolios 
as alternative ‘risk-free’ assets. Credit risk can be traded easily through CDSs. 
According to Alexander, Edwards, and Ferri (1998), a large proportion of debt buyers 
hold corporate bonds to maturity. Consequently, the secondary corporate bond market 
remains illiquid. Buying and selling of large amounts are impossible in the secondary 
market. However, credit default swaps give participants the opportunity to go long or 
short credit risk on a large time span in unlimited amounts. One thing to be emphasized 
is that the buyer and seller of a CDS may not actually own the reference asset in the 
contract. For example, if an investor predicts the default of a corporate bond, he can 
buy the CDS for speculation without holding that bond. Therefore, the sum of notional 
value protected by CDSs can greatly exceed the value of the underlying asset itself.  
 
Many people believe that CDSs are conducive to the efficiency of the financial system. 
Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) claim that CDSs offer a near-perfect instrument to 
gauge the magnitude of the default component of corporate yield spreads. This suggests 
that CDSs provide pure credit risk premiums to investors in the market and facilitate 
price discovery. Moreover, Hull, Predescu and White (2004) find that CDS spread is 
negatively related to the credit rating of the reference entity and both changes and levels 
of CDS spread can effectively estimate the probability of downgrade. There seems to 
be an information channel from the CDS market to the rating market. However, a 
number of scholars criticize CDSs for their adverse effects on the economy. 
Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) find that the onset of CDS trading is positively related to 
the bankruptcy of reference entities and Arentsen et al. (2015) present evidence of CDSs 
increasing the default probability of underlying subprime mortgage loans. Furthermore, 
Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2009) show banks using credit derivatives for the 
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purpose of dealer activity rather than risk hedging. This implies that instead of reducing 
risk CDSs put the bank system in danger. With such a collection of praise and blame, 
credit default swaps deserve attention. Augustin et al. (2016) argue that a deep 
understanding for potential CDS impacts is necessary. 
 
CDSs create a hedging opportunity for investors to lay off their credit risk. This 
opportunity is important because it can erase the risk premium asked by creditors. 
Following the appearance of CDSs, creditors could hedge the default risk of those 
reference entities, undermining the significance of the risk premium. Nevertheless, 
CDSs might also have reverse traction on debt price. Parlour and Winton (2013) suggest 
that banks are reluctant to monitor borrowers if they can lay off their risk through 
buying CDSs. As a result, reference firms may invest in risky projects, leading to higher 
failure probability. In addition, CDSs generate exacting creditors, who are tougher in 
debt renegotiations pushing reference firms more easily into bankruptcy (Bolton and 
Oehmke, 2011). Since CDSs affect debt price in two opposite directions, their impacts 
are hard to judge at the average level. Ashcraft and Santos (2009) investigate the effect 
of CDS trading on debt costs but have not found strong evidence. 
 
Our study is interested in whether CDS availability affects the yield spread between 
Treasury and corporate bonds and is linked to several others (e.g., Hu and Black, 2008; 
Bolton and Oehmke, 2011; Ashcraft and Santos, 2009; Parlour and Winton, 2013; 
Subrahmanyam et al., 2014; Arentsen et al., 2015). We seek to explain how CDSs 
influence the yield spread through either negative or positive channel. First, we develop 
a theoretical model for the yield spread in scenarios with and without the CDS market. 
Using this model, we show the mechanism between the yield spread and hedging 
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opportunity/reduced bank monitoring/empty creditors and why the overall CDS effect 
should depend on a firm’s credit when it issues bonds. Our empirical work starts from 
testing whether the CDS effect varies with firms’ credits at issue times. We then 
investigate the two opposite CDS effects on the yield spread by splitting the sample into 
different groups based on CDS availability and credit proxy. 
 
Many papers show the favorable impact of CDSs on the information environment 
(Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, 2005; Acharya and Johnson, 2007; Hull, Predescu, and 
White, 2004). This suggests that the onset of CDS trading alleviates market 
imperfections, which contributes to lower finance costs. Also, CDSs constrain the 
likelihood of strategic default, helping to relieve the agency problem (Bolton and 
Oechmke, 2011). Moreover, Saretto and Tookes (2013) find that CDSs help to increase 
credit supply by breaking the separation between those willing to hold risk and those 
with capital. All these channels imply that CDSs may lead to stronger investment. 
However, an adverse CDS effect on investment also comes in several ways. First, CDSs 
reduce banks’ monitoring interests (Parlour and Winton, 2013) making other lenders 
lose the opportunity to be “free riders”. Additionally, CDSs generate exacting creditors 
which pressures firms to raise their cash reserves (Subrahmanyam et al, 2017). 
 
This research tries to figure out whether and how the CDS market affects a firm’s 
investment and is related to previous studies (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988; 
Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004; Cleary, Povel, and Raith, 
2007; Guariglia, 2008). Furthermore, we are interested in the effect of CDS use on a 
firm’s investment-cash flow sensitivity. While altering a firm’s capacity for getting 
external funds, CDSs change its demand for cash reserves as well. This inevitably 
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influences the firm’s whole capital status and its dependence on cash flow to investment. 
Since manufacturing needs the largest investments, we investigate both the broad 
sample, which contains all sectors, and the manufacturing sample. Considering the CDS 
effects on investment and the investment-cash flow sensitivity may vary, our analysis 
constructs a range of subsamples depending on firms’ liquidities and integrities. 
 
As a tool for transferring risk, CDSs alter not only the relationship between creditors 
and borrowers but also that between managers and outside shareholders. Easterbrook 
(1984) claims that a significant purpose of introducing external funds is to subject 
management to monitoring. With this, creditors potentially serve as protectors for 
outside shareholders although the monitoring is for their own interests. However, the 
inception of CDS trading slackens this mechanism (Parlour and Winton, 2013) and 
breaks the initial balance between two counterparties. Thus, through either an outcome 
or a substitute channel (La Porta et al., 2000), the incentive of managers on dividend 
policy may be changed. In addition, CDSs create empty creditors (Hu and Black, 2008) 
which could also affect corporate dividend policy. On the one hand, these creditors 
reduce managers’ incentive towards “empire” leading to higher probability of cash 
disbursement. On the other hand, they make managers want to reserve more cash, 
putting pressure on dividend payment. 
 
We seek to find the ultimate CDS impact on dividend policy among these conflicting 
effects and add to the literature (e.g., La Porta et al., 2000; Ferris at al., 2009; Jiraporn 
et al., 2011; Aggarwal et al., 2012; Hail et al., 2014; Louis and Urcan, 2015). Since 
agency conflict matters, we split our sample by its proxies to investigate whether the 
CDS effect on dividend policy varies. CDSs could affect the signaling role of dividends 
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too. This is because managers’ incentives to pay dividends are altered by them. If the 
substitute theory works, firms tend to use dividends to compensate reduced third-party 
protection due to CDSs. Conversely, if the outcome theory is true, dividends after CDS 
trading are more used to signal future earnings growth. Considering the variation in 
dividend information content, we also want to know whether there is an influence of 
CDSs on stock responses to dividend announcements. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
The objectives of our research are: 
 
1) To investigate whether and how CDS availability affects the yield spread 
between Treasury and corporate bonds. 
2) To identify any impact of CDSs on corporate investment and the investment-
cash flow sensitivity. 
3) To examine CDS effects on dividend policy, the signaling role of dividends and 
stock responses to dividend announcements. 
 
We initially study the CDS effect on the yield spread by exploring changes the CDS 
market brings to creditors. In our theoretical framework, we show that arbitrage of 
creditors between the bond market and the CDS market gives the yield spread a 
downward momentum. To the contrary, the CDS market weakens bank minoring and 
creates empty creditors stimulating it upwards. The overall CDS effect is dependent on 
firms’ credit conditions at issue dates. In our empirical analysis, we construct an 
interaction of the credit proxy and the CDS trading dummy to check the validity of the 
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inference from our theoretical model. Afterwards, to understand the dominance of the 
CDS effect in different conditions, we split the sample using CDS availability and credit 
proxies. In this part, we answer four questions: How does the negative CDS channel 
affect the yield spread? How does the positive CDS channel affect the yield spread? 
Does the CDS effect on the yield spread vary with firms’ credits on issue times? Does 
the negative CDS effect outweigh the positive during good credit periods and vice versa? 
 
Our next objective is to investigate the CDS impact on firms’ investments and their 
sensitivities of investment to cash flow. Considering that the investment decision is 
intertemporal, we use the first difference generalized method of moments (GMM) 
approach for estimations. Since manufacturing needs more investment in fixed assets 
than other industries, we present results for both the broad and the manufacturing 
samples. For testing whether CDSs attenuate the dependence of corporate investment 
on internal capital, we create an interaction of cash flow and the CDS trading dummy. 
Moreover, we split our sample by firms’ cash flow levels; coverage ratios; ages and 
credit ratings to examine whether the potential CDS effects are different across groups. 
We address three questions: Is the emergence of the CDS market conducive to 
increasing private sector investment? Does the increase of corporate leverage after CDS 
trading really loosen financial constraints faced by firms? Do CDSs affect investment 
and the investment-cash flow sensitivity differently towards to good and bad 
liquidity/integrity firms? 
 
A further aim is to identify whether and how CDS trading influences dividend policy, 
the signaling role of dividends and stock responses to dividend announcements. We first 
examine the CDS effects on probabilities of dividend payments, increases, continuities 
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and decreases. Then, we extend our research to test whether these CDS effects are 
themselves affected by different levels of firms’ free cash flows, firm ages and firm 
sizes. To observe the change of dividends’ signaling role, we produce interactions of 
the CDS trading dummy with four dividend indicators. In addition, we use three days 
abnormal stock return as the dependent variable to investigate the CDS impact on stock 
responses to dividend announcements. Doing these, we solve the following questions: 
Do CDSs change the relationship between managers and outside shareholders? How 
does reduced third-party supervision affect managers’ incentive towards dividend 
policy? The outcome theory or the substitute theory, which one really works? Have 
CDSs altered the purpose of dividend payments? Do investors in the stock market care 
about the change of dividends’ information content? 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on credit 
default swaps; debt pricing and bond markets; corporate investment; financial 
constraints; dividend policy and the signaling role of dividends. Chapter 3 investigates 
the CDS effect on the yield spread between treasury and corporate bonds. Chapter 4 
examines how the emergence of the CDS market affects corporate investment and the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Chapter 5 studies the impacts of CDS trading on 
dividend policy, the signaling role of dividends and stock responses to dividend 










2.1 The literature on credit default swaps (CDSs) 
 
Past research indicates that credit default swaps contribute to a more efficient financial 
market and bring some welfare to ease frictions. One such important example is the 
creation of new information. Hull, Predescu and White (2004) investigate the 
relationship between CDS spreads, credit rating announcements and bond yields. They 
find that CDS spread is negatively related to the credit rating of the reference firms. 
Higher rated firms always have smaller CDS spreads than lower rated firms. They 
expand their study to the relationship between rating announcements and spreads of 
credit default swaps, arguing that downgrade reviews from rating agencies contain 
outstanding information. Simultaneously, they find that either changes or levels of CDS 
spread can effectively estimate the probability of downgrade. Moreover, they study the 
association between bond yields and CDS spreads. Fixed income theory suggests that 
the difference between yields on the risky and the riskless bonds closes to the spread of 
credit default swaps. Their empirical work shows that the relationship suggested by 
theory holds well and can be used to estimate the risk-free rate implicit in the CDS 
market. These works imply that there exist some information sharing channels from the 
CDS market to the bond market and rating agencies.  
 
Many studies investigate the effect of CDSs from a corporate finance perspective. 
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Saretto and Tookes (2013) study the impact of CDSs on the quantity and non-price 
contract terms of debt financing. They argue that CDSs can affect credit supply in three 
ways: (i) CDSs reduce capital requirements for banks and insurance firms asked by the 
regulator; (ii) CDSs help lenders make loans to clients for maintaining business 
relationship without taking credit risk; (iii) CDSs provide the opportunity to build risk 
free asset equivalents. They show empirically that, after the inception of CDS trading, 
reference firms have higher leverage ratios and longer debt maturities. To explore 
whether the finding is more significant under binding financial constraints, Saretto and 
Tookes investigate this CDS effect during a period of credit supply tightening. Models 
are re-estimated conditioned on aggregate time-series patterns, regional supply shocks 
and bank-specific supply shocks. All results show that the effects of credit default swaps 
on the firms’ leverage and debt maturity become stronger when liquidity shrinks.  
 
Normally, a CDS is viewed as having no effect on the credit risk of the reference firm. 
However, studies show that this possibility cannot be ignored. Hu and Black (2008) 
define CDS-protected lenders as “empty creditors” and claim that the financial interests 
of lenders with CDSs should be different from those of debt holders without them. 
Bolton and Oehmke (2011) are then first to model the empty creditor problem. They 
note that credit default swaps not only transfer the risk of the debt holder to the 
protection seller but also that they change the payoff of debt holder during financial 
distress. Comparing outcomes of owning or not owning CDSs, they investigate the 
empty creditor problem with a formal debt model in which commitment is limited. They 
find that CDSs strengthen the bargaining power of debt holders and reduce the 
likelihood of strategic default. The underlying explanation is that lenders are tough in 
debt renegotiations due to the protection of credit default swaps. However, they also 
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find that creditors holding CDS are unwilling to restructure the debt even when it is 
efficient to do so. That appears to be because debt holders have an incentive to over-
insure and large CDS position would change their payoffs in the event of default. Their 
model also shows that, when there are multiple debt holders, it is harder to reach an 
agreement on debt restructuring and the empty creditor problem deteriorates even 
further. 
 
Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) test the effect of CDS trading on reference firms’ credit 
risk and verify the existence of the empty creditor problem. They initially observe the 
variation of credit rating after the onset of CDS trading. Their “within-firm” analysis 
shows that compared to one year before CDS trading (t-1), credit ratings of the 
reference firms deteriorate two years after (t+2). Moreover, Standard & Poor’s 
downgrades almost 37% of firms after they have been referenced by credit default 
swaps. Afterwards, difference-in-difference analysis also shows that CDS firms are 
more likely to be downgraded after CDS trading than non-CDS firms. They next expand 
to multivariate analyses to acquire further evidence of CDS impact on the credit risk of 
the reference firms. Empirical results reveal that the coefficient on CDS trading is still 
significant even after application of fixed effect controls. To explore the empty creditor 
problem, they study the probability of bankruptcy on distress when a firm is linked to 
CDS trading. Their results are consistent with creditors being inclined to push a 
distressed firm into bankruptcy once CDSs become available referencing its debt. They 
also find that if a firm’s CDS contracts are mostly “no restructuring”, creditors are more 
likely to push the firm into bankruptcy. Furthermore, they claim that the number of 
creditors increases after the inception of CDS trading and this goes against coordination 
at the time of financial distress. In general, their analyses demonstrate that CDS trading 
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increases the credit risk of the reference firms. 
 
Ashcraft and Santos (2009) are first investigate the effect of CDS trading on the cost of 
corporate debt. Many studies claim that credit default swaps improve the efficiency of 
the financial system and expedite complete markets, so an instinctive idea is that credit 
default swaps reduce the price of risk due to the new hedging opportunity and 
information created. This means that the cost of corporate financing may go down. 
Ashcraft and Santos investigate this issue in two ways. One is the effect of CDS trading 
on the cost of corporate bonds for underlying firms. The other is the effect on the cost 
of syndicated loans obtained from banks. Corporate-Treasury yield spread and loan-
LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) yield spread are employed as two dependent 
variables. They create two dummies, “traded” and “trading”, for their study. The 
“traded” dummy is used to control invariant differences between CDS and non-CDS 
firms. The “trading” dummy is more important in investigating the impact of CDS 
trading on debt costs. The analysis initially focuses on the sample of CDS firms to 
observe the differences in debt costs after the onset of CDS trading. Then a matched 
sample of firms that are never referenced by CDSs, but have similar characteristics to 
those are, is constructed as a control group. However, they do not find evidence that 
CDS trading lowers debt costs on average after controlling for firm-specific variables, 
bond or loan features variables, and time dummies. 
 
The emergence of a CDS market changes lenders’ incentives for monitoring and also 
their attitudes toward debt restructuring. These changes inevitably affect CDS reference 
firms when they make cash holding decisions. Looser monitoring encourages the firms 
to take on risk and reduce cash holdings for maximizing their equity value but tougher 
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lenders increase the firms’ liquidity costs and their need to retain cash. Subrahmanyam 
et al. (2017) investigate how cash holding varies after CDS initiation between the 
converse impacts of risk-taking and exacting lenders. They find that the exacting lender 
effect, on average, dominates the risk-taking effect. This means that the cash holdings 
of reference firms rise after CDS trading becomes available. Their further analyses 
show that the increase of cash holding is only significant for firms that never pay 
dividends and firms without bank debt. That can be evidence of existing risk-taking 
effect although it is rather weak. They also explore the mechanism behind the raising 
of cash holdings. Results indicate that the increased cash is from the issuance of long 
term debt rather than cash flows coming from operations. After the initiation of CDS 
trading, reference firms increase their leverage and cash holding at the same time. A 
strategy of high leverage with high cash holding is more profitable for shareholders. 
This finding suggests that a part of increased leverage is used to raise cash reserves. 
 
The growth of CDS related studies is as fast as the inflation of CDS market value. To 
make a periodical review of literature in recent decades and shed light on the further 
direction of CDS study, Augustin et al. (2016) give a narrative expatiating on the past, 
present and future of credit default swaps. They summarize the literature in four 
dimensions. First are the pros and cons the CDS market brings to the economy and 
involved entities. This aspect pays main attention to how the inception of CDS trading 
affects asset pricing, economic behavior and the relationship between lender and 
borrower. Augustin et al. (2016) claim that gaps for this aspect are more specified 
findings of CDS benefits, the externality implications of CDSs and how the intensity of 
CDS trading matters; secondly, in the post-crisis era, the effects of stringent regulations 
on CDS market circumstances, especially Basel III and Dodd-Frank. They note that we 
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know little about the effects of these regulations on credit default swaps and related 
financial products. Moreover, some CDS issues stand at the crossroads between finance 
and law. For example, whether it is reasonable to give empty creditors the right to vote 
in a debt restructuring. Also, the use of CDS information to study sovereign risk and 
the spillover from sovereign risk to firm risk. They conclude that attention should be 
paid towards exploiting the CDS information implied by term structure, CDS trading 
volume and international CDS corporate data. 
 
Arentsen et al. (2015) are first to provide empirical evidence that credit default swaps 
(CDSs) adversely affect defaults of subprime mortgage loans. Their work exploits a 
large sample of mortgage loans, originated and securitized by finance companies, 
investment banks and commercial banks during the period from 2003 to 2007. Loan 
delinquency is used to measure the performance of subprime loans. Arentsen et al. 
compare the quality of borrowers with and without CDS coverage. They find that 
borrowers’ FICO scores are lower when loans are covered by CDSs (FICO is an 
acronym for the Fair Isaac Corporation, introduced in 1989 and used by the majority of 
US banks and credit grantors; based on consumer credit files of the three national credit 
bureaus: Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion). Afterwards, they investigate the effect of 
CDS coverage to mortgage default. Their first finding is that CDS coverage has a 
positive effect on the delinquency probability of mortgage loans. Secondly, they find 
that loans originated after the start date of a CDS show a high default frequency 
compared with loans originated before. Thirdly, the effect of CDS also depends on 
issuers’ types. Although delinquency rates of loans with CDS from all commercial 
banks, investment banks and finance companies are higher than those without, the 
difference of rates from commercial bank loans is the largest. Arentsen et al. (2015) 
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claim this phenomenon is because commercial banks using soft information to construct 
mortgage pools. 
 
Minton, Stulz and Williamson (2009) study the extent to which banks use credit 
derivatives for the purpose of hedging loans. They focus on companies that belong to 
US banks and have assets over 1 billion dollars during the period from 1999 to 2007. 
According to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (2002), credit derivatives 
contain “credit default swaps, total rate of return swaps, synthetic collateralized loan, 
debt, and commercial paper obligations, and other credit derivative instruments.” They 
analyze the sample excluding foreign bank holding companies. They find that only a 
few banks exploit credit derivatives (23 out of 395 in 2005). Using net credit protection 
purchase as a criterion of bank hedging, this hedging accounts for less than 2% of banks’ 
loans outstanding although the nominal amount of banks’ credit derivatives outweighs 
that of their credit exposure. This means the purpose of using credit derivatives is dealer 
activity rather than risk hedging for banks, which have credit derivatives positions. 
Secondly, Minton, Stulz and Williamson use probit models to discover why banks have 
net credit protection purchase. Their empirical work shows that banks having less 
capital are inclined to buy net credit protection. This supports the idea that net purchase 
of credit protection is made in order to reduce capital requirements rather than to hedge 
credit exposure. In general, they argue that few banks use credit derivatives and do so 
for dealer activities. 
 
Parlour and Winton (2013) model the behavior of banks when they want to lay off their 
credit risks. There are two ways to unload the credit risk of holding a loan. The first is 
buying single name credit default swaps for protection. The second is selling the loan 
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to other institutions. Differences between these two choices are the control right for 
cash flows and the willingness to monitor. In their model, a firm that raises money for 
a project has net positive present value and will exist for five periods. At time 0, the 
bank originates the loan and the firm uses the money to finance a risky project. At time 
1, the bank learns private information about the management of the project and faces a 
capital shock. At time 2, the bank chooses to lay off the risk of the firm through a credit 
default swap or a loan sale. At time 3, the owner of the loan (i.e. the originating bank 
or the loan buyer) exerts a costly effort to make the project good. At time 4, the firm 
pays off all claims and the model ends. The authors assume that, given the opportunity, 
the firm tends to make the project risky and it is socially inefficient in doing so. They 
claim that (i) the transfer of risk leads to inadequate monitoring of safer loans and 
exorbitant monitoring of riskier loans; (ii) if the cost of a bank’s equity capital increases, 
the effect mentioned above is aggravated; (iii) banks typically choose loan sales rather 
than CDSs to unload credit risk for riskier loans; (iv) credit default swaps dominate 
loan sales as a tool to lay off risk for safer loans considering reputation and repeated 
lending. 
 
Roberts and Whited (2011) demonstrate methods for addressing the endogeneity 
problem in empirical corporate finance. They claim that endogeneity is the most 
important matter that should be considered before corporate finance studies. Broadly 
speaking, endogeneity is a correlation between exogenous variables and the error term. 
Omitted variables, simultaneity and measurement error are causes for endogeneity. 
Roberts and Whited introduce three methods to solve endogeneity: instrumental 
variables, regression discontinuity design, and difference-in-difference estimators. 
They argue that instruments should satisfy two requirements. One is a relevance 
18 
 
requirement that the instrument be partially correlated to the endogenous variable. The 
other is an exclusion requirement requiring the covariance of the instrument and the 
dependent variable to be zero. The method uses instruments to estimate a two-stage 
least squares. First, use all other explanatory variables and instruments to estimate the 
predicted value of the endogenous variable. Then, use the predicted value to replace the 
endogenous variable in the regression and carry out a formal OLS. They note that 
difference-in-difference estimators are normally employed to investigate the treatment 
effects. To study the effect of sudden policy or environment changes, there are two ways 
that either compare the difference between before and after inception or the difference 
of ex post outcomes between control and treatment groups. These differences 
complement one another. The comparison of cross-section avoids probable omitted 
trends while the comparison of time series avoids potential divergence between groups. 
In order to compare cross-sectional differences, we need to find that the counterparty 
has similar characteristics. They also present the means, propensity score matching, to 
find a matched sample. 
 
2.2 The literature on debt pricing and bond markets 
 
Yield spread is defined as the difference between a rate of return on a security and a 
benchmark rate. The benchmark rate used depends on the purpose of the research. The 
normal benchmark rate is the Treasury yield rate with the same maturity since Treasury 
bonds are liquid and essentially risk-free. The yield spread measures risks of holding 
an individual security compared to the same maturity Treasury. Large spread means 
high risk. The risks considered here are various, including credit risk, liquidity risk, 
event risk and option risk. However, the main risks are the first two: credit risk and 
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liquidity risk. Credit risk contains the information of default frequency and recovery 
rate that are essential to investors, so it attracts especial concern. Elton et al. (2001) 
show that the yield spread can be explained by expected default loss, tax premium and 
risk premium. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) suggest that the changes of the yield spread 
are dependent upon the variation in state variables.  Huang and Huang (2012) find that 
only 30% of the yield spread can be explained as a compensation for the credit risk of 
corporate bonds. This implies that the remaining yield spread is largely due to liquidity 
risk. 
 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) try to find elements affecting changes of 
the credit spread between corporate and Treasury bonds. They use dealers’ quotes of 
straight industrial bonds to obtain transaction prices. Callable and puttable bonds are 
excluded from their sample. Data are monthly and the sample period is from July 1988 
to December 1997. They suppose that credit spread comes from two fundamental 
factors: the existence of default risk, and in the event of default, creditors only receive 
a recovered amount that accounts for a small proportion of the completed payments. 
Consequently, they try to explain changes in the credit spread by proxy for either 
changes of the default probability in future time or changes of the recovery rate. Theory 
for bonds suggests that credit risk contains spot rate changes risk, yield curve slope 
changes risk, leverage changes risk, volatility changes risk and business climate 
changes risk. Thus, they construct a structural model to investigate whether changes of 
theoretical determinants can explain variations of credit spreads. Their first finding is 
that theoretical factors only account for 25% of credit spread changes. Secondly, 
residuals from their regressions display high cross-correlation. Through analysis of 
principal components, they find that these residuals arise mainly from a single common 
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factor. This means that if omitted explanatory variables existed, they would not be firm-
specific. However, the authors fail to find a set of variables to explain this common 
systematic factor, though several macroeconomic, financial and liquidity variables are 
tried. Their finding indicates that local supply or demand shocks give rise to the chief 
component in monthly changes of credit spread of corporate bonds. 
 
Elton et al. (2001) attempt to explain the yield spread between corporate and 
government bonds. The literature suggests that the difference of return rates for risk and 
risk-free bonds comes from three strands: expected default loss (determined by default 
frequency and recovery rate), tax premium, and risk premium. Elton et al. estimate the 
sizes of these three components on corporate-Treasury yield spreads. Firstly, they 
assume investors are risk neutral and estimate the spot spreads between corporate and 
government bonds considering only expected default loss. To complement this task, 
they need to estimate marginal default probability and recovery rate. They use a 
function of rating to estimate recovery rate and two transition matrixes from S&P and 
Moody’s to estimate marginal default probability. Secondly, they re-estimate the spot 
spreads taking both the tax premium and the expected default loss into consideration. 
They show that the spot spreads are not sufficient to explain the corporate-government 
yield spreads considering only expected default loss and tax premium. Then, they 
investigate whether the unexplained spread is driven by risk premium. They verify that 
the risk premium largely explains the rest of the spread. They suppose that the risk 
premium is a compensation for systematic risks. The logic behind this is that returns of 
corporate bonds systematically vary with that of other assets whereas returns of 
Treasury bonds do not. Moreover, there is an interesting finding that tax premium has 




Huang and Huang (2012) investigate how much the size of Corporate-Treasury spread 
can be attributed to credit risk. They exploit a structural approach, based on the option 
pricing ideas of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). Their approach requires 
structure models to confront the observed historical data on equity risk premium as well 
as on bond defaults. A multitude of structure models considering stochastic interest rates, 
stationary leverage ratio, endogenous default and strategic default are employed. 
Moreover, they both introduce a model with jumps in firm value and time-varying 
premium for asset risk. They show that, within the structural models, the quantitative 
degree of credit spread can reach a strong consensus if each model is first calibrated to 
equity risk premium and historical default loss. Specifically, they find that credit risk 
can only explain a small portion of the spread for highly rated bonds of all maturities. 
However, they find that the credit component in the yield spread is fairly large for junk 
bonds. They argue that structural models have little explanation on yield spreads of high 
quality bonds if the models are calibrated to equity risk premium and historical default 
loss. The first implication of their work is that a new structural model is needed if there 
are model misspecifications. The second is that illiquidity, tax premium, and risk 
premium play a big role in yield spreads on investment-grade bonds. Furthermore, they 
do not find a correlation between bond defaults and business cycles. 
 
Bao, Pan and Wang (2011) study the illiquidity of corporate bonds and its implications 
for asset pricing. After the financial crisis, a multitude of studies pay attention to an 
illiquidity problem in the US corporate bond market. They claim that, although 
illiquidity and credit risk both drive up corporate bond spreads, it is not clear which 
factor is dominant. Instead of using percent of trading day and quoted bid-ask spreads, 
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they construct a simple yet robust proxy (ϒ) for illiquidity. ϒ is defined as “the negative 
of the autocovariance in relative price changes”. The effect of illiquidity on corporate 
bond pricing is investigated either at the individual bond or aggregate level. They find 
that aggregate illiquidity is correlated with market risk as measured by Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Volatility Index and credit risk as captured by CDS index. Aggregate 
illiquidity doubled in 2007, tripled at the time of Bear Sterns collapsing and was five 
times when Lehman Brother defaulted. In addition, their results show that illiquidity 
dominates credit risk turning into the primary factor in explaining monthly changes of 
aggregate high-quality bond spreads. At individual bond level, a significant and positive 
relationship between bond illiquidity and yield spread is found after controlling for 
credit risk as proxied by CDS spreads. In sum, they argue that illiquidity is substantial 
in corporate bonds and more than the explanation of bid-ask spreads of bonds. 
Furthermore, they also suggest that the age, maturity and trade size of bond are 
correlated with its illiquidity and the illiquidity will become stronger after price 
decrease. 
 
Using information from CDS markets, Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) examine the 
components of yield spread on corporate bonds. How much of corporate yield spreads 
arise from default risk and non-default factors, such as taxes and illiquidity, is an 
important issue for both investment and corporate finance perspectives. Although a 
number of studies try to address this issue, most are limited by having only bond data. 
Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis extract information from CDS spread to measure default 
risk. They claim that credit derivatives offer researchers a near-perfect instrument to 
gauge the magnitude of a default component on corporate yield spreads. To measure 
the magnitude of a default component, they employ two approaches. One is using the 
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CDS spread directly to represent the default component. The other is using a reduced-
form model to calculate the magnitude of the default component. A series of riskless 
rates including swap curves, Refcorp, and Treasury are used to calculate corporate bond 
spreads. Through empirical tests, they find that most of the corporate bond spread is 
accounted for by a default component. This finding is across all credit ratings. 
Specifically, using Treasury as the riskless rate, the default component explains “51% 
of the spread of AAA and AA bonds, 56% for A-rated bonds, 71% for BBB-rated bonds, 
and 83% for BB-rated bonds”. Nevertheless, they also find the effect of non-default 
factors on corporate bond spreads. The non-defaulted component is highly related to 
gauges of bond-special and market illiquidity. Moreover, it is time varying.  
 
In contrast with stocks or Treasuries, corporate bonds normally face liquidity problems. 
Thus, prices of corporate bonds reflect not only credit risk but also liquidity risk. 
Correspondingly, credit and liquidity premium compose the yield spread between 
corporate and Treasury bonds. With the emergence of credit default swaps, a number of 
researchers use CDS spread as a perfect representation of credit risk to study the 
liquidity component of yield spreads of corporate bonds. However, whether this method 
is appropriate depends on CDS liquidity and its impact on CDS spread. Chen, Fabozzi 
and Sverslove (2010) investigate the liquidity of corporate credit default swaps and its 
implications for yield spreads of corporate bond. They first analyze the bid-ask spreads 
in credit default swaps and find that these spreads are wide for many CDS quotes. The 
bid-ask spread on average is 30 percent of middle prices of ask and bid. Secondly, they 
study the dynamics of credit and liquidity factors. A two-factor affine model is 
employed to estimate liquidity premium in CDS spread. They find that the liquidity 
factor is both statistically and economically significant. The bid-ask spreads can be 
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largely explained by the premium of liquidity risk. In addition, they argue that the 
premium of liquidity risk in CDS quotes is not correlated with credit risk though 
liquidity is. Furthermore, their simulations imply that a small premium for CDS 
liquidity can raise a huge liquidity discount in the prices of bonds. After considering 
liquidity in their model, they find no significant difference between CDS spreads and 
yield spreads of bonds. 
 
Greenwood and Hanson (2013) investigate the relationship between issuer quality and 
returns of corporate bonds. In most studies relating to credit cycles, variations of credit 
quantities are mostly explained by changes of bank capital and borrowers’ net worth. 
However, Greenwood and Hanson (2013) argue that the allocation and quantity of 
credit largely depend on time-varying tastes or beliefs of investors. In their research, 
historical data over eighty years are employed. They make a link between corporate 
bond financing and time-series change in credit risk pricing. The basic idea is that 
financial costs for high-risk firms are disproportionately affected by broad variations in 
pricing credit risk. Consequently, the bond issuance of high-risk firms is probably useful 
to measure financing conditions. Specifically, they claim that changes in bond issuer 
quality may be effective for forecasting excess corporate bond returns. To test the 
hypothesis, they construct time-series gauges of bond issuer quality. The first gauge 
compares the expected default frequency of firms with high bond issuance to that of 
firms with low bond issuance. The second gauge computes the proportion of issuance 
of speculative bonds. Their empirical work shows that the average issuer quality 
decreases when the quantity of aggregate credit grows. Then, they employ these issuer 
quality gauges to forecast corporate bond excess returns. They discover that Treasury 
bonds perform better than corporate bonds when issuers have poor quality. The 
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magnitude of return predictability is large in either economic or statistical terms. 
Moreover, they also find that the forecasting power of issuer quality for excess bond 
return is incremental above that of macro variables and even the aggregate bonds 
issuance. 
 
He, Qian and Strahan (2012) investigate whether investors will charge more if MBSs 
are issued by big companies. They test the impact of issuer size on the yield spread 
(both ex ante and ex post price) of MBSs. Almost all MBS tranches originated from 
2000 to 2006 receiving at least one rating from Moody’s, Fitch or S&P are included in 
their sample. The sample is divided into AAA tranches and non-AAA tranches. Models 
are regressed without distinguishing issuer size at first. Next, the sample is split into 
AAA tranches issued by big companies, AAA tranches issued by small companies, non-
AAA tranches issued by big companies and non-AAA tranches issued by small 
companies. A big company was defined as top 10 in market share for the given year. 
They find that initial yield spread of MBS is positively related to issuer share in both 
AAA and non-AAA tranche samples. Moreover, the price of an MBS issued by a big 
company decreases more than that issued by a small one after origination in non-AAA 
tranches sample. An extra finding is that an MBS issued by a small company with only 
one rating is priced more than that with all three ratings from Moody’s, Fitch and S&P. 
This means that investors also consider the possibility of shopping for the best rating. 
 
Dass and Massa (2014) investigate how the variety of maturities offered by corporate 
bonds affects the investment choice of institutional investors. In the US corporate bond 
market, some firms provide their bonds with various maturities. For example, IBM 
offered 13 bonds with 12 maturities ranging from 1 to 89 years. Do investors treat firms 
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with various bond maturities, like IBM, differently? Moreover, does the variety of bond 
maturities have any impact on bond yields? Dass and Massa (2014) give the first 
empirical evidence. The data they use are from the first quarter of 1998 to the second 
quarter of 2007 on institutional holding of corporate bonds. The largest buyers of these 
corporate bonds are mutual funds and insurance companies. Dass and Massa (2014) 
argue that firms with various bond maturities are attractive to institutional creditors 
because the creditors can save the expense of collecting information. The pivotal insight 
is that several institutional creditors need to invest both short-term and long-term assets 
and the convenience of various bond maturities reduces the cost of information 
collection. They find that bonds weight and portfolio holdings of institutional creditor 
have a positive relationship with the maturity variety of a firm. This is especially true 
for larger institutional creditors. In addition, they discover that the demand of a fund 
for holding a firm’s bond is higher when its “sister funds” also hold bonds from the 
same firm. Afterward, Dass and Massa test whether a firm’s maturity variety affects its 
bond yields. The result shows that bond yields of firms with various bond maturities 
are lower than those of firms with similar characteristics. 
 
Griffin, Lowery and Saretto (2014) test the assumption that higher-reputation 
companies originate good securities. General knowledge suggests that underwriters 
with good reputation originate high-quality financial products. The insight here is that 
it is costly to build a good reputation, so underwriters would not sacrifice their long-
term benefits in exchange for maximizing their short-term profits. However, Griffin, 
Lowery and Saretto (2014) develop a model showing this suggestion might be wrong 
when considering complex securities. In their model, a two-period reputation is 
assumed. Underwriters have partial ability to control a security’s payoff in bad and good 
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financial states through selecting the quality of collateral and assets correlation. 
Investors find it hard to analyze the performance of assets in the financial state they 
cannot observe because the securities are complicated. Investors can only know a bad 
payoff when the bad state occurs whereas underwriters can know in both good and bad 
states. Their model suggests that good reputation increases the incentive of strategic 
underwriters to produce low-quality complex securities. Moreover, their model 
indicates that strategic underwriters would ceaselessly produce low-quality securities 
until a financial crisis. They use a large number of complex securities to verify their 
theoretical model. Complex securities include collateralized loan obligations, 
collateralized debt obligations, asset-backed securities, and mortgage-backed securities. 
The sample period is from January 2000 to December 2010. Empirical analysis shows 
that the performances of complex securities issued by higher-reputation companies are 
even worse than those issued by obscure companies. Furthermore, higher-reputation 
underwriters continually created poor securities before the financial crisis in 2008. 
 
2.3 The literature on corporate investment and financial constraints 
 
Exploration of the investment-cash flow sensitivity has continued over decades. Fazzari, 
Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) propose that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
can be used as a proxy for financial constraints. Employing dividend payout ratio as 
their criterion, they split their simple into financially constrained firms, possibly 
financial constrained firms and not financially constrained firms. They propose that 
retention practices give a useful indicator to identify which firms face external financial 
constraints. Their empirical results demonstrate that firms which pay low dividends (i.e. 
they may be facing financial constraints) depend heavily on their cash flows for 
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investment. The stronger the dependence, the heavier the constraints. The feasible 
explanation given by them is that it is hard to access either new debt or equity from 
external financing when a company faces financial constraints. As a result, internal 
funding (cash flow) is the only source for its investment and operation. Moreover, they 
argue that investment would be sensitive to the aggregate tax burden if external 
financing cannot perfectly substitute internal financing.  
 
Different thinking comes from Kaplan and Zingales (1997), who oppose using the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity as the proxy for financial constraints and challenge the 
findings of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). They analyze the subsample in 
Fazzari et al. (1988) including 49 firms with low dividend payouts. The subsample is 
again split into three groups that are firms likely constrained, firms possibly constrained 
and firms never constrained. However, the separation criterion they use is not based on 
retention practices but qualitative information from firms’ annual reports and 
quantitative data in firms’ financial notes. They find that, in the three groups, firms 
never constrained display the highest sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Their 
analysis shows that firms with high interest coverages and those always paying 
dividends (i.e. financially unconstrained firms) are more dependent on cash flow for 
investment than other firms in the sample. Thus, they argue that the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity ought not to decrease monotonically with the loosening of financial 
constraints. 
 
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) try to reconcile the different empirical findings from 
early studies. They suppose that negative cash flow observations may result in the more 
constrained firms displaying lower the investment-cash flow sensitivity; when a firm 
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faces financial distress, it becomes more radical in investment decision-making due to 
the desire to win money back. As a result, investment cannot respond to its cash flow. 
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) revisit the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) but 
exclude negative cash flow observations. The results after this modification are similar 
to those of Fazzari et al. (1988). They also replicate the work of Cleary (1999) without 
negative cash flow observations deriving the same conclusion. Moreover, they 
document a decline in the sensitivity of investment to cash flow during the period 1977-
1996, especially for more constrained firms. 
 
To shed light on the debate, Cleary, Povel, and Raith (2007) study the effect of internal 
funds on corporate investment via both theoretical and empirical approaches. Their 
model demonstrates a U-shaped relationship and the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
rests with the interaction between revenue and cost effects. When its cash flow 
decreases, a firm has an incentive to reduce investment since the cost of external 
financing is higher than that of internal financing (the cost effect). However, the firm 
may also consider increasing investment to improve cash flow (the revenue effect). The 
decisive factor is the marginal gain of investment at different cash flow levels. They 
argue that the revenue effect dominates the cost effect when a firm faces high default 
risks (negative cash flow) and vice versa. They expand their study to empirical analyses 
using real data. Two proxies of internal funds are employed to plot investment and they 
get the U-shaped chart. Their standard regression also shows that the function of 
investment on internal funds is quasi-convex. 
 
Guariglia (2008) argues that contradictory findings in empirical work are due to 
different indicators used to measure financial constraints. She employs a UK firms 
30 
 
panel including over twenty thousand individuals, 90 percent unlisted in the stock 
market. Following Bond et al. (2003) and Bloom et al. (2007), she uses an error-
correction model. With cash flow level/interest coverage ratio as a measure of internal 
financial constraints, her sample is split to three groups: negative cash flow/coverage 
ratio, medium cash flow/coverage ratio and high cash flow/coverage ratio. She claims 
that, with these measures, a U-shaped investment-cash flow curve arises. 
Correspondingly, she divides the sample into small/young, medium/middle-aged and 
large/old groups according to firms’ sizes/ages. Her results indicate that the relation 
between cash flow and investment is positive and convex under this classification. 
 
Besides Kaplan and Zingales (1997), the other challenge Fazzari, Hubbard, and 
Petersen (1988) face is from Chen and Chen (2012), who argue that the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow is disappearing. To display this trend, they analyze US data 
with a long sample period, from 1967 to 2006. According to product category, they 
group firms into 3 subsamples: durable goods industry, non-durable goods industry and 
high-tech industry. For each subsample, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is 
estimated every 5 consecutive years, displaying declining trends in that. Their cross-
sectional regression shows that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is 0.33 in 1967 but 
0.02 in 2006. They claim that the investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good 
indicator for financial constraints since capital imperfection is still outstanding. This 
conclusion is challenged two years later by Lewellen and Lewellen (2014). Using 
different measure of cash flow, they find that the investment-cash flow sensitivity not 
only exists but also is significant. 
 
Early papers use static models to estimate investment while Gatchev et al. (2010) note 
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that the nature of financial decisions is intertemporal. For example, investment this year 
is determined by both cash flow this year and investment last year. When cash flow 
shortfall comes, firms may not definitely cut down their investments but use external 
financing to continue investing because adjusting investment plan is highly costly. As 
a result, using a static model may lead to biased coefficient estimations. They 
investigate numerous financial decision variables: capital expenditures, acquisitions, 
asset sales, equity issues, change in long-term debt, change in short term debt, change 
in cash ﬂow, etc. Their results indicate that most financial decision variables are 
significantly related across time. Thus, lagged dependent variable should be included 
in the specification. In addition, they find that there exist interdependent effects within 
these decision variables. 
 
2.4 The literature on dividend policy and the signaling role of 
dividends 
 
The information asymmetry between a firm’s management and outside shareholders 
makes dividend payment a necessary device to signal firms’ prospects. As a costly 
signal, the disclosure of dividends accompanying other disclosures helps to enhance 
firms’ information environments. Thus, many theoretical papers suggest that firms with 
severer information asymmetries are more likely to pay and increase dividends to avoid 
concerns about their outlooks. However, little empirical evidence is found to support 
this prediction for US quoted firms. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Huddart and Ke 
(2007) explain this inconsistency by inadequate changes across US quoted firms in the 
information environment. Based on the idea that extents of information asymmetries 
are more diverse for ADR firms that are non-US firms but cross listed on the US markets, 
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Aggarwal et al. (2012) examine the role of information environment in affecting 
dividend changes, using ADR firms’ data. To measure the differences in information 
asymmetries, they employ three proxies: institutional following, trading volume and 
analyst following. They find that ADR firms under impoverished information 
environments more easily use dividend increase as a signal of a bright future for 
outsiders and the increased amounts are large. They simultaneously analyze the 
informativeness of dividend changes in forecasting prospective earning changes, 
finding that dividend changes can predict variations of future earnings but only for ADR 
firms in sparse information environments. Lastly, they extend their research to the 
relationship between dividend initiation and information environment but fail to find 
sufficient evidence in this case. This is in accordance with Bulan et al. (2007) and 
Grullon et al. (2002) that dividend initiation denotes approaching maturity rather than 
being a signal for prospects. The main contribution of their paper is to support the theory 
that the signal role of dividend increase is important and does exist. 
 
Deangelo et al. (2008) suppose that firms use dividends to relieve outsiders’ doubts that 
managers will overinvest, destroying free cash flows and firm values. This arises from 
information asymmetry and firms’ incentives for paying and increasing dividends vary 
with its severity. Then, if there are shocks that change information environments, firms’ 
dividend policies can also be affected. Hail et al. (2014) investigate the relationship 
between information shocks and corporate dividend policy. Two national-level events 
are viewed as driving forces that improve the environment of information. One is the 
global coercive enforcement of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
around 2005. The other is the prosecution of insider trading laws by a series of countries 
after 1990. Several papers show that both these events allow analysts more easily to 
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forecast corporate performances and improve the quality of financial reports (e.g., 
Bushman et al., 2005, Landsman et al., 2012, Jayaraman, 2012). Hail et al. (2014) find 
that after a country requires firms to adopt IFRS, firms in that country are less likely to 
pay or increase their dividend payouts but are inclined to reduce or terminate them. A 
similar outcome is observed using the initiation of insider trading laws as the trigger 
event. In addition, they study the variation of market response facing dividend 
disclosures after two events. Using the sum of stock returns on days before, on and after 
dividend disclosure as the dependent variable, they show that, after improvement of 
information environments, stock markets respond less to dividend announcements than 
previously. Finally, they discover that the decrease of dividend payouts after two events 
are more pronounced for firms in code law nations, firms with large management 
shareholdings and firms used to finance projects by external funds. This is in 
accordance with firms under these conditions exhibiting greater free cash flow agency 
costs. 
 
A state shareholder is distinctive among investors and can affect corporate governance 
on several dimensions. First, firms with large government holdings are viewed as 
inefficient, non-transparent and value-destroying and contribute a higher level of 
information asymmetries. Secondly, the management of a state-controlled firm may not 
only be interested in maximizing the firm’s value but also in political targets. 
Specifically, there are two opposite possibilities when considering how state ownership 
affects dividend payouts. The substitute theory of dividends suggests that firms 
suffering severer information asymmetries (here firms with partial government 
ownership) are likely to pay and increase dividends. Additionally, the pecking order 
theory (e.g., Myers, 1984; Verrecchia, 2001) suggests that firms facing higher agency 
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costs have fewer investment opportunities and, thus, do not need to retain so much free 
cash flows, which can be paid as dividends. Furthermore, firms partially-owned by a 
state depend less on internal cash flows because they can more easily obtain external 
financing (e.g., Chahrumilind et al., 2006; Chaney et al., 2011) and the life-cycle theory 
implies that such firms have higher propensity to disgorge cash (e.g., Fama and French, 
2001; Grullon et al., 2002; DeAngelo et al., 2006). On the other hand, the outcome 
theory indicates that firms that lack monitoring and are poorly-governed, making it hard 
for outside shareholders to force profit distributions. Ben-Nasr (2015) studies the 
impact of government ownership on a firm’s dividend policy using global data. He 
identifies a firm as partially-held by the state if the government accounts for more than 
10 percent of its total shares and finds that state ownership decreases a firm’s dividend 
payout. This is supporting evidence for the outcome theory that firms with higher 
agency costs are less likely to pay or increase dividends. He expands the study to 
situations in which the negative relation between state ownership and dividend payout 
is more pronounced, showing that the negative relation is more significant for firms in 
countries with low investor protection and fewer political constraints. This again 
supports the outcome theory. 
 
The literature suggests that accounting conservatism is negatively-related to corporate 
distribution. However, most research concentrates on a mechanism whereby 
conservatism reduces firms’ earnings and retained earnings. The information 
asymmetry between shareholders and creditors creates the need to limit dividend 
payments. Normally, a limitation will emerge in the form of debt covenants that make 
dividend payouts conditional on the amounts of firms’ earnings or retained earnings. As 
a result, conservative accounting reduces dividend payouts by restricting incomes. 
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However, Louis and Urcan (2015) claim that the role of accounting conservatism in 
reducing dividend payouts far transcends the argument of covenant restriction. Agency 
theory indicates that a purpose of dividends is to mitigate the concern that managers 
might over-invest free cash flows for making their “empires”. If accounting 
conservatism can reduce this concern, it is rational that firms pay out less in dividends. 
According to Watts (2003), conservatism leads to sufficient ex ante project estimation 
and effective ex post project monitoring that alleviates the insider-outsider agency 
problem. Moreover, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) show that the incentive of taking a 
risky project is decreased under conservatism. Louis and Urcan (2015) find that 
accounting conservatism reduces corporate dividend payouts even after controlling for 
the covenant restriction effect. In other words, the negative relationship is due to the 
reduced agency problem rather than restricted earnings. In addition, they find that this 
negative relationship is more pronounced for firms with greater free cash flows, firms 
lacking lender monitoring, firms with bad credits and non-family firms. Their paper 
contributes to the literature in three strands. First, accounting conservatism is an 
important determinant of dividend payouts. Secondly, accounting conservatism can be 
used as a substitute for costly dividend payments for reducing information asymmetries. 
Finally, conservatism not only alleviates the agency problem between shareholders and 
creditors but also the agency problem between shareholders and managers. 
 
Cumulative studies show that dividend payouts are determined by corporate 
governance, national legal regime and a series of firm-specific variables, such as 
leverage, sale-growth, earning, Tobin’s q and cash holdings. However, empirical 
findings are contradictory when using data from different countries even after taking 
these ingredients into consideration. According to La Porta et al. (2000), firms in those 
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countries with better investor protections are inclined to pay and increase dividends 
because minority shareholders can effectively use legal rights to force corporate 
distributions. In contrast, Ferris at al. (2009) find that firms in civil law countries, which 
lack investor protections pay more dividends as substitute for legal guarantee. A fierce 
debate between supporters of the outcome theory and the substitute theory leads Bae at 
al. (2012) to the idea that dividend policy may relate to different national cultures 
around the world. They claim that culture can affect dividend policy in several ways. 
For example, managers in a country under an aggressive culture more likely behave 
overconfidently and engage in value destroying projects that worsen the agency 
problem. Moreover, they argue that culture determines the financial flexibility of a 
nation and this flexibility is one of the most important factors when firms make dividend 
decisions. Bae at al. (2012) investigate how culture influences dividend policy and the 
impact of corporate governance on this association. Hofstede (1980) claims that culture 
is a gathering of public faith, behavior rules, common values and moral norms for 
society. Bae at al. (2012) use the extent of masculinity, uncertainty tolerance and long-
term orientation as three proxies for culture. They find that firms pay lower dividends 
under the cultures of masculinity, uncertainty averseness and long-term thinking. 
Additionally, they reveal that the negative relation between culture and dividend 
payouts varies with corporate governance. In countries where governances are weaker, 
as measured by the index proposed by Atanassov and Kim (2009), the effect of culture 
on dividend payouts is more significant. 
 
Rommens et al. (2012) study dividend payments of privately held firms using Belgian 
data. In Belgium, privately held firms account for the vast majority of all firms and 
most of them have financial statements in the public domain. These conditions make 
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Belgium a perfect nation to explore the difference in dividend policies between 
privately held firms and public firms. Rommens et al. find that privately held firms in 
Belgium are less likely to pay dividends. They explain this in two ways. Managers in 
privately held firms always own large share positions and other investors are closely 
related to insiders. As a result, the information asymmetry between managers and 
outsiders is smaller for privately held firms, contributing to weak incentive for using 
dividends as a positive signal for future earnings or a commitment not to destroy free 
cash flows. Secondly, dividends are costly for firms from the perspective of taxation 
because they are taxed twice both at the firm level and the investor level in many 
countries. For privately held firms where most investors are managers, it is more 
profitable to pay shareholders tax-exempt bonuses rather than taxable dividend 
payments. They next focus their attention on whether dividend policies of stand-alone 
firms are dissimilar to those of group firms. In Belgium, dividends from subsidiaries to 
holding firms within the same group are not taxed by the government and so group 
firms are more likely to pay and increase dividends than stand-alone firms. Moreover, 
dividends can serve as internal financing within one group, leading to high frequency. 
Empirical findings from Rommens et al. (2012) support these arguments. Lastly, they 
find that group firms with outside minority investors are more willing to make dividend 
payments. This is consistent with the substitute theory of dividend that firms with high 
agency costs pay more dividends. 
 
Besides dividend payments, stock repurchase is the other important distribution form 
in cash disbursement. In the United States, stock repurchases became increasingly 
popular during the period 1980 to 2000 and overwhelmed dividends as the first way of 
corporate payout in the beginning of the 21st century (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). 
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According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), stock repurchases and dividends are 
substitutes for each other if there is a perfect capital market. Of course, market frictions 
exist in reality and the differential tax burdens on stock repurchases and dividends affect 
this substitution. The tax rate on dividends is historically higher than that on stock 
repurchases in America. In contrast, dividends in Australia generate imputation tax 
credits making them not tax-disadvantaged and this tax environment allows testing of 
the substitution hypothesis between stock repurchases and dividends. Brown et al. 
(2015) find that changes in dividends are negatively related to on-market repurchase 
yields. In other words, firms in Australia use the cash originally paid as dividends to 
increase on-market stock repurchase and the substituted relation holds well. The 
relationship between dividend variations and off-market repurchase yields are positive 
and significant. This implies that firms make more off-market stock repurchases when 
increasing dividends at the same time. They explain this inconformity by different tax 
executions in Australia towards on-market and off-market stock repurchase activities. 
On-market repurchases are taxed similarly with capital gains while off-market 
repurchases carry imputation tax credits the same as for dividends. Therefore, dividends 
are substitutes to on-market stock repurchases but complementary to off-market stock 
repurchases. Lastly, they add on-market and off-market repurchases and study the 
association between dividends and aggregate repurchases. 
 
Jiraporn et al. (2011) investigate the effect of corporate governance on firms’ dividend 
payments. They use ISS reports to capture qualities of governance on various 
dimensions. ISS includes broad governance measures, which consist of 62 specific 
standards on 8 different respects. These standards cover director education, 
management ownership, executive salary, broad composition, audit status, takeover 
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defense, bylaws and other governance considerations. Jiraporn et al. use two proxies to 
scale the overall property of corporate governance for a firm. First, they create a 
composite index in which firms obtain one point when they satisfy a governance 
standard. The alternative is the ISS computed score that takes every governance 
standard into account. They find that firms with higher quality of corporate governance 
are more likely to pay dividends and the payments are much greater. Their robustness 
test, which employs two-stage least square estimation, shows that the positive relation 
is not derived from the causality of dividends to governance. They separately study the 
relationship between dividends and each governance aspect. Their results show that 
management ownership and executive salary are positively related to dividend payouts 
while takeover defense and bylaws are negatively associated. They discover that 
director education has little influence on corporate cash distributions. They also explore 
the impact of agency conflict on dividend-governance association and find that firms 
with severer information asymmetries have higher sensitivity of dividend payouts to 
corporate governance. They show that governance affects dividend payments for both 
regulated firms and non-regulated firms but the effect is more pronounced for the latter. 
They extend their research to investigate whether the governance effect varies with 
change of tax legislation but their analysis fails to support the argument that highly 
governed firms pay more dividends after a tax cut. 
 
In recent years, firms have become accustomed to using stock repurchases to substitute 
for dividends as cash payouts. However, this substitution is affected by agency conflicts 
in the economy and existent literature suggests that employee stock options do matter. 
Kahle (2002) supposes that employee stock options affect corporate distribution on two 
dimensions. One is the ‘managerial wealth hypothesis’ that managers are partial to stock 
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repurchases since dividends reduce the value of employee options. Without dividend 
protected policy, the exercise price of an option does not change while the stock price 
is decreased ex-dividend. The other is the ‘option funding hypothesis’ that managers 
prefer stock repurchases because they can offset new stock issues resulting from option 
exercise. Since most employee options in Taiwan are dividend protected, Wu et al. 
(2008) argue that this policy setting offers a useful environment to test the ‘managerial 
wealth hypothesis’. They show that neither overall employee options nor particular 
executive options significantly affect firms’ stock repurchases. Then, they split their 
sample into two: ‘exercisable’ and ‘un-exercisable’. They find that only exercisable 
executive options are positively related to stock repurchases in favor of both the 
‘managerial wealth hypothesis’ and the ‘option funding hypothesis’. Additionally, they 
demonstrate that the adverse impact of employee options on dividend payouts is 
ambiguous when using Taiwanese data. They attribute this to the dividend protection 
of employee options that adjusts the exercise price. They test the signaling hypothesis 
of stock repurchase in Taiwan and discover that stock repurchases are used as a positive 
signal for future earnings only in the period before the emergence of employee options. 
After 2001, the time of the first employee option issue in Taiwan, the purpose of stock 
repurchases becomes to fund option exercises to avoid the EPS (earnings per share) 
being diluted. 
 
Agency theory suggests that investor protection and corporate governance affect firms’ 
cash distributions. Managers in civil law countries or with fewer constraints are less 
likely to pay dividends. Thus, what could investors expect if they confront this situation? 
He (2012) argues that competition in the product market is an efficient way to substitute 
investor protection and corporate governance. Japan, a nation with a high percentage of 
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group firms, is considered as facing a serious agency problem and provides an ideal 
setting to test the function of the market competition mechanism. He (2012) finds that 
firms in a highly competitive market disgorge more cash than their counterparties. 
Moreover, his results show that firms facing tough competition are more willing to 
increase dividends while their incentive for omitting dividends is lower. He claims that 
market competition makes overinvesting risker and more easily observed and so 
reduces managers’ willingness to proceed with negative net present value projects. 
However, this potency is weaker in the period of Japan’s great recession. He next 
expands his study to the impact of market competition on the association between 
ownership concentration and dividend payouts. He discovers that the negative effect of 
concentration on dividends is less pronounced when there is market competition. This 
supports the hypothesis that market competition has the role of investor 
protection/corporate governance. In Japan, a considerable proportion of firms are 
affiliated with Keiretsu. On one hand, investors of Keiretsu firms are always group 
members, leading to convenient supervision and more dividend payments. On the other 
hand, group affiliation engages management to dominate firms totally, giving rise to 
weak minority shareholder protection and fewer cash disbursements. He (2012) shows 
that the influence of Keiretsu membership on dividend payment is mixed and 
ambiguous. 
 
Fama and French (2000) study the issue of profitability and earnings forecasting. 
Although new technologies sometimes offer supernormal profitability in a particular 
industry, mimics will rapidly draw that down afterwards. Thus, it comes an argument 
that profitability is mean-reverting and to some extent can be predicted. Fama and 
French claim that prior evidence about this argument is insufficiently convincing. They 
42 
 
use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach to forecast firms’ earnings and profitability. 
This estimates results year-by-year using cross-sectional data and then calculates 
average slopes and time-series standard errors of them. They note that the approach is 
helpful in making use of large samples and allows residual cross-correlation. Their 
model shows that profitability is mean-reverting at almost 38 percent per year. 
Moreover, they find that the reversion is much stronger during the time profitability is 
far away from the mean, in both directions. Simultaneously, they find that earnings 
changes are mean-reverting as well, while positive changes reverse more weakly than 
negative changes. Finally, they indicate that the reason earnings can be forecast is 




















How do credit default swaps affect the yield spread 




Since the financial crisis that began in 2007, particular attention has been paid to credit 
derivatives, especially credit default swaps (CDSs). Stulz (2010) notes that the CDS 
market in the United States was largely developed during the previous ten years. 
According to the Bank for International Settlements, the CDS market in the United 
States increased dramatically from $6.4 trillion in 2004 to $58.24 trillion in 2007 then 
decreased to $12.29 trillion by the end of 2015 (www.bis.org). With this size volatility 
comes a need to understand the effect of CDS use on financial systems. Supporters 
claim that CDSs help creditors to lay off their risks and improve the efficiency of 
financial systems. For example, Greenspan (2004) concludes that credit derivatives 
contribute to a more efficient, resilient, and flexible financial system. Conversely, 
opponents argue that CDSs were partially responsible for the financial crisis. Indeed, 
even before the crisis, Partnoy and Skeel (2006) associated credit derivatives with the 
systemic risk of market collapse. 
 
On the other hand, a large number of studies examine the effect of CDS from a corporate 
finance perspective. Ashcraft and Santos (2009) investigate the effect of CDS trading 
on corporate debt costs. However, they do not find strong evidence that CDSs impact 
the cost of corporate debt on average. Saretto and Tookes (2013) show that, after the 
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onset of CDS trading, firms have higher leverage ratios and longer debt maturities. 
Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) argue that CDSs increase the credit risk of reference firms 
and creditors are inclined to push a distressed firm into bankruptcy after CDS trading. 
In this chapter, we investigate both theoretically and empirically the impact of CDSs 
on the yield spread between corporate and Treasury bonds following the introduction 
of CDS trading, discovering how these differ for firms with good or bad credits at bond 
issue times. 
 
Why might the CDS market affect the yield spread between Treasury and corporate 
bonds? One mechanism generally assumed is that the CDS market permits capital 
lenders to lay off their credit risks, influencing the pricing of credit risk. There are both 
negative and positive routes for CDSs to impact the yield spread. A negative effect 
arises from the new hedging opportunity created by CDSs. With the introduction of 
CDS trading, investors can hedge against the default risks of reference firms, so 
corresponding risk premiums are erased. Thus, firms for which there is CDS trading are 
expected to have easier access to funding and can enjoy shrinkages of the yield spread. 
Positive effects arise in two ways. One is that CDSs generate the empty creditor 
problem. Creditors owning CDSs are insured against default but still have voting rights 
in the event of debt renegotiation making them “empty creditors” (Hu and Black, 2008). 
The separation of legal right and risk exposure changes the payoffs of creditors during 
financial distress. Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model this and predict that creditors with 
CDSs may be unwilling to agree to restructure the debt, even when it is efficient to do 
so, since they have an incentive to over-insure such that a large CDS position gives 
them more money in the event of default. The other is reduced incentive for banks to 
monitor borrowers. Parlour and Winton (2013) suggest that banks have reduced 
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incentive to monitor borrowers if they can lay off their risk through buying credit 
default swaps. Both the empty creditor problem and reduced monitoring from banks 
would affect the risk of reference firms, leading to the yield spread increases after the 
onset of CDS trading. 
 
In summary, once CDS trading becomes available, debt holders may require a lower 
return than previously from a corporate bond (because the CDS market creates a 
hedging opportunity) but, conversely, could require a higher return (due to changed 
credit quality of a reference firm). This means we cannot estimate directly the effect of 
CDSs on the yield spread without somehow distinguishing between the two directions. 
For this, we make use of the negative and positive effects performing differently under 
different conditions. To give us direction in our empirical investigation, we first develop 
a theoretical model of the yield spreads before and after the emergence of CDS trading. 
With this we show that the overall CDS effect should depend on a firm’s credit when it 
issues bonds, leaving us to determine empirically whether the CDS effect varies with 
firms’ credits. We find that the negative effect dominates the positive when firms issue 
bonds in their good credit periods but the positive effect dominates the negative during 
their bad credit periods. A rationale for this is that, during a good credit period, investors 
will pay a higher issue price for the bond because of the hedging opportunity provided 
by CDS trading but, during a bad credit period, investors pay a lower price because of 
the empty creditor problem and CDS trading results in a lack of monitoring. Punishment 
of the empty creditor problem is severer during times of credit deterioration, and the 
loss due to reduced monitoring is larger when a loan is in danger. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents theoretical proofs 
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for how the CDS availability affects the yield spread through the negative and positive 
channels. Section 3.3 describes data and gives the empirical specifications. Section 3.4 
presents empirical results and analysis of the effect of CDS on the yield spread between 
corporate and Treasury bonds. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Framework 
 
We next develop a theoretical structure to indicate how to approach an empirical 
investigation. We consider two scenarios: before the emergence of a CDS market and 
after the emergence, with the possibility of CDS trading. Before CDS trading, 
individuals can invest in two assets, a Treasury bond (risk-free) and a corporate bond. 
Use W to denote initial wealth, rf for the risk-free rate, r for the interest rate of the 
corporate bond, p for the probability of default, l to denote the loss rate of initial wealth 
when a default event happens and U(x) for investors’ utility function. If investors are 
risk averse, U’(x)>0 and U’’(x)<0, and if they are indifferent between these two assets 
then for expected utility we have 
 
              U[W(1+rf)] = pU[W(1+r-l)] + (1-p)U[W(1+r)].  (3.1) 
 
Taking a second order Taylor approximation of the right-hand side of equation (3.1) 
around W(1+rf) gives 
          
   p{U[W(1+rf)]+U’[W(1+rf)][W(r-rf-l)]+(1/2)U’’[W(1+rf)][W(r-rf-l)]2} + 
    (1-p){U[W(1+rf)]+U’[W(1+rf)][W(r-rf)]+(1/2)U’’[W(1+rf)][W(r-rf)]2}.  (3.2) 
 





           pU’’[W(1+rf)]W2(r-rf)l+(1/2)pU’’[W(1+rf)](Wl)2 = 0.  (3.3) 
                                       
Using s to denote r-rf, u’ to denote U’[W(1+rf)] and u’’ to denote U’’[W(1+rf)], we can 
simplify (3.3) to 
 
           (1/2)(u’’W2)s2+(u’W-u’’pW2l)s+(1/2)u’’p(Wl)2-u’pWl = 0.  (3.4) 
 
Solving equation (3.4), we find 
 
              r-rf = s = pl + (-u’/u’’W){1±[1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(p2-p)]1/2}. 
 
1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(p2-p)>0, when 0<p<1 is assumed here. Clearly, lim
𝑝→0
𝑆 = 0 and lim
𝑝→1
𝑆 = 
l should hold, so  
                r = rf + pl + (-u’/u’’W){1-[1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(p2-p)]1/2}.  (3.5) 
 
Since, u’ >0, u’’<0 and 0<p<1, the last term (-u’/u’’W){1-[1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(p2-p)]1/2}>0. 
 
Now a CDS market emerges. CDS sellers ask an insurance price, f, per unit of wealth, 
W. Then the expected utility of a CDS seller is given by  
 
                 UCDS SELLER = pU[W(f-l)] + (1-p)U(Wf) .  (3.6) 
 
Take a Taylor approximation of the left-hand side of equation (3.6) around 0. Assume 
that the CDS seller is risk neutral. Thus, all derivatives of order 2 and higher are equal 
to zero. Since credit default swaps break the separation between those willing to hold 
risk and those with capital, it is rational to assume bond holders are risk averse but CDS 




        UCDS SELLER = p{U(0)+U’(0)[W(f-l)]}+(1-p)[U(0)+U’(0)(Wf)].  (3.7) 
 
Assume there is a perfectly competitive CDS market. Thus, the profit approximates to 
0. That means that UCDS SELLER = U(0). As a result, we obtain  
 
                            P(f-l) + (1-p)f = 0  (3.8) 
                               and f = pl.  (3.9) 
 
Now, we may first assume (only for a moment) that there only exist the negative but 
not the positive route for CDS availability to affect the yield spread. Thus, once CDS 
trading becomes available, individuals can invest in either the risk-free Treasury bond 
or a portfolio consisting of investing in a corporate bond and buying a CDS. Comparing 
equations (3.5) and (3.9), we find that individuals could exercise an arbitrage strategy 
of selling a Treasury bond and buying a corporate bond with CDS protection. This 
strategy makes an excess return of (-u’/u’’W){1-[1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(p2-p)]1/2} without risk. 
With the increasing demand for the corporate bond, the r continuously reduces until it 
is equal to rf +pl. This is in accord with the theoretical equivalence derived by Duffie 
(1999) and the empirical findings of Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005). 
 
If the assumption of only the negative CDS effect were true, we would find a decrease 
in the yield spread after the onset of CDS trading. Moreover, to some extent, firms 
should enjoy greater decrease when they issue bonds during a bad credit period than 
during a good credit period. However, empirical results are not in accord with this 
viewpoint. Ashcraft and Santos (2009) find that safer firms benefit more than riskier 
firms from the development of CDS markets. Actually, Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) 
have verified that the probability of default increases after CDS trading. This means 
that the onset of CDS trading has a positive effect on risk, increasing the default 
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probability p. This proof implies that there is a trade-off for the yield spread between 
before and after CDS trading. The expected loss increases with the disappearance of (-
u’/u’’W){1-[1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(p2-p)]1/2}. 
 
Using rB to denote the interest rate of a corporate bond before CDS trading, rA to denote 
the interest rate of a corporate bond after CDS trading, pB to denote the default 
probability before CDS trading and pA to denote the default probability after CDS 
trading with the same fundamentals, we obtain  
 
rB = rf + pB*l + (-u’/u’’W){1-[1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(pB2-pB)]1/2}  (3.10) 
rA = rf + pA*l.  (3.11) 
 
Thus, the difference between rA and rB depends on the sum of (pA–pB)l and (u’/u’’W){1-
[1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(pB2-pB)]1/2}. Obviously, (pA–pB)l is bigger than 0 and (u’/u’’W){1-
[1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(pB2-pB)]1/2} is smaller than 0. In conclusion, the change in the spread 
is determined by the CDS effect on the probability of default when fundamentals do not 
change. 
 
Since concerns about the empty creditor problem and less bank monitoring are relevant 
to pre-event risk, we assume pA = F(pB)*pB. F(x) should have four important properties. 
First, F(x) should be bigger than 1 for 0<x<1. In other words, the risk with the same 
fundamentals increases after CDS trading. Secondly, lim
𝑥→0
𝐹(𝑥) should be equal to one. 
This means that the CDS effect on the probability of default is very small when pre-
event risk is small. Thirdly, F’(x) should be bigger than 0 for 0<x<1 and so higher initial 
risk induces a bigger CDS effect on risk. Fourthly, F(x) should be convex in the interval 




Make g(pB) = rA – rB = [F(pB)-1]pBl + (u’/u’’W){1-[1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(pB2-pB)]1/2}. Taking 
the derivative of g(pB) with respect to pB, we get 
 
g ’(pB)=F’(pB)pBl + [(F(pB)-1)l – 
(1/2)(u’’/u’)[1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(pB2-pB)]-1/2Wl2(2pB-1)]  (3.12) 
 
Also 
                    lim
𝑝𝐵→0
𝑔′(𝑝𝐵)=(1/2)(u’/u’’)Wl2<0  (3.13) 
and 
                  lim
𝑝𝐵→1/2
𝑔′(𝑝𝐵)=(1/2)F’(1/2)l+[(F(1/2)-1]l>0.  (3.14) 
 
Now, taking the second derivative of g(pB) with respect to pB, we get 
 
g ’’(pB)= F’’(pB)pBl+2F’(pB)l-(1/2)(u’’/u’)Wl2{(-1/2)[1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(pB2-pB)]-3/2   
            (u’’/u’)2W2l2(2pB-1)2+2[1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(pB2-pB)]-1/2}.  (3.15) 
 
Using T to denote [1+(u’’/u’)2W2l2(pB2-pB)] and A to denote (u’’/u’)2W2l2, we simplify 
equation (3.15) to 
 
   g ’’(pB)= F’’(pB)pBl+2F’(pB)l-(1/2)(u’’/u’)Wl2T-1/2{2-A(2pB-1)2/[2+2A(pB2-pB)]}. 
 
Equation (3.4) has solution and existing g’(x) in (0,1), A=(u’’/u’)2W2l2 should be 
smaller than 4. Thus, all the terms are bigger than 0 and always g’’(pB) > 0. 
 
Recalling (3.13) and (3.14), we find there exists and only exists one value (p0) in the 
interval (0,1/2) making g’(p0) = 0. So, in the interval (0, p0), g’(pB)<0 and in the interval 





𝑔(𝑝𝐵)=[F(1)-1]l>0, there exist and only exist one value (p*) in the interval (p0,1) 
making g(p*)=0.  
 
Consequently, when pB < p*, g(x) = rA – rB <0 and when pB > p*, g(x) = rA – rB >0. This 
means that the overall effect of CDS on the yield spread is determined by the trade-off 
of the negative effect and the positive effect of CDS. Thus, after the onset of CDS 
trading, when a firm issues bonds during a good credit period, it enjoys spreads 
shrinkage but when it issues bonds during a bad credit period, it sees expansion. 
 
For simplicity, we assume rf = 0.05, l = 0.2, U(x) = lnx and F(x) = 1.25x. The following 
figure is obtained. 
 










3.3 Empirical Specification and Data Description 
 
3.3.1 Empirical specification 
 
The goal of this chapter is to identify the effect of CDS use on the yield spread between 
corporate and Treasury bonds. Our theoretical framework shows how the overall CDS 
effect depends on a firm’s credit when it issues bonds, so we must determine empirically 
whether the CDS effect varies with firms’ credits. To do this, we create an interaction 
of CDS trading dummy and credit proxy. Afterwards, we separate good credit periods 
from bad credit periods by dividing the sample into subsamples. For investigating the 
negative impact, we split the data into 4 groups: good credit without CDS trading, good 
credit with CDS trading, no good credit without CDS trading and no good credit with 
CDS trading. Thus, we directly investigate the difference between group 2 and group 1, 
which is the benchmark. Similarly, for testing positive CDS impact, we split the sample 
into: bad credit without CDS trading, bad credit with CDS trading, no bad credit without 
CDS trading and no bad credit with CDS trading and compare the first two groups.  
 
To identify whether the CDS effect varies with firms’ credits, we apply the following 
model: 
 
Yield Spreadi,j,t = c + a1CDS Starti,t + a2CDS Starti,t × Credit Proxyi,t-1 + a3Ai,t-1 + a4Bj,t 
+ a5Ct +a6CDS Companyi + vi,j,t                                                          (3.16) 
 
The dependent variable is the yield spread, defined as the difference between returns of 
a corporate bond j at issue time t of the firm i and the Treasury with the same maturity 
as the bond. CDS Start i,t is a dummy variable equals 1 for bonds issued by a reference 
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firm i after the beginning date of the firm’s CDS trading, 0 otherwise. We employ two 
indicators as credit proxy. The first indicator is the leverage (total liability over total 
assets) of firm i in the quarter just before issuing t-1. Leverage is a widely used proxy 
to measure the debt burden faced by a firm. Firms with high leverage ratios are more 
likely to be involved in financial distress and fail to pay their debts. Therefore, high 
leverage level implies high credit risk. The second indicator is the number converted 
from the credit rating of firm i in the quarter just before issuing t-1 (AAA = 1, AAA- = 
1.33,…, C- = 9). The interaction of CDS Start i,t and Credit Proxyit-1 shows that how 
CDS effect varies with a firm’s credit information at issue. We include a CDS Company i 
dummy which equals 1 for CDS firms, 0 otherwise. This dummy is used to address the 
concern that CDS firms have time-invariant difference from non-CDS firms. 
  
Both theoretical and empirical studies suggest that yield spreads are mainly driven by 
credit risk, so it is necessary to control for factors affecting that. Ait-1 contains several 
variables to control credit risk in firm-specific level. These variables include Log Sales 
(natural log of the company’s sales) to control the general risk of firms. A firm’s sales 
reflect its ability in acquiring cash flow and repaying debt. Larger sales imply lower 
probability of failing to pay, so this variable should be negative with the yield spread. 
Leverage ratio (total liability over total assets) is included to control a firm’s debt risk. 
Higher leverage needs to be compensated with higher the yield spread. Thus, the 
variable Leverage positively relates to the dependent variable. A it-1 also includes 
Profitability (net income over sales) and Rating (the firm’s credit rating). Firms with 
high profitability are more likely to pay lower yield spreads. We employ firms’ credit 
ratings because rating agencies are seen as owning private information on firms. Senior 
rating firms have lower yield spreads than junior firms. The variable Rating is the 
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numbers linked to the firms’ credit ratings. The conversion is AAA = 1, AAA- = 1.33,…, 
C- = 9. In summary, we include Log Sales (natural log of the company’s sales), 
Leverage ratio (total liability over total assets), Profitability (net income over sales) and 
Rating (the firm’s credit rating) as firm-specific controls. Moreover, we use cash flow 
as an extra firm-specific control for robustness check.  
 
A set of variables for bond-specific characteristics B j,t is also taken into account in our 
model. These variables include Log Amount (natural log of the bond’s issue amount), 
Log Maturity (natural log of the bond’s maturity), and dummy variables to flag 
redeemable bonds (Redeemable), puttable bonds (Puttable), convertible bonds 
(Convertible) and bonds with some enhancement terms (Enhancement). If a bond is 
issued in large amount, that might induce high credit risk; conversely, it might be 
accompanied by the benefit of scale. Similarly, longer maturity bonds are often issued 
by good credit firms although longer maturity itself leads to high credit risk.  In other 
words, the relationships between these two variables and the yield spread are uncertain. 
Since the embedded option to redeem has a negative value for lenders, so the dummy 
Redeemable should be positively related to the dependent variable. Conversely, bonds 
with the embedded put option normally have lower yield spreads. Convertible bonds 
give lenders the right to convert bonds to stocks on specific days, so these bonds tend 
to have lower yield spreads. Bonds with enhancement terms should carry lower yield 
spreads since enhancement terms reduce the credit risk of firms. 
 
Our model further considers the impact of timing on the yield spread. A series of time 
dummies, Ct, (one for each quarter) are included in the specification. Several factors 
such as growth in the economy, monetary policy and risk preference of lenders vary 
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over time and impact on the yield spread. 
 
To separate the negative CDS effect from the positive effect, we apply the following 
model: 
 
Yield Spreadi,j,t = c + a1Goodi,t-1&CDS Starti,t + a2No Goodi,t-1&No CDS Starti,t +a3No 
Goodi,t-1&CDS Starti,t + a4Ai,t-1 + a5Bj,t + a6Ct + a7CDS Companyi + vi,j,t      (3.17) 
 
Yield spreadi,j,t = c + a1Badi,t-1&CDS Starti,t + a2No Badi,t-1&No CDS Starti,t +a3 No 
Badi,t-1&CDS Starti,t + a4Ai,t-1 + a5Bj,t + a6Ct + a7CDS Companyi + vi,j,t       (3.18) 
 
Yield spreadi,j,t, Ai,t-1, Bj,t, Ct, and CDS Companyi are defined as before. Goodi,t-1&CDS 
Start i,t equals 1 if a bond is issued after CDS trading and during good credit periods, 0 
otherwise. No Goodi,t-1&No CDS Start i,t equals 1 for a bond issued without CDS trading 
and during no good credit periods, 0 otherwise. No Goodi,t-1&CDS Start i,t equals 1 for 
a bond issued after CDS trading and during no good credit periods, 0 otherwise. Badi,t-
1&CDS Start i,t, No Badi,t-1&No CDS Starti,t and No Badi,t-1&CDS Start i,t are defined 
similarly to their “Good” counterparts. We use leverage and the credit rating expressed 
numerically (AAA=1, etc.) as two credit proxies to distinguish good/bad and no 
good/no bad credit periods. A good/bad period is the time when a firm’s credit proxy is 
smaller/bigger than the selected level of that proxy. 
 
All our models are estimated by (1) OLS with robust standard errors and clustered by 
firm; (2) OLS with robust standard errors and firm fixed effects; (3) OLS controls 
industry fixed effects and clusters standard error at the firm level. 
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3.3.2 Data description 
 
We employ three databases: Compustat, Mergent-FISD and Markit. To start with, we 
need to know which firms referenced by credit default swaps and the timing of inception 
of CDS trading. We obtain daily CDS quotes from the Markit CDS database. Markit is 
a widely used source for dealer quotes of credit default swaps from January 2001 
onwards. We select all firms that have CDS quotes and use the first CDS appearance 
date of a firm, denominated in US dollars and having five years maturity, as the start of 
CDS trading for that firm. The sample period is from January 2001 to December 2014. 
Fundamental information for firms comes from the Compustat quarterly database. 
Compustat contains financial, market, and statistical data of most North America firms 
and provides our research several firm-specific features. Since the financial sector is 
seen as different from other economic sectors, we consider only non-financial firms. 
All firms are required to have no missing values for all interested variables. To exclude 
the impact of outliers, we windsorize all interested variables at the 1th and 99th 
percentiles. The bond-specific data such as bond yields, maturity, issue amount and a 
variety of bond characteristics are acquired from the Mergent fixed investment 
securities database (FISD). Similarly, we require that all bonds have no missing values 
for any variable of interest. Bonds with all required firm-specific and bond-specific 
information are obtained to construct our sample. Moreover, if a reference firm’s bonds 
are all issued before or after the onset of its CDS trading, we remove all the bonds of 
that firm. We limit our sample to bonds issued when firms’ credit ratings are no worse 
than C-. In the end, we obtain 6454 bonds issued by 1300 firms in which 346 firms are 




Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
variables  CDS Starti,t=0 vs CDS Starti,t=1 
  
CDS Starti,t=0   
 CDS Starti,t=1 
 Difference        
Log Sales  6.373888  7.835319  1.461431*** 
Leverage  0.667543  0.652157  -0.015386*** 
Profitability  0.038301  0.069238  0.030937*** 
Log Amount  12.08985  13.01167  0.92182*** 
Log Maturity 2.331337  2.284804  -0.046533*** 
Rating(%)       
AAA  0.019703  0.019626  -7.70E-05 
AA- ~ AA+  0.081826  0.07243  -0.009396 
A- ~ A+  0.237134  0.28271  0.045576*** 
BBB- ~ BBB+ 0.289754  0.424299  0.134545*** 
BB- ~ BB+  0.153222  0.12757  -0.025652*** 
B- ~ B+  0.103848  0.067757  -0.036091*** 
CCC- ~ CCC+ 0.005332  0.003271  -0.002061 
CC  0.001391  0  -0.001391* 
Unrated  0.10779  0.002337  -0.105453*** 
Spread  193.6716  213.5465  19.8749*** 
Number of observations 4314   2140   6454 
Log Sales: natural log of the firm’s sales. Leverage: total liability over total assets. Profitability: net income 
over sales). Log Amount: natural log of the bond’s issue amount. Log Maturity: natural log of the bond’s 
maturity. Rating: the firm’s long-term credit rating. Spread: ex ante bond yield over Treasury with the same 
maturity. ***,**,* indicates the difference is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 
Table 3.1 separately gives summary statistics for groups with CDS Start i,t=0 and CDS 
Start i,t=1. Comparing these two groups can provide some insights. The result shows that 
natural log of sales is a little higher for the group with CDS Start i,t=1. This implies that 
bond issue firms have better performances after the onset of CDS trading. Leverage 
slightly decreases after the start of CDS trading. This is contrary to the finding of Saretto 
and Tookes (2013) but in accord with that of Ashcraft and Santos (2009). The reason 
could be that the former focuses on firms in the S&P 500 index that often stay at good 
credit levels rather than bond issue firms. There is a high increase of profitability after 
CDS start. This is not surprising because CDS sellers are more likely to sign a contract 
when reference firms are profitable. After CDS trading, natural log of the bonds’ issue 
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amounts increase a lot while that of maturities decrease with a small portion. In the 
group with CDS Start i,t=0, about 63 percent of bonds are issued when firms’ credit 
ratings are better than BBB. However, in the group with CDS Start i,t=1, that number is 
increased to 80 percent. The probability of unrated firms after introducing CDS is close 
to 0. These two are consistent with claims of Arentsen et al. (2015) that credit default 
swaps are often traded when reference firms have investment-grade ratings. Similar to 
the findings of Ashcraft and Santos (2009), the yield spreads are increased after CDS 
trading, perhaps due to the “empty creditor” problem and a lack of bank monitoring. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we present empirical findings with regard to the CDS effect on the yield 
spread between corporate and Treasury bonds. Since the effect could vary with an 
issuer’s credit information at issue time, credit proxies must be taken into consideration. 
We employ leverage and the credit rating expressed numerically (AAA=1, etc.) as 












3.4.1 Does CDS effect vary with the company’s credit risk on issue time? 
Table 3.2 Does CDS effect vary? Use leverage as the credit proxy 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Log Sales -27.75*** -6.865* -36.28*** 
 (2.401) (3.543) (3.057) 
Profitability -195.7*** -105.5*** -167.8*** 
 (19.66) (12.15) (20.76) 
Leverage 51.18** 82.86*** 63.45*** 
 (21.64) (17.38) (21.38) 
Rating 33.12*** 10.74*** 22.14*** 
 (2.018) (1.539) (2.088) 
Log Amount 14.17*** 9.875*** 8.576*** 
 (2.688) (2.616) (2.966) 
Log Maturity -1.759 12.43*** 1.425 
 (3.110) (2.268) (2.619) 
Enhancement 25.64*** -7.191 2.497 
 (9.531) (5.936) (8.721) 
Convertible -212.0*** -192.3*** -219.7*** 
 (13.71) (15.42) (15.69) 
Redeemable 4.810 -0.365 -1.128 
 (5.607) (4.446) (5.992) 
Puttable -14.70 -23.38** -4.362 
 (9.654) (10.29) (9.051) 
CDS Start -122.9*** -99.08*** -140.9*** 
 (26.27) (15.44) (25.03) 
CDS Start × Leverage 144.8*** 151.6*** 166.0*** 
 (40.28) (21.26) (38.65) 
CDS Company -1.483  4.309 
 (6.534)  (7.022) 
Constant 3.318 -44.74 -190.3*** 
 (38.05) (75.95) (45.07) 
Firm Fixed Effect No Yes No 
Industry Fixed Effect No No Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,358 6,358 6,358 
R-squared 0.568 0.825 0.663 
Column (1) is estimated with robust standard error and clustered by company. Column (2) is estimated with 
robust standard error and firm-fixed effects. Column (3) controls industry-fixed effects and clusters standard 
error at the firm level. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-fixed effects. CDS start: dummy 
variable that is equal to one for bonds after the beginning date of the firm’s CDS trading. Rating is the number 
linked to the firm’s credit rating. The conversion is AAA = 1, AAA- = 1.33,…, C- = 9. Log Amount: natural 
log of the bond’s issue amount. Log Maturity: natural log of the bond’s maturity. Enhancement: bonds with 
some enhancement terms. Convertible: convertible bond. Redeemable: redeemable bonds. Puttable: bonds 
with put option. See table 1 for definitions of remaining variables. ***,**,* indicates the difference is 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3.2 presents results when using leverage as the credit proxy. As expected and 
shown in section 3.3.1, firms have larger sales, higher profitability and better credit 
rating lower the yield spread. Issue amount for a bond does increase the yield spread 
whereas evidence of a bond’s maturity contributing to the raising of the yield spread is 
inconclusive. Convertible bonds enjoy lower yield spreads. Some bond-specific 
variables (redeemable, puttable and enhancement) are statistically not significant in 
general. A reasonable explanation could be that our sample is not very large and bonds 
with these features are few. Our main interests are coefficients on dummy CDS Start i,t 
and the interaction of CDS Starti,t and Credit Proxyi,t-1. All 3 regressions (columns 1,2,3) 
show that coefficients on dummy CDS Start i,t are negative and statistically significant 
at 1% confidence level whereas coefficients on the interaction of CDS Start i,t and 
Leveragei,t-1 are positive and statistically significant at 1% level. These results verify 
our assumption that the CDS effect varies with the firm’s credit risk at issue time. 
Taking the derivative of equation (3.16) with respect to CDS Starti,t, we get ∂yield 
spreadi,j,t/∂CDS Start i,t = a1 + a2Leveragei,t-1. The negative a1 tells us that after CDS 
trading, firms may enjoy lower the yield spread when issuing bonds during extremely 
good credit periods. However, positive a2 implies the CDS effect would turn from 
negative to positive with the increase of the credit risk (leverage). Thus, the overall 
effect of CDS on the yield spread depends on the credit risk of the firm when it issues 








Table 3.3 Does CDS effect vary? Use credit rating numbers (AAA=1, etc.) as the credit 
proxy. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Log Sales -23.79*** -8.017** -33.97*** 
 (2.560) (3.386) (3.044) 
Profitability -195.6*** -103.3*** -165.4*** 
 (19.45) (11.66) (20.05) 
Leverage 62.86*** 102.2*** 85.12*** 
 (18.26) (14.55) (18.55) 
Rating 27.80*** 6.881*** 19.23*** 
 (1.951) (1.489) (2.049) 
Log Amount 15.39*** 9.750*** 8.904*** 
 (2.597) (2.510) (3.038) 
Log Maturity -2.018 14.13*** 3.140 
 (2.897) (2.176) (2.556) 
Enhancement 9.448 -16.81*** -7.376 
 (9.273) (5.716) (8.541) 
Convertible -188.8*** -168.9*** -202.0*** 
 (12.62) (14.82) (15.01) 
Redeemable 1.396 -0.720 -2.542 
 (5.629) (4.251) (5.474) 
Puttable -21.73** -22.95** -7.920 
 (9.457) (9.878) (9.054) 
CDS Start -253.0*** -238.8*** -246.2*** 
 (28.86) (12.29) (23.07) 
CDS Start × Rating 57.96*** 61.08*** 55.04*** 
 (7.003) (2.783) (5.835) 
CDS Company -13.31**  -5.158 
 (6.481)  (7.163) 
Constant -19.84 -55.46 -224.3*** 
 (36.05) (72.80) (44.61) 
Firm Fixed Effect No Yes No 
Industry Fixed Effect No No Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,358 6,358 6,358 
R-squared 0.592 0.839 0.678 
Column (1) is estimated with robust standard error and clustered by company. Column (2) is estimated 
with robust standard error and firm-fixed effects. Column (3) controls industry-fixed effects and clusters 
standard error at the firm level. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-fixed effects. CDS 
start: dummy variable that is equal to one for bonds after the beginning date of the firm’s CDS trading. 
Rating is the number linked to the firm’s credit rating. The conversion is AAA = 1, AAA- = 1.33,…, C- 
= 9. Log Amount: natural log of the bond’s issue amount. Log Maturity: natural log of the bond’s 
maturity. Enhancement: bonds with some enhancement terms. Convertible: convertible bond. 
Redeemable: redeemable bonds. Puttable: bonds with put option. See table 1 for definitions of remaining 
variables. ***,**,* indicates the difference is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
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Table 3.3 presents results from the same approach but using the credit rating expressed 
numerically (AAA=1, etc.) as the credit proxy. Coefficients on CDS Starti,t in all 3 
columns use the same symbol with the significance as findings observed in table 3.2. 
Coefficients on interaction of CDS Start i,t and Ratingi,t-1 suggest that CDS effect 
positively varies with the credit rating expressed numerically (AAA=1, etc.) for all 3 
different estimations. Results from table 3.3 imply that, after CDS trading, the yield 
spread decreases when the firm issues bonds with a good credit rating but increases 
with a bad credit rating at time of issue. These findings confirm our previous 
assumptions and analyses. 
 
3.4.2 Separating good credit periods from bad credit periods 
 
Our empirical results show that the CDS effect indeed varies with firms’ credit 
information at issue dates. However, we do not know whether the negative effect 
outweighs the positive during good credit periods and the positive effect is dominant 
during bad credit periods. To address this, we divide our sample to 4 groups to 
investigate either the negative or positive CDS effect. Moreover, this approach 
eliminates the concern of correlation between CDS Starti,t and CDS Start i,t multiplied 









Table 3.4 Detailed statistical summary for leverage in the sample 
Leverage 
         
  Percentiles  Smallest     
1%  0.2463452  0.0363191     
5%  0.4220801  0.1156367     
10%  0.4774439  0.1323362  Obs  6358 
25%  0.5699214  0.1662572  Sum of Wgt.  6358 
         
50%  0.6698778    Mean  0.696665 
     Largest  Std. Dev.  0.234211 
75%  0.7775905  2.348285     
90%  0.8814926  2.364728  Variance  0.054855 
95%  1.09326  2.364728  Skewness  2.194365 
99%  1.592987  2.364728  Kurtosis  11.91719 
This is the detailed statistic summary for leverage in our sample. 
 
The method we use to divide our sample is illustrated in section 3.3.1. Leverage and 
the credit rating expressed numerically (AAA=1, etc.) are used as two credit indicators 
to distinguish whether a firm is during a good or bad credit period. Table 3.4 presents 
a detailed statistical summary of the variable Leverage. We find that the 10 percent 
quartile of leverage in our sample is 0.48 and the 90 percent quartile is 0.88. Therefore, 
we define that: if a firm has leverage less than 0.5 at time of issue, bonds are considered 
as issued during a good credit period. We select the leverage of 0.5 because it is not 
only close to the 10 percent quartile, but also the ratio for net assets to liability is greater 
than 1 and so the guarantee is sufficient. Correspondingly, if a firm has leverage more 
than 0.88 at time of issue, bonds are considered as issued during bad credit periods. 
 
When using the credit rating expressed numerically (AAA=1, etc.) as indicator, we do 
not employ quartiles of the number in our sample to identify whether a firm is during a 
good or a bad period. The reason is that these numbers are discontinuous, so quartiles 
cannot be reliable criteria. We define bonds as issued during good credit periods when 
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firms have an A- credit rating or better at issue time. Nevertheless, at issue time, when 
firms have a BB+ credit rating or worse (no investment grade), bonds are viewed as 
issued during bad credit periods. 
 
To investigate the negative effect, the sample is divided into Goodi,t-1&No CDS Start i,t, 
Goodi,t-1&CDS Start i,t, No Goodi,t-1&No CDS Start i,t and No Goodi,t-1&CDS Start i,t. The 
benchmark group is Good i,t-1&No CDS Starti,t and the interest of our analysis is the 
difference between Goodi,t-1&CDS Start i,t and the benchmark. Similarly, for finding the 
positive effect, we divide our sample to Bad i,t-1&No CDS Start i,t, Badi,t-1&CDS Start i,t, 
No Badi,t-1&No CDS Starti,t and No Badi,t-1&CDS Start i,t. The benchmark is Badi,t-1&No 

















Table 3.5 The CDS effect on the yield spread using leverage as the indicator 
  The Yield Spread 
 Negative CDS Effect  Positive CDS Effect 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
        
Good & CDS Start -43.52*** -8.95 -55.29***     
 
(12.42) (10.87) (13.58) 
    
No Good & No CDS Start -24.75*** -12.68 -20.70**     
 
(10.27) (7.985) (9.49) 
    
No Good & CDS Start -49.85*** -7.828 -48.14***     
 
(12.65) (9.301) (11.95) 
    
Bad & CDS Start 
    
81.53*** 91.68*** 64.88*** 
 
    
(30.8) （13.46） （14.02） 
No Bad & No CDS Start 
    
-15.61 -1.448 -8.311 
 
    
（15.77） （10.3） （9.201） 
No Bad & CDS Start 
    
-50.19*** -5.291 -44.93*** 
     
（17.87） （11.57） （10.43） 
        
CDS Company -0.383 
 5.071 
 
-1.496  4.101 
 
(6.684)  (7.165) 
 
（6.539）  （4.594） 
Constant -1.32 -68.67 -201.54***  
27.26 -52.72 -187.2 
 
(38.3) (76.26) (45.8) 
 
（45.48） （77.8） （120.4） 
Firm Fixed Effect No Yes No  No Yes No 
Industry Fixed Effect No No Yes  No No Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6358 6358 6358  
6358 6358 6358 
R-squared 0.566 0.823 0.66   0.572 0.826 0.664 
Column (1), (4) are estimated with robust standard error and clustered by company. Column (2), (5) are estimated with 
robust standard error and firm-fixed effects. Column (3), (6) controls industry-fixed effects and clusters standard error at 
the firm level. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-fixed effects. Good & CDS start: dummy variable that 
equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and during good credit periods. No Good & No CDS start: dummy variable 
that equals one for bonds issued without CDS trading and during no good credit periods. No Good  &CDS start: dummy 
variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and during no good credit periods. Bad & CDS start: dummy 
variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and during bad credit periods. No Bad & No CDS start: dummy 
variable that equals one for bonds issued without CDS trading and during no bad credit periods. No Bad &CDS start: dummy 
variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and during no bad credit periods. See table 1 and 2 for definitions 




Table 3.5 shows results of the negative and positive CDS effects using leverage as the 
credit proxy. To save space, we only report coefficients that we are interested in. 
However, these models include all controls considered in section 3.4.1, as do later 
models. Coefficients on Goodi,t-1&CDS Starti,t in column 1 and 3 are negative and 
statistically significant at 1% confidence level. This means that the yield spread 
decreases after CDSs begin to trade when bonds were issued during good credit periods. 
A surprising finding is that the coefficients on other two groups are also significantly 
negative in columns 1 and 3. A probable reason is that bond buyers do not think lower 
leverage level can be an ideal indicator for lower credit risk. In contrast with the 
ambiguous results of the negative effect, findings from columns (4), (5) and (6) are 
explicit. All coefficients on Badi,t-1&CDS Start i,t in three columns are positive and 
statistically significant at 1% confidence level. It is obvious that under the condition of 
issuing bonds during bad credit periods, yield spreads of bonds issued after CDS trading 
are higher. This verifies our assumption that firms after CDS begin to trade are punished 












Table 3.6 The CDS effect on the yield spread using credit rating numbers (AAA=1, etc.) as the 
indicator 
  The Yield Spread 
 Negative CDS Effect  Positive CDS Effect 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
        
Good & CDS Start -70.71*** -51.27*** -74.35***     
 
（10.43） （7.339） （9.459） 
    
No Good & No CDS Start 3.953 -3.271 -8.498     
 
（7.602） （6.338） （8.533） 
    
No Good & CDS Start -2.252 23.99*** -18.12     
 
（11.28） （7.857） （11.63） 
    
Bad & CDS Start 
    
54.41*** 98.70*** 49.64*** 
 
    
（14.72） （8.004） （14.33） 
No Bad & No CDS Start 
    
-111.8*** -26.82*** -74.85*** 
 
    
（9.516） （7.73） （9.784） 
No Bad & CDS Start 
    
-155.9*** -52.35*** -123.3*** 
     
（12.07） （8.518） （11.71） 
        
CDS Company -5.895 
 0.438 
 
-6.188  -0.0856 
 
（6.566）  （7.209） 
 
（6.229）  （6.799） 
Constant -18.49 -80.3 -209.1***  
193.9*** -5.567 -100.2** 
 
（37.98） （75.04） （46.29） 
 
（36.28） （74.31） （44.00） 
Firm Fixed Effect No Yes No  No Yes No 
Industry Fixed Effect No No Yes  No No Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6358 6358 6358  
6358 6358 6358 
R-squared 0.573 0.829 0.665   0.621 0.836 0.687 
Column (1), (4) are estimated with robust standard error and clustered by company. Column (2), (5) are estimated with 
robust standard error and firm-fixed effects. Column (3), (6) controls industry-fixed effects and clusters standard error 
at the firm level. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-fixed effects. Good  & CDS start: dummy variable 
that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and during good credit periods. No Good  & No CDS start: dummy 
variable that equals one for bonds issued without CDS trading and during no good credit periods. No Good &CDS start: 
dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and during no good credit periods. Bad & CDS start: 
dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and during bad credit periods. No Bad & No CDS 
start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued without CDS trading and during no bad credit periods. No Bad  
&CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and during no bad credit periods. See 
table 1 and 2 for definitions of remaining variables. ***,**,* indicates the difference is statistically significant at 1%, 
5%, and 10% respectively. 
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As a robustness test, we change the credit proxy to the number converted from credit 
rating. It seems that these numbers are more effective than leverage as the credit proxy, 
especially during a good credit period. Table 3.6 shows that coefficients on Goodi,t-
1&CDS Start i,t in column 1, 2 and 3 are all negative and statistically significant at 1% 
confidence level. This confirms our earlier results that CDSs do lead to decrease in the 
yield spread as long as bonds are issued with high credit rating of firms at issue time. 
Columns (4), (5) and (6) suggest that Badi,t-1&CDS Start i,t is positively related to the 
yield spread and its coefficients are statistically significant at 1% confidence level. This 
indicates that bonds issued after CDS trading begins have larger yield spreads when 
firms have worse credit ratings at times of issue. During bad credit periods, yield 
spreads of bonds issued after CDSs begin to trade increase 50-100 basis points relative 
to those of bonds issued before and bonds of non-CDS firms. These are quite large 
economically. Coefficients on No Badi,t-1&No CDS Starti,t and No Badi,t-1&CDS Start i,t 
are significantly negative, implying that these two groups have lower yield spreads 
compared to the benchmark group. 
 
3.4.3 Potential Endogeneity 
 
Results displayed in section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 clearly demonstrate both negative and 
positive CDS effects on the yield spread. However, the estimation method we use is 
ordinary least squares (OLS), which strictly requires the covariance of the estimation 
error and regressors equals to zero. This condition may not be satisfied because we do 
not know whether the timing of CDS trading onset is exogenous or not. It is probable 
that CDS trading begins while market participants predict the future changes of the 
yield spread. Thus, a potential endogeneity problem arises and must be taken into 
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consideration. We follow Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) 
using propensity score matching to find a matched sample and address the problem. 
 
3.4.3.1 Propensity score matching 
 
Propensity score matching is one of the most popular methods to solve an endogeneity 
problem because of its simple matching methodology (Roberts and Whited, 2012). In 
contrast with the exact matching approach, propensity score matching only depends on 
one dimension, that is the propensity score. The former becomes very complicated 
when there are many covariate Xs or several of the covariates have many different 
values. Given a series of covariate Xs, the propensity score is viewed as the conditional 
probability of receiving treatment. The propensity score is a scalar although Xs is a 
vector represents many characteristics. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) note that if the 
treatment and potential outcomes are mutually independent of each other conditional 
on covariates, they are mutually independent conditional on the propensity score. 
 
Observational data are always non-randomized and the application of propensity score 
matching helps to change this situation. In identifying a treatment effect, to avoid self-
selection bias, scholars need to compare treated observations with untreated ones that 
have very similar characteristics. However, this sort of untreated observation is not 
ready-made. We find them by estimating propensity scores and matching untreated 
observations to treated. Thus, problems of non-randomized data and potential 
endogeneity are addressed. The difference of underlying outcomes (such as the yield 




3.4.3.2 Finding a matched sample 
 
We identify a matched sample in which firms are not referenced by CDSs but have 
similar features to CDS firms by p score matching. Data from the first quarter of 2001 
to the first quarter of each CDS trading are used for CDS reference firms and for non-
CDS firms we include all data throughout our sample period. A probit model is 
employed to investigate the coefficient on each covariate for receiving CDS trading. 
These covariates contain Log Assets (natural log of the company’s total assets), Log 
Sales (natural log of the company’s sales), Leverage (total liability over total assets), 
Profitability (net income over sales), Rating (the company’s credit rating), ROA 
(income divide total assets), PPENT (property, plant and equipment over total assets), 
RE (retained earnings over total assets), Rated (equals 1 for rated company) and IG 
(equals 1 for investment grade company). The dependent variable is binary, equaling 0 
before the inception of CDS trading and 1 thereafter. For non-CDS companies, this 
dependent variable is always equal to 0. We then use the estimated coefficients getting 
from the probit model to predict the propensity scores. 
 
The implementation of matching is based on propensity scores obtained beforehand. 
For each CDS firm, we identify one non-CDS firm that has a bond issue record and is 
the nearest neighbor. Replacement is allowed in choosing the nearest neighbor. This 
means that a non-CDS firm may be matched to more than one CDS firm if it is the 
nearest neighbor for all of them. A caliper of 0.01 is used in the matching. Any CDS 
firm for which we cannot find a nearest neighbor within the distance of 0.01 is removed 




3.4.4 Results using the p score matched Sample 
Table 3.7 P score matched sample using leverage as the indicator 
  The Yield Spread 
 Negative CDS Effect  Positive CDS Effect 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
        
Good & CDS Start 0.363 -1.44 -10.99     
 
（14.48） （11.99） （13.79） 
    
No Good & No CDS Start -24.19* -9.326 -14.32     
 
（13.64） （9.595） （12.78） 
    
No Good & CDS Start -6.86 2.052 -5.642     
 
（16.19） （10.83） （14.36） 
    
Bad & CDS Start 
    
105.9*** 76.03*** 90.58** 
 
    
（39.29） （16.51） （37.99） 
No Bad & No CDS Start 
    
-32.15 -15.72 -22.18 
 
    
（26.63） （14.00） （24.30） 
No Bad & CDS Start 
    
-24.51 -12.13 -22.31 
     
（28.6） （15.08） （25.09） 
        
CDS Company 2.192 
 -7.307 
 
3.39  -5.881 
 
（9.171）  （8.575） 
 
（9.03）  （8.385） 
Constant -20.86 1.592 145.6***  
37.34 32.41 176.2*** 
 
（48.98） （79.59） （55.91） 
 
（61.32） （82.35） （60.52） 
Firm Fixed Effect No Yes No  No Yes No 
Industry Fixed Effect No No Yes  No No Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,521 3,521 3,521  
3,521 3,521 3,521 
R-squared 0.567 0.763 0.68   0.576 0.766 0.686 
Column (1), (4) are estimated with robust standard error and clustered by company. Column (2), (5) are estimated with 
robust standard error and firm-fixed effects. Column (3), (6) controls industry-fixed effects and clusters standard error at 
the firm level. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-fixed effects. CDS company: dummy variable that 
equals to one for companies referenced by CDS. Good  & CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after 
CDS trading and during good credit periods. No Good & No CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued 
without CDS trading and during no good credit periods. No Good &CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds 
issued after CDS trading and during no good credit periods. Bad & CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds 
issued after CDS trading and during bad credit periods. No Bad & No CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds 
issued without CDS trading and during no bad credit periods. No Bad &CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for 
bonds issued after CDS trading and during no bad credit periods. See table 1 and 2 for definitions of remaining variables. 




We re-estimate the negative and positive CDS effects with a propensity score matched 
sample. The variables of interest are still Goodi,t-1&CDS Start i,t for good credit periods 
and Badi,t-1&CDS Start i,t for bad credit periods. Using the propensity score matched 
sample, we gauge the CDS impact either negative or positive by the difference between 
CDS and matched non-CDS firms that have similar probability of receiving CDS 
trading. 
 
Table 3.7 shows results of the negative and positive CDS effects with the propensity 
score matched sample using leverage as the credit proxy. When the leverage of an issuer 
is under 0.5 at the time of issue, its bonds are viewed as issued during good credit 
periods. When using the matched sample, coefficients on Goodi,t-1&CDS Starti,t for 
column 1, 2 and 3 become statistically insignificant. This again verifies that leverage is 
not a perfect proxy for credit when it is in lower levels. When the leverage of an issuer 
is over 0.88 at issue time, their bonds are viewed as issued during bad credit periods. 
All coefficients on Badi,t-1&CDS Starti,t in three columns are positive and statistically 
significant at 5% or 1% confidence level. This means that, under the condition of 
issuing bonds during bad credit periods, yield spreads of bonds issued after CDS trading 
are higher than those of bonds issued by matched non-CDS firms. There is a punishment 









Table 3.8 P score matched sample using credit rating numbers (AAA=1, etc.) as the indicator 
  The Yield Spread 
 Negative CDS Effect  Positive CDS Effect 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
        
Good & CDS Start -32.13*** -41.77*** -32.36***     
 
(10.69) (8.512) (9.486) 
    
No Good & No CDS Start 5.864 -8.383 -3.468     
 
(9.005) (8.1) (9.732) 
    
No Good & CDS Start 42.59*** 25.46*** 20.38*     
 
(12.35) (9.602) (12.28) 
    
Bad & CDS Start 
    
94.02*** 94.23*** 84.75*** 
 
    
(17.47) (9.031) (15.94) 
No Bad & No CDS Start 
    
-104.8*** -32.81*** -77.91*** 
 
    
(12.52) (9.518) (13.46) 
No Bad & CDS Start 
    
-115.0*** -50.22*** -92.90*** 
     
(15.32) (10.20) (14.17) 
        
CDS Company 0.219 
 -8.081 
 
-5.477  -8.747 
 
(9.115)  (8.797) 
 
(7.970)  (7.740) 
Constant -36.98 -22.09 115.7**  
169.4*** 38.99 247.7*** 
 
(49.23) (78.18) (56.95) 
 
(41.74) (76.48) (49.49) 
Firm Fixed Effect No Yes No  No Yes No 
Industry Fixed Effect No No Yes  No No Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,521 3,521 3,521  
3,521 3,521 3,521 
R-squared 0.581 0.771 0.686   0.646 0.783 0.722 
Column (1), (4) are estimated with robust standard error and clustered by company. Column (2), (5) are estimated with robust 
standard error and firm-fixed effects. Column (3), (6) controls industry-fixed effects and clusters standard error at the firm 
level. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-fixed effects. CDS company: dummy variable that equals to one 
for companies referenced by CDS. Good & CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and 
during good credit periods. No Good & No CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued without CDS trading 
and during no good credit periods. No Good &CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading 
and during no good credit periods. Bad & CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and 
during bad credit periods. No Bad & No CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued without CDS trading and 
during no bad credit periods. No Bad &CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and 
during no bad credit periods. See table 1 and 2 for definitions of remaining variables. ***,**,* indicates the difference is 





The credit rating expressed numerically (AAA=1, etc.) is also used as the credit proxy 
to investigate CDS effects with the propensity score matched sample. Table 3.8 shows 
CDS impacts both during good and bad credit periods using the matched sample. If a 
firm has an A- credit rating or better at issue time, bonds are considered as issued during 
good credit periods. Similar to findings in table 3.6, Goodi,t-1&CDS Start i,t is negatively 
correlated with the yield spread and its coefficients are statistically significant at 1% 
confidence level. This suggests that bonds issued after CDS trading have lower yield 
spreads compared with bonds issued by matched non-CDS firms when issuers have 
better credit ratings. Coefficients on CDS Companyi dummy are insignificant suggested 
by estimations 1 and 3. If a firm has a BB+ credit rating or worse at issue, bonds are 
viewed as issued during bad credit periods. Unsurprisingly, all coefficients on Badi,t-
1&CDS Start i,t in column 4, 5 and 6 are positive and statistically significant at 1% 
confidence level. These coefficients show that with lower credit ratings, yield spreads 
of bonds issued by CDS firms, after CDS trading, increase 85-95 basis points relative 
to those of bonds issued by non-CDS firms with similar probability of receiving CDS 
trading. 
 
3.4.5 Does the liquidity of CDS market matter? 
 
The impact of CDSs on the yield spread depends on how liquid a CDS market is. 
Without a high liquid CDS market, bond buyers cannot hedge their risks at lower cost 
level and some basic assumptions in our study are undermined. Since CDSs’ liquidities 
are different among our sample, whether CDSs with high liquidities are distinguishing 
from those with low liquidities becomes an interesting question. We re-estimate 
equation 3.17 and 3.18 with different liquidities and display results in table 3.9 and 3.10.
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Table 3.9 The negative CDS impact on the yield spread with different CDS liquidity 
Dependent variable:       Negative CDS Effect    












 Low  
Liquidity 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Good & CDS Start -76.85***  -1.117  -45.73***  12.35 
 
-92.19***  -1.825 
 (12.62)  (17.79)  (9.534)  (24.74) 
 
(12.07)  (20.99) 
No Good & No CDS Start 14.99** 
 11.03  18.54***  22.62** 
 
3.123  2.285 
 (7.512)  (11.65)  (6.860)  (11.35) 
 
(8.545)  (12.32) 
No Good & CDS Start 3.937  65.66***  62.31***  41.45* 
 
-14.74  34.53 
 (13.70)  (19.83)  (10.05)  (21.98) 
 
(14.03)  (21.79) 
CDS Company -4.459  -6.28     
 
2.145  -4.43 
 (6.693)  (16.87)     
 
(7.529)  (19.76) 
Constant 9.547  -9.589  -43.34  -183.6* 
 
-201.1***  -126.4* 
 (38.04)  (53.90)  (74.88)  (97.40) 
 
(46.74)  (70.11) 
Firm Fixed Effect No  No  Yes  Yes 
 
No  No 
Industry Fixed Effect No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 






0.880  0.676 
 
0.683 
Observation 5,198  3,693  5,198  3,693  5,198 
 3,693 
Column (1), (4) are estimated with robust standard error and clustered by company. Column (2), (5) are estimated with robust standard error and firm-fixed effects. Column (3), (6) controls 
industry-fixed effects and clusters standard error at the firm level. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-fixed effects. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-
fixed effects. CDS company: dummy variable that equals to one for companies referenced by CDS. Good  & CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading 
and during good credit periods. These regressions include all controls considered in section 3.4.1. ***,**,* indicates the difference is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3.10 The positive CDS impact on the yield spread with different CDS liquidity  
Dependent variable:       Positive CDS Effect    












 Low  
Liquidity 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Bad & CDS Start 46.95**  100.7***  119.4***  95.01***  43.33** 
 100.1*** 
 (19.07)  (21.66)  (11.51)  (24.80)  (19.03) 
 (23.25) 
No Bad & No CDS Start -123.5*** 
 -122.9***  -35.22***  -36.61***  -85.50*** 
 -74.75*** 
 (9.683)  (12.00)  (8.414)  (13.06)  (10.26) 
 (12.24) 
No Bad & CDS Start -167.6***  -116.4***  -49.41***  -39.67* 
 
-137.6***  -72.23*** 
 (13.82)  (20.02)  (10.49)  (22.45) 
 
(13.82)  (21.40) 
CDS Company -4.209  -5.29     
 
2.520  -9.70 
 (6.466)  (17.03)     
 
(7.115)  (18.97) 
Constant 226.9***  229.9***  21.47  -121.4  -70.91 
 -29.18 
 (38.58)  (51.70)  (75.07)  (97.21)  (46.08) 
 (65.62) 
Firm Fixed Effect No  No  Yes  Yes  No 
 No 
Industry Fixed Effect No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 






0.883  0.692 
 
0.702 
Observation 5,198  3,693  5,198  3,693  5,198 
 3,693 
Column (1), (4) are estimated with robust standard error and clustered by company. Column (2), (5) are estimated with robust standard error and firm-fixed effects. Column (3), (6) controls 
industry-fixed effects and clusters standard error at the firm level. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-fixed effects. CDS company: dummy variable that equals to one for 
companies referenced by CDS. Bad & CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and during bad credit periods. No Bad & No CDS start: dummy variable 
that equals one for bonds issued without CDS trading and during no bad credit periods. No Bad &CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and during no 
bad credit periods. These regressions include all controls considered in section 3.4.1. ***,**,* indicates the difference is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Following Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Amiram et al. (2017), we use the number of 
CDS quotes as the proxy for liquidity. If a CDS quotes number in the bond issue quarter 
is larger (smaller) than the average of that in our sample, the bond issue is assigned to 
the high (low) liquidity group. Table 3.9 shows that Goodi,t-1&CDS Start i,t is only 
significantly correlated with the yield spread for the high liquidity group. For the low 
liquidity group, it is either positive or insignificant negative. This result is consistent 
with our logic that the negative CDS effect is driven by the new hedging opportunity, 
which are highly dependent on the liquidity of the CDS market. Table 3.10 shows that 
all coefficients on Badi,t-1&CDS Starti,t are positive and significant no matter CDSs are 
liquid or not. It is because the positive CDS effect are derived from the concern of 
reduced bank monitoring and empty creditor problem which are both not relevant with 
the liquidity of the CDS market. 
 
3.4.6 Does Financial Crisis matter? 
 
The financial crisis in 2007 has been a tremendous shock to the world’s economy. For 
the US CDS market, the nominal principle dropped dramatically from $58.24 trillion in 
2007 (the peak) to $12.29 trillion by the end of 2015 (www.bis.org). With such a big 
fall, we cannot neglect the potential influence of the financial crisis on this research. 
Investors may view CDSs differently before and after the financial crisis, so we split 
our sample into two groups that before financial crisis and after financial crisis. 
Equations 3.17 and 3.18 are re-estimated using different subsamples and we display 





Table 3.11 The negative CDS impact on the yield spread before and after the financial crisis (2007)  
Dependent variable:       Negative CDS Effect    














  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Good & CDS Start -52.30***  99.21***  -28.44***  27.50  -47.99*** 
 68.59** 
 (10.36)  (29.10)  (8.537)  (21.87)  (9.931) 
 (31.17) 
No Good & No CDS Start 9.181 
 70.51***  10.66  3.292  4.866 
 48.35*** 
 (6.627)  (17.00)  (7.372)  (19.73)  (7.824) 
 (17.81) 
No Good & CDS Start 11.62  133.2***  32.58***  43.62**  6.620 
 73.29** 
 (12.56)  (29.35)  (9.569)  (22.08)  (12.58) 
 (32.26) 
CDS Company -10.60*  -11.68      -4.574 
 -57.50* 
 (6.335)  (16.87)      (6.889) 
 (29.82) 
Constant -11.15  -232.3**  -8.883  44.37  -219.7*** 
 -56.62* 
 (33.51)  (105.9)  (71.44)  (103.9)  (44.01) 
 (128.9) 
Firm Fixed Effect No  No  Yes  Yes  No 
 No 
Industry Fixed Effect No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 






Yes  Yes 
 
Yes 
R Square 0.527  0.635  0.825  0.921  0.642  0.779 
Observation 4,233   2,125   4,233   2,125   4,233   2,125 
Column (1), (4) are estimated with robust standard error and clustered by company. Column (2), (5) are estimated with robust standard error and firm-fixed effects. Column (3), (6) controls 
industry-fixed effects and clusters standard error at the firm level. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-fixed effects. CDS company: dummy variable that equals to one 
for companies referenced by CDS. Bad  & CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and during bad credit periods. No Bad  & No CDS start: dummy 
variable that equals one for bonds issued without CDS trading and during no bad credit periods. No Bad  &CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading 




Table 3.12 The positive CDS impact on the yield spread before and after the financial crisis (2007)  
Dependent variable:       Positive CDS Effect    














  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Good & CDS Start 36.35**  94.53***  61.52***  100.5***  34.24** 
 44.83** 
 (15.81)  (31.09)  (10.09)  (22.52)  (15.84) 
 (20.36) 
No Good & No CDS Start -97.68*** 
 -202.9***  -17.41**  -31.49  -67.91*** 
 -150.0*** 
 (9.724)  (20.13)  (8.769)  (21.25)  (10.64) 
 (22.96) 
No Good & CDS Start -122.3***  -114.1***  -27.23***  -24.96**  -90.68*** 
 -101.5*** 
 (13.50)  (31.05)  (9.972)  (23.23)  (13.31) 
 (35.77) 
CDS Company -9.958*  -7.82      -4.753 
 -62.57** 
 (6.046)  (27.64)      (6.490) 
 (29.46) 
Constant 165.1***  257.7**  24.83  136.2  -126.2*** 
 366.2*** 
 (35.21)  (101.0)  (72.07)  (106.3)  (44.52) 
 (123.1) 
Firm Fixed Effect No  No  Yes  Yes  No 
 No 
Industry Fixed Effect No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Time Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 






0.923  0.656 
 
0.797 
Observation 4,233  2,125  4,233  2,125  4,233 
 2,125 
Column (1), (4) are estimated with robust standard error and clustered by company. Column (2), (5) are estimated with robust standard error and firm-fixed effects. Column (3), (6) controls 
industry-fixed effects and clusters standard error at the firm level. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-fixed effects. CDS company: dummy variable that equals to one 
for companies referenced by CDS. Bad  & CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and during bad credit periods. No Bad  & No CDS start: dummy 
variable that equals one for bonds issued without CDS trading and during no bad credit periods. No Bad  &CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading 




Table 3.11 shows that coefficients on Goodi,t-1&CDS Start i,t are negative and significant 
in column (1), (3) and (5) but positive in column (2), (4), (6). This suggests that before 
the financial crisis, when CDS reference firms issue bonds during their good credit 
periods, they can enjoy reduced yield spreads. However, it is changed after the financial 
crisis. They have to pay high prices to get financing even when they look good. It means 
that the negative CDS effect is overwhelmed by the positive CDS effect in all situations. 
Table 3.12 shows that all coefficients on Badi,t-1&CDS Start i,t are positive and 
statistically significant at 5% or 1% confidence level. This is in accordance with our 
expectation that CDS reference firms are penalized during their bad credit periods due 
to reduced bank monitoring and empty creditor problem. Through comparing, we can 
easily find that the penalty during firms’ bad credit periods are aggravated after the 
financial crisis. In general, our analysis implies that investors’ attitudes towards CDSs 
turn to negative after the financial crisis. It may be due to the reduce of risk preference 




We report CDS effects, both negative and positive, on bond yield spreads. We underpin 
our investigation with a theoretical model, establishing the direction for our empirical 
work. Earlier literature provides support for either increased or decreased spreads 
following the introduction of named-firm CDSs into the market. We show how each of 
these can predominate, depending upon credit conditions for a firm, and present 
empirical evidence for our prediction. To our knowledge, this is the first such 




This chapter uncovers an impact of the CDS market on the bond issue market and 
contributes to a better understanding of lenders’ behaviors during different credit 
periods of the issuers. Our findings suggest that if issuers are during good credit periods, 
lenders view CDS trading as candy because a new hedging opportunity is created. 
However, if issuers are during bad credit periods, lenders view CDS trading as a shock 






















Chapter 4  
 
The impacts of credit default swaps on investment 




During the past decade the impact of credit derivatives has been controversial, with 
credit default swaps (CDSs) attracting most attention because they account for a large 
portion of the total credit derivatives market. CDSs can help creditors lay off their risks 
while maintaining voting rights, potentially changing the relationship between lenders 
and borrowers. When a firm is in financial distress and fails to pay his debts, creditors 
who had buy CDSs and may have no loss if default happening still hold the voting right 
in the firm’s debt renegotiation. However, their interests may be different from other 
creditors who have not buy any CDS. In this chapter, we investigate whether and how 
the CDS market affects a firm’s investment and its sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow. 
 
Several channels may impact corporate investment, both favorably and unfavorably. On 
the favorable side, the CDS market provides new information and contributes to a more 
perfect capital market. According to Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), prices of CDSs 
offer investors a near-perfect instrument to measure firms’ credit risks. Moreover, Hull, 
Predescu, and White (2004) argue that the CDS market can predict credit rating events. 
Acharya and Johnson (2007) present evidence on the information flow from the CDS 
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market to the stock market. All these empirical findings indicate that the CDS market 
can relieve information asymmetries which leads to lower finance costs and thus 
stronger investment approaches. Also, CDSs can reduce the likelihood of strategic 
default. Bolton and Oechmke (2011) construct a credit limited commitment model to 
study the impacts of CDS on debt outcomes. Their model shows that the emergence of 
the CDS market strengthens investors’ bargaining power and reduces the incentive of 
borrowers to default strategically. Credit default swaps work as a commitment device 
and to some extent relieve the distrust between borrowers and creditors. They promote 
corporate investment from easier external financing. Lastly, CDSs break the separation 
between those willing to hold risk and those with capital. Saretto and Tookes (2013) 
claim that CDSs help to increase banks’ incentive to lend by reducing conflicts on the 
credit supply side. 
 
On the adverse side, impact comes in three ways. Parlour and Winton (2013) suggest 
that banks will not monitor borrowers if they can lay off their risks through buying 
credit default swaps. Compared with individual lenders, banks have scale and 
information advantages in monitoring. Consequently, debtors and other lenders become 
free riders in this financing mechanism. If banks do not monitor borrowers because of 
CDSs, signals and safeguards for these free riders are lost, reducing their willingness to 
lend and decreasing credit supply. Subsequently, CDSs increase the credit risk of 
reference firms. Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) give detailed evidence that firms are more 
likely to be downgraded and go into bankruptcy after their debts are referenced by CDSs. 
The increase of the credit risk raises the financing costs of reference firms and thus 
depresses their investment impulses. Last but not least, CDSs create exacting creditors 
and push reference firms into raising their cash holdings. The model of Bolton and 
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Oechmke (2011) shows that CDS-protected lenders are tougher in debt renegotiation, 
particularly when they hold large CDS positions. This puts pressure on the firms and 
makes them adjust investment strategies. Subrahmanyam et al. (2017) claim that 
reference firms have to increase cash reserve for future use after predicting this threat 
from tough creditors. 
 
Why would CDSs influence firms’ investment-cash flow sensitivity? Exactly because 
credit default swaps impact the firms’ whole capital status. On the one hand, CDSs 
affect a firm’s capacity for getting external funds. On the other hand, CDSs change the 
firm’s demand for cash reserves. According to Saretto and Tookes (2013), firms would 
have higher leverage ratios after CDS trading. Moreover, Subrahmanyam et al. (2017) 
claim that firms’ cash holdings increase as well and it is probably maintained by using 
higher leverage. If the increase in leverage can overwhelm the increased need of cash 
holding, we can expect that the firm’s financial constraints are loosened after the onset 
of CDS trading. However, if the additional leverage can just compensate or even not 
compensate the growing cash reserve, we predict CDSs have no or adverse effect on 
the severity of a firm’s financial constraints. Fazzari et al. (1988) claim that a firm 
depends more on its cash flow to investment when it faces severer financial constraints. 
Therefore, after CDS trading, intuitively a firm’s investment-cash flow sensitivity will 
go down for the former scenario but go up for the latter.  
 
Findings from Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) 
and Acharya and Johnson (2007) suggest that the initiation of the CDS market brings 
clear price signal to investors and this is helpful to reduce the information asymmetry 
in an imperfect market. Moreover, Bolton and Oechmke (2011) claim that CDSs can 
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work as a commitment device relieving the distrust between borrowers and creditors. 
These changes reduce conflicts on credit supply side and make creditors more likely to 
lend money. With such an easy financing environment, firms may have high enthusiasm 
to borrow funds and implement investments. Based on this logic, we proceed to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: CDS reference firms increase their investments after the initiation of the 
CDS market. 
 
On the other hand, the emergence of the CDS market reduce the incentive of bank 
monitoring (Parlour and Winton, 2013). Without that, some other creditors lose the 
opportunity to be free riders depressing their willingness to lend money. In addition, 
CDSs increase the credit risk of reference firms (Subrahmanyam et al., 2014) keeping 
conservative lenders away. These two variations may lead to higher financing costs and 
thus restrain corporate investments. Furthermore, CDS reference firms have to increase 
cash holdings to defend exacting creditors and may have less capital to invest 
(Subrahmanyam et al., 2017). From this point of view, we have the following alternative 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: CDS reference firms reduce their investments after the initiation of the 
CDS market. 
 
CDSs increase firms’ leverage (Saretto and Tookes (2013) and cash serves 
(Subrahmanyam et al., 2017) simultaneously. The dominance of these two effects give 
us two alternative hypotheses as follows:  
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Hypothesis 2a: CDS reference firms are more dependent on their cash flows to invest 
after the beginning of CDS trading. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: CDS reference firms are less dependent on their cash flows to invest 
after the initiation of the CDS market. 
 
We construct a CRSP-Compustat and Markit merged data set to investigate the impact 
of CDSs on corporate investment and the investment-cash flow sensitivity. Considering 
different behaviors of manufacturing firms in investing, we present outcomes for both 
the broad sample, which contains all sectors, and for the manufacturing sample. Our 
results show that reference firms reduce their investments, on average, after introducing 
credit default swaps and their investment-cash flow sensitivities increase 
simultaneously. Results for the broad sample and manufacturing sample are generally 
robust. We also construct a variety of subsamples for studying whether the CDS effects 
vary across groups. We find that, following the inception of CDS trading, firms with 
high liquidity or integrity enhance their investments and rely less on cash flow to invest. 
In contrast, firms with low liquidity or integrity face severer financial constraints and 
have to cut down their investments. 
 
To our knowledge, the impacts of CDS on investment and the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity have never been analyzed before though some papers state the importance 
of this topic (Augustin et al., 2016 and Subrahmanyam et al., 2017). Our study exactly 
fills this gap and presents a better understanding. Moreover, our research sheds light on 
the consequence of financial innovations on an imperfect market. Many scholars 
believe that credit derivatives can relieve frictions in the economy and bring us a more 
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efficient market. Through investigating the relationship between investment and credit 
default swaps, we can concretely test whether firms in the economy do indeed profit 
from financial innovations. Furthermore, we are able directly to test the model proposed 
by Bolton and Oechmke in 2011. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes data and the 
empirical specification. Section 4.3 presents empirical results and analyses of CDS 
effects on investment and investment-cash flow sensitivity. Section 4.4 gives the 
conclusion. 
 
4.2 Methodology and Data 
 
4.2.1 Empirical specification 
 
The literature suggests that, after the inception of CDS trading, reference firms have 
increased leverage. However, whether the firms exploit this financial advantage to 
implement more investment remains ambiguous. There is also evidence that the firms 
prefer to hold more cash once their debts are referenced by credit default swaps. As a 
result, it is possible either that the firms, after CDS trading, spend more to invest 
responding to the growth of leverage or that the firms reduce capital expenditure in 
order to reserve cash. To investigate which effect dominates the other, we use the 
following specification: 
 




Iit/TAit-1 is the dependent variable defined as the fixed investment, Iit, of the firm divided 
by its total assets in last period, TA it-1. Iit-1/TAit-2 is one lag of the relative value of 
investment. It controls the autocorrelation of investment decision. Due to different 
industries and development stages, the absolute values of firms’ investments cannot be 
compared. Therefore, instead of using absolute value of investment, we take a relative 
one. Dividing firms’ investments by their total assets in the last period makes every firm 
comparable. For the same reason, we deflate firms’ cash flows by their total assets in 
the last period. CFit/TAit-1 is the ratio of the firm’s cash flow, CFit, to its last period total 
assets, TAit-1. 
 
We use Tobin’s Q to measure firms’ investment opportunities. In the Q theory, marginal 
Q is very important and even sufficient factor to explain firms’ investments. Following 
Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004), Qit-1 is calculated by equity market value to book 
value of asset in the last period. Our interest is the dummy variable CDS Start it, which 
equals 0 for investments occurring before the onset of CDS trading, 1 otherwise. The 
coefficient β1 captures the dynamic effect between investment in this year and last year. 
Considering the continuity of investment, this coefficient is expected to be positive. The 
coefficient β2 measures the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. In most cases, cash 
flow as the main source of internal financing is positivity related to a firm’s investment. 
Estimated on average level, β2 should be bigger than 0. The coefficient β3 shows the 
relationship between investment and investment opportunities. Firms with more 
opportunities normally invest more than firms with less, so we expect β3 to be positive. 
The main interest is the coefficient β4 that uncovers the impact of CDS on investment. 
Since firms increase both leverage and cash holding after CDS trading, the symbol of 
β4 may depends. On average, we anticipate that the CDS effect on investment is 
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negative because firms with high risk find it hard to increase leverage even after CDS 
trading but they have to reserve cash to guard against exacting lenders. 
 
As the sensitivity of investment to cash flow can be used as an indicator of financial 
constraints, the impact of CDS on the sensitivity can potentially help to understand 
whether credit default swaps change the situation of capital shortage. If the increase of 
leverage is larger than that of cash reserve needed, financial constraints are loosened 
for reference firms and they can turn to these funds to invest. However, if the increment 
of external financing is insufficient to compensate the raised demand of cash holding, 
the economic intuition is that firms’ investments depend more heavily on cash flows 
compared with the situation before the emergence of the CDS market. To study how 
CDSs affect the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, the model is specified as follows: 
 
Iit /TAit-1 = c + β1 Iit-1/TAit-2 + β2 CFit/TAit-1 + β3 Qit-1 + β4 CDS Startit +β5(CFit/TAit-1×CDS 
Startit) + αi + αt + εit.                                                 (4.2) 
 
All variables are as described previously, besides the interaction of CFit/TAit-1 and CDS 
Start it introduced to observe a change of the investment-cash flow sensitivity after CDS 
trading. We expect firms with low credit risks can leave a part of the increased financing 
after adding cash holding while the increment of cash reserving is higher than that of 
leverage for firms with high credit risks. Thus, altogether, funds are in shortage and 
firms rely more on cash flow to invest, contributing to a positive β5. 
 
The specifications above are estimated by the first difference generalized method of 
moments (GMM) approach proposed by Arellano and Bond in 1991 to eliminate 
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endogeneity. In our estimations, two or more lags of each regressor are included as 
instrument variables and the instruments matrix also contains the time dummies. 
According to Roodman (2006), the instrument set, which starts from the lag n to the 
deeper one is only valid when the differenced residuals are not serially correlated in 
order n. Thus, to effectively use GMM, we need to ensure that differenced residuals are 
not nth-order serially correlated. We use an M(n) test to investigate this and, if there is 
no nth-order correlation, we would find the statistic is asymptotically standard normal. 
Moreover, a correct GMM model also requires that the instruments in the set are not 
correlated with the error term. We employ a Hansen test to avoid this concern. If the 
test cannot reject the null, the instruments used are valid and the statistic distributes like 
a χ2 function. 
 
4.2.2 Sample separation standard 
 
The literature shows that the potential effects of CDSs vary across different firm groups 
(Subrahmanyam et al., 2017; Ashcraft and Santos, 2009). In our research, two main 
sources leading to changes in investment for reference firms are increases of corporate 
leverage and cash reserve. After CDS trading, reference firms find it easier to obtain 
external financing but they also have an incentive to retain more cash for resisting 
threats from exacting creditors. However, these two effects are not same for every 
reference firm. When CDSs reduce the frictions on the credit supply side, most of this 
easing targets firms with low credit risks and so firms with high credit risks may not 
benefit much. Correspondingly, healthy firms are relatively not affected by exacting 
creditors and have less pressure of raising cash compared to the counterpart. As a result, 
we have sufficient reasons to anticipate that the CDS effects on investment and the 
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investment-cash flow sensitivity are different across groups. 
 
Since the CDS effects may be related with the credit risk of reference firms, we split 
the sample by a variety of measures for firm quality. Two kinds of credit proxies are 
employed in our analyses. One is liquidity indicators including cash flow level and 
coverage ratio. High liquidity firms are popular among investors and can benefit more 
from credit easing due to the initiation of the CDS market. On the other hand, they may 
be not affected by exacting creditors as much as low liquidity firms. Firms with strong 
cash flows have sufficient funds to cover their maturing debts and face small probability 
of debt restructuring which would bring exacting creditors after CDS trading. Similarly, 
firms with high coverage ratios have sufficient income to pay interest expenses and 
their intentions to increase cash reserve for defending against exacting creditors are low. 
We display a statistics comparison of average leverage before and after CDS trading for 
high and low liquidity firms in table A 8. It shows that the increasing ratio of leverage 
for high liquidity firms are much greater than that for low liquidity firms. 
Simultaneously, high liquidity firms have smaller increasing ratio of cash holdings 
compared to low liquidity firms. So, high cash flow/coverage ratio firms are more likely 
to invest more and depend less on cash to invest after CDS trading. The sample is 
divided into three groups: liquidity sufficient firms, liquidity moderate firms and 
liquidity constraint firms. Liquidity sufficient, moderate and constrained firms 
represent firms’ average coverage ratios or cash flows are below 25th, above 25th but 
below 75th and above 75th percentile of the liquidity distribution for firms in the same 
industry. 
 
The other is integrity indicators that contain firm age and credit rating. Firm age is a 
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valuable credit proxy, especially considering the existence of information asymmetry. 
Young firms normally have few debit records and financial data, making them looked 
high-risk to outside investors. Evidence from the bond market shows that an issuer’s 
age is negatively related to the cost of debt financing. It is probable that older firms can 
obtain more external financing than younger firms under increased credit supply due to 
the beginning of the CDS market. Rating agencies are gatekeepers of the economy and 
are believed to have firms’ private information. There is no doubt that firms with high 
rating grades are popular among lenders and so we expect, once CDS trading has begun, 
high rating firms can gain more credit increase than firms with low ratings. 
Consequently, we argue that old firms and firms with high ratings can implement more 
investments and display lower investment-cash flow sensitivity after the inception of 
CDS trading. We construct integrity reliable, ordinary and suspicious subsamples in 
which firms’ ages or average ratings are below 25th, above 25th but below 75th and 
above 75th percentile of the integrity distribution for firms in the same industry. 
 
A specified construction is that our liquidity and integrity indicators can also be viewed 
as proxies for internal and external financial constraints (Guariglia, 2008). That gives 
the opportunity to observe which sort of firms benefit more, constrained or 




Our research is based on two main databases: CRSP-Compustat and Markit. To start 
with, we need to know which firms are referenced by credit default swaps and the 
timing of inception of CDS trading. We obtain daily CDS quotes from the Markit CDS 
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database. Markit is a widely used source for dealer quotes of credit default swaps. We 
select all firms that have CDS quotes and use the first CDS appearance date of a firm, 
denominated in US dollars and having five years maturity, as the beginning time of 
CDS trading for that firm. The sample period is from January 2001 to December 2014. 
January 2001 is the start of the Markit CDS database. Then we merge selected firms 
with fundamental information from the CRSP-Compustat yearly database. CRSP-
Compustat contains financial, market, and statistical data of most listed North America 
firms and provides our research several firm-specific fundamentals. Since the financial 
sector is seen as different from other economic sectors, we take only non-financial firms 
into consideration. All firms are required to have no missing values for all interested 
variables. To exclude the impact of outliers, we windsorize all interested variables at 
the 5th and 95th percentiles. In the end, we obtain 741 CDS reference firms and 11683 
firm-year data. 
 
Table 4.1 summarizes the statistics of the variables included in our analyses. The 
literature shows that manufacturing sector investment can differ from others, so the 
broad sample including all sectors and the manufacturing sample should be investigated 
simultaneously. Following this routine, we report both the broad sample and the 
manufacturing sample. Panel A shows means and standard deviations of variables 
before and after CDS trading and their differences. Panel B reports the statistics for 
subsamples having diverse liquidity levels. Correspondingly, panel C describes the 






Table 4.1 Summary statistics. 
Panel A: Before vs after CDS trading 
Variables Broad Sample  Manufacturing Sample 
 




Before  After 
 
Difference 
Total Assets 9370.4 20556.02 
 11185.62***  8292.87 17398.97  9106.1*** 
 
(25226.6) (49038.5)    （21912.7） （34887.4）   
Iit /TAit-1 0.0817 0.0564 
 -0.0253***  0.0637 0.0405  -0.0232*** 
 
(0.0908) (0.0555)    （0.0473） （0.0297）   
CFit/TAit-1 0.1118 0.1036 
 -0.0008***  0.1124 0.1065  -0.0059*** 
 
(0.0861) (0.0678)    (0.0799) (0.0724)   
Qit-1 3.2272 3.0722 
 -0.155**  3.7026 3.5493  -0.1534 
 
(4.1719) (4.2528)    (4.4536) (4.7025)   
Number of 
observations 
    
 
    
5246 6437   11683   2317 3013   5430 
Panel B: Subsamples depend on firm liquidity 
       Using cash flow as the proxy        Using coverage ratio as the proxy 















Total Assets 24425.91 12684.78 11943.57   19409.18  13326.55  9702.638 
 （65750.41） (25149.3) （27777.13）  （42208.79） （38957.94） （21561.35） 
Iit /TAit-1 0.0908 0.0646 0.0492 
 0.0693 0.0664 0.0649 
 （0.0925） (0.0669) (0.0605)  （0 .0688） （0.0702） （0.0933） 
CFit/TAit-1 0.1679 0.1006 0.0549   0.1468 0.1087 0.0733 
 （0.0794） (0.06) (0.0591)  （0.0873） （0.0684） （0.0621） 
Qit-1 4.7626 2.763 2.1794 
  4.1213 3.1969 2.3215 
 （5.4493） (3.296) (3.9564)  （4.2085） （4.2582） （4.644） 
Number of 
observations 
       
3006 5960 2717  2463 4760 2176 
        
Manufacturing Sample       
        
Total Assets 22293.83 8923.78  13172.76   19928.28 9802.37  11668.98 
 (41767.22) (13736.18) (37707.74)  (41133.87) (15941.9) (27431.35) 
Iit /TAit-1 0.0594 0 .0509 0.0415 
 0 .0527 0.0513 0.0478 
 (0.0449) (0.0392) (0.0346)  (0.0462) (0.0366) (0.0389) 
95 
 
CFit/TAit-1 0.1673 0 .1045 0.0568 
 0.1487 0 .1074 0.0735 
 (0. 0687) (0.0567) (0. 0607)  (0.0817) (0.0565) (0.0553) 
Qit-1  5.8652  3.105  2.3048  4.7356 3.4128  2.6237 
 (5.7207) (3.4344) (4.5598)  (4.7335) (4.1528) (4.7076) 
Number of 
observations 
       
1384 2750 1296   1314 2606 1206 
Panel C: Subsamples depend on firm integrity 
 Using age as the proxy  Using credit rating as the proxy 














Total Assets  27090.4  11940.68 6917.76  
26795.71 14909.9 5356.1 
 (60360.77) (30141.62) (9871.11)  (40997.35) (47836.22) (7593.62) 
Iit /TAit-1  0.0591  0.0712 0.0728  0.066 0 .0648 0 .0757 
 (0 .0472) (0.0811) (0.0890)  (0.0543) (0.0647) (0.1044) 
CFit/TAit-1 0 .0999 0.1146  0.1019  
 0.1299 0 .1073  0.0842 
 (0.0628) (0 .0803) (0.0845)  (0.0666) (0.0772) (0 .0782) 
Qit-1 3.3608  3.0971  2.9283   4.1469  3.1132  2.1786 
 (4.2278) (3.8106) (4.9563)  (3.9914) (3.7942) (4.9595) 
Number of 
observations 
   
 
   
3620 5501 2562  2935 5859 2889 
        
Manufacturing Sample       
        
Total Assets 27469.45 7117.44  5943.05  25968.47  11559.01  3922.06 
 (47408.42) (13366.55) (8750.75) 
 (40358.69) (29245.61) (4199.67) 
Iit /TAit-1 0 .0497 0.0523 0 .0495 
 0.051 0 .0488 0.0547 
 (0.0307) (0.045) (0 .0419) 
 (0.0309) (0 .0361) (0.0541) 
CFit/TAit-1 0 .1122 0 .1143 0 .0949 
 0 .1416 0 .1061 0.0818 
 (0.0617) (0.0752) (0.0784) 
 (0.0599) (0.0691) (0.0777) 
Qit-1 4.4371  3.3905  2.9313 
  5.2642 3.4104  2.336 
 (5.3403) (3.952) (4.4703) 
 (4.9372) (4.0406) (4.781) 
Number of 
observations 
       
1735 2425 1270   1384 2705 1341 
Panel A displays descriptive statistics for the broad sample and manufacturing sample. Iit is the firm’s fixed investment this 
term. TAit-1 is the firm’s total assets last term. Iit/TAit-1 is the relative value of investment. CFit is the firm’s cash flow this 
term. CFit /TAit-1 is the ratio of the firm’s cash flow this term to its total assets last term. Qit-1 is the ratio of equity market 
value last term to book value of asset last term. Panel B reports statistics for two samples depending on firm liquidity. We 
use cash flow and coverage ratio as two proxies. Liquidity sufficient, moderate and constrained firms represent firms’ average 
coverage ratios or cash flows are below 25th, above 25th but below 75th and above 75th percentile of the liquidity distribution 
for firms in the same industry. Panel C presents statistics for two samples depending on firm integrity. We use firm age and 
credit rating as the proxies. Integrity reliable, ordinary and suspicious firms represent firms’ average ages or credit ratings 
are below 25th, above 25th but below 75th and above 75th percentile of the integrity distribution for firms in the same indus try. 




The statistics comparison showed in panel A can give us some insight into what happens 
after introducing credit default swaps. We find that firms’ total assets, for both samples, 
increase dramatically after the inception of CDS trading. This is not surprising 
considering the ‘after data’ are always later than the ‘before data’ and firms’ total assets 
should inflate with years. Moreover, banks prefer to sell CDS contracts that reference 
large firms (Subrahmanyam et al., 2014). Investment scaled by total assets last term (Iit 
/TAit-1) decreases 30.97% for the broad sample and 19.69% for the manufacturing 
sample after CDS trading. This implies that CDS reference firms may have to reduce 
investment for increasing cash reserve to resist exacting debtors. Cash flow divided by 
total assets last year (CFit/TAit-1) decreases slightly after the onset of CDS trading. 
Although statistically significant, the difference is very small economically. This 
suggests that, the operation and performance of firms do not change much. The decrease 
of Tobin’s Q is quite obscure, especially for the manufacturing sample. 
 
We divide the broad and manufacturing samples into three subsets based on firm 
liquidity measured by two proxies, cash flow and coverage ratio. Panel B shows that, 
for the broad sample, total assets, investment scaled by total assets last year (Iit /TAit-1) 
and Tobin’s Q increase monotonically with the increase of cash flow scaled by total 
assets last year (CFit/TAit-1). Using coverage ratio as the liquidity proxy, we find similar 
results. For the manufacturing sample, the subset of liquidity moderate has the lowest 
total assets while the subset of liquidity sufficient has the highest no matter which 
indicator is used. However, other variables that Iit /TAit-1, CFit/TAit-1 and Tobin’s Q are 
on the same growth trend of coverage ratio. Despite having the largest total assets that 
scales investment, the liquidity sufficient group still has the highest ratio of investment 
to total assets (Iit /TAit-1). This indicates that liquidity sufficient firms invest much more 
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than firms in the other groups.  
 
We also split the samples depending on firm integrity gauged by age and credit rating. 
For the broad sample, in Panel C, total assets and Tobin’s Q increase monotonically 
with the raising of firm age or credit rating. Nevertheless, the group we name ‘integrity 
suspicious’ has the largest investment to total assets ratio (Iit /TAit-1) when use both 
proxies. This result differs greatly from findings in Panel B and the probable reason is 
that firm integrity is highly correlated with firm total assets and the smallest total assets 
leads to the largest I it /TAit-1. The ratio of cash flow to total assets (CFit/TAit-1) is highest 
for integrity ordinary firms using firm age as the proxy but highest for integrity reliable 
firms using credit rating. For the manufacturing sample, integrity ordinary firms have 
the largest Iit /TAit-1 and CFit/TAit-1 when using firm age as the proxy but integrity 
reliable firms have the largest when using credit rating. Total assets and Tobin’s Q 
perform similarly with those in the broad sample.  
 
4.3 Empirical Results 
 
Our interest is to investigate the CDS effect on a firm’s investment and whether the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow changes after introducing credit default swaps. In 
this section, we first present empirical findings for the broad and the manufacturing 
samples. Afterwards, considering the CDS effects may vary across different groups, we 






4.3.1 The CDS impacts on investment and the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
Table 4.2 The average CDS effects for broad and manufacturing sample  
Dependent variable:   Iit/TAit-1 
Broad Sample   Manufacturing Sample 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 Iit-1/TAit-2 0.344*** -0.0398  0.353*** 0.255* 
 (0.093) (0.0766)  (0.0507) (0.131) 
 Qit-1 
0.000731 -0.00101  -0.0000578 0.0000481 
 (0.000664) (0.00092)  (0.00024) (0.000459) 
 CFit/TAit-1 0.310*** 0.238*** 
 0.197*** 0.0594 
 (0.0936) (0.0889)  (0.0329) (0.117) 
 CDS Startit 
-0.00432** -0.0405**  0.0029 -0.0242** 
 (0.0022) (0.0177)  (0.00213) (0.00989) 
 CFit/TAit-1×CDS Startit  0.345**   0.256** 
  (0.167)   (0.102) 
      
Observations 11,683 11,683  5,430 5,430 
M1(p) 0.000 0.045  0.000 0.007 
M2(p) 0.619 0.107  0.435 0.455 
Hansen(p) 0.178 0.387  0.435 0.514 
Table 4.2 shows results of equation 1 and 2 for the broad sample and the manufacturing industry. Iit/TAit-1 is 
the relative value of investment. Iit-1/TAit-2 is one lag of the relative value of investment. Q it-1 is the ratio of 
equity market value last term to book value of asset last term. CFit /TAit-1 is the ratio of the firm’s cash flow 
this term to its total assets last term. CDS Startit equals 0 for investments occurring before CDS trading, 1 
otherwise. Observations are the numbers of observations. M1 and M2 are tests for first-order and second order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced errors. Hansen is the result of Hansen test. ***,**,* indicates the 





Columns (1) and (2), in table 4.2, show the regression results of equations (4.1) and 
(4.2) for the broad sample and corresponding columns (3) and (4) display that for the 
manufacturing sample. We can readily see that the coefficient estimate for CDS Start it 
in column (1) is negative and statistically significant, which suggests that the 
investment of reference firms decreases after CDS trading when we consider all 
industries. Column (2) shows that the coefficient on interaction of CDS Startit and 
CFit/TAit-1 is positive and significant at 5% confidence level, indicating that, after the 
onset of CDS trading, the firms are more dependent on their cash flows for investments. 
Moreover, the decreased investment and the raised investment-cash flow sensitivity 
could be indirect evidence that, on average, the easing of credit supply is overwhelmed 
by the need for reserving cash attributed to the introduce of credit default swaps. For 
the manufacturing sample, the effect of CDS on a firm’s investment is not significant. 
However, we also observe the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction. 
 
Coefficients of other regressors are mostly consistent with findings from the literature. 
As predicted, the investment this term positively and significantly correlated with the 
investment last term and there is definitely an intertemporal effect on financial decisions. 
Columns (1), (2) and (3) show that the coefficients on CFit/TAit-1 are positive and 
significant at 1% confidence level, which signifies that cash flow is a very important 
source for a firm’s investment. Coefficients on Qit-1 are insignificant and the probable 
reason could be that the effect of Tobin’s Q is explained by lags of other regressors used 






4.3.2 The CDS impacts with different liquidities 
Table 4.3 Using cash flow as the liquidity proxy 
Panel A: Broad Sample  Dependent Variable: Iit/TAit-1 
 Liquidity sufficient   Liquidity moderate  Liquidity constrained 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.253** 0.207* 
  0.245*** 0.206**  0.133** 0.143** 
 (0.122) (0.116)  (0.082) (0.096)  (0.0551) (0.0689) 
Qit-1 0.000234 0.000436  0.001144 -0.000189  -0.000484 -0.000683 
 (0.000472) (0.000619)  (0.000738) (0.00104)  (0.000714) (0.000851) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.410*** 0.444*** 
 0.411*** 0.222***  0.147*** 0.0132 
 (0.115) (0.132)  (0.109) (0.075)  (0.056) (0.074) 
CDS Start it -0.00586 -0.0167 
 -0.00148 -0.0021  -0.00980** -0.0195*** 
 (0.00439) (0.0217)  (0.00274) (0.0085)  (0.00467) (0.00605) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it  0.0679   0.129   0.186** 
  (0.135)   (0.081)   (0.0892) 
Observations 3006 3006  5960 5960  2717 2717 
M1(p) 0.001 0.001  0.029 0.017  0.033 0.021 
M2(p) 0.245 0.187  0.175 0.128  0.167 0.184 
Hansen(p) 0.933 0.264  0.198 0.186  1 1 
Panel B: Manufacturing 
Sample 
 Dependent Variable: Iit/TAit-1 
 Liquidity sufficient   Liquidity moderate  Liquidity constrained 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.394*** 0.351***  0.294*** 0.253***  0.101 0.177** 
 (0.0491) (0.0458)  (0.0623) (0.0745)  (0.0982) (0.0851) 
Qit-1 -0.000174 -0.000203  0.000758 0.000726  -0.000364 -0.000468 
 (0.00024) (0.000262)  (0.000583) (0.000698)  (0.000507) (0.000416) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.236*** 0.328*** 
 0.141*** 0.244***  0.0443 0.0154 
 (0.0478) (0.0688)  (0.0313) (0.0598)  (0.0646) (0.0692) 
CDS Start it 0.00572 0.0359***  0.00485 0.0235***  -0.00463* -0.00933** 
 (0.00393) (0.0132)  -0.00386 (0.00878)  (0.0026) (0.00429) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it  -0.194***   -0.194**   0.107 
  (0.0714)   (0.0783)   (0.0703) 
Observations 1384 1384  2750 2750  1296 1296 
M1(p) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.001  0.023 0.004 
M2(p) 0.326 0.306  0.487 0.356  0.295 0.37 
Hansen(p) 1 1   1 1   1 1 
Table 4.3 shows results using cash flow as the proxy. Iit/TAit-1 is the relative value of investment. Iit-1/TAit-2 is one lag of the relative 
value of investment. Qit-1 is the ratio of equity market value last term to book value of asset last term. CFit /TAit-1 is the ratio of the 
firm’s cash flow this term to its total assets last term. CDS Startit equals 0 for investments occurring before CDS trading, 1 otherwise. 
Observations are the numbers of observations. Number of ID is the number of firms. M1 and M2 are tests for first-order and second 
order serial correlation in the first-differenced errors. The criterion for sample splitting has been shown in Table 1. ***,**,* indicates 
the difference is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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According to Subrahmanyam et al. (2017), liquidity constrained firms are more likely 
to store cash for resisting exacting debtors. Moreover, Ashcraft and Santos (2009) show 
that safe firms benefit more from external financing than risky firms. Therefore, it is 
probable that firms with different liquidities behave divergently when they make 
investment decisions. 
 
Table 4.3 lists empirical results for liquidity sufficient, liquidity moderate and liquidity 
constrained subsamples based on firms’ cash flow levels. Panel A shows that 
coefficients on CDS Startit in columns (1) and (3) are insignificant. However, that in 
column (5) is negative and significant at 5% confidence level. This comparison 
indicates that investments of firms with sufficient and moderate liquidities do not 
change much but investments of liquidity constrained firms decrease obviously after 
the inception of CDS trading. This could be explained by the finding from 
Subrahmanyam et al. (2017) that liquidity constrained firms hold more cash than their 
counterparts after the CDS market has started. Columns (2), (4) and (6) show regression 
results of equation (4.2) that investigates the CDS effect on the sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow. Coefficients on CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it in Columns (2) and (4) are 
insignificant but the coefficient in column (6) is positive and significant, suggesting that 
liquidity constrained firms depend more on cash to invest than they were before the 
emergence of the CDS market. 
 
Panel B of table 3 shows results using the manufacturing sample. Similarly, we find 
that the coefficient on Startit is significant in the fifth column but not in the first or the 
third. In manufacturing industry, firms with constrained liquidit ies also experience 
reduced investments after credit default swaps reference their debts. Coefficients on 
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CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it in Columns (2) and (4) are negative and significant but the 
coefficient in column (6) is insignificant, signifying that liquidity unconstrained 
manufacturing firms, especially sufficient manufacturing firms, depend less on cash to 
invest after the onset of CDS trading but liquidity constrained manufacturing firms do 
not. This implies that liquidity constrained manufacturing firms may not enjoy the 
credit supply easing caused by the activation of the CDS market. Coefficients on 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it in columns (2) and (4) of panel B are negative. However, that in 
column (6) of panel A is positive. This heterogeneity is due to the different dominance 
of two CDS effects. Liquidity moderate and sufficient firms can benefit more from 
credit easing but have less need to increase cash reserves, so rely less on cash flows to 
invest. However, liquidity constrained firms cannot benefit as much but demand more 
















Table 4.4 Using coverage ratio as the liquidity proxy  
Panel A: Broad Sample  Dependent Variable: Iit/TAit-1 
 
Liquidity sufficient   Liquidity moderate  Liquidity constrained    
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.365*** 0.425***    0.167** 0.160**  0.0299 0.0652 
 (0.0555) (0.0507)  (0.0697) (0.0701)  (0.0914) (0.0688) 
Qit-1 0.000346 0.000403 
 0.000684* 0.000667*  0.00065 0.000136 
 (0.000773) (0.000638)  (0.000382) (0.000366)  (0.000488) (0.000453) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.282*** 0.285***  0.231*** 0.175***  0.438*** 0.516** 
 (0.0618) (0.0547)  (0.0511) (0.0481)  (0.167) (0.207) 
CDS Start it 0.00816** 0.0260*** 
 -0.000969 -0.015  -0.0146** -0.00902 
 (0.00401) (0.00974)  (0.0031) (0.00996)  (0.00703) (0.0214) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it  -0.123**   0.104   0.0284 
  (0.0517)   (0.083)   (0.307) 
Observations 2463 2463  4760 4760  2176 2176 
M1(p) 0.000 0.000  0.003 0.003  0.018 0.039 
M2(p) 0.16 0.185  0.168 0.165  0.27 0.353 
Hansen(p) 0.985 1  0.992 1  1 1 
Panel B: Manufacturing 
Sample 
 Dependent Variable: Iit/TAit-1 
   
Liquidity sufficient   Liquidity moderate  Liquidity constrained    
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.327*** 0.326***  0.530*** 0.448***  0.206*** 0.302*** 
 (0.0533) (0.0554)  (0.0441) (0.0549)  (0.0675) (0.102) 
Qit-1 0.000818 0.000488 
 0.000430** 6.47e-05  3.41e-05 0.000164 
 (0.000517) (0.000485)  (0.000214) (0.000192)  (0.000383) (0.000445) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.189*** 0.291***  0.0873*** 0.149***  0.171*** -0.0015 
 (0.0517) (0.0540)  (0.0295) (0.0539)  (0.0577) (0.0775) 
CDS Start it 0.00867** 0.0356***  0.00126 0.00347  0.00511 -0.0164 
 (0.00366) (0.00842)  (0.00275) (0.00789)  (0.00428) (0.012) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it 
 -0.212***   -0.0217   0.275 
  (0.0508)   (0.0705)   (0.222) 
Observations 1,314 1,314  2,606 2,606  1,206 1,206 
M1(p) 0.001 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.031 0.035 
M2(p) 0.244 0.31  0.115 0.423  0.972 0.816 
Hansen(p) 1 1   1 1   1 0.676 
Table 4.4 shows results using coverage ratio as the proxy. Iit/TAit-1 is the relative value of investment. Iit-1/TAit-2 is one lag of the relative 
value of investment. Qit-1 is the ratio of equity market value last term to book value of asset last term. CFit /TAit-1 is the ratio of the 
firm’s cash flow this term to its total assets last term. CDS Startit equals 0 for investments occurring before CDS trading, 1 otherwise. 
Observations are the numbers of observations. M1 and M2 are tests for first-order and second order serial correlation in the first-
differenced errors. Hansen is the result of Hansen test. The criterion for sample splitting has been shown in Table 1. ***,**,* indicates 




Table 4.4 reports results of the subsamples based on firms’ coverage ratios that defined 
as the profit before tax and interest divided by interest payments. Coverage ratio is a 
widely used liquidity proxy measuring a firm’s capacity to repay debt. Panel A of table 
4.4 shows that the coefficient, in column (1), on CDS Startit for liquidity sufficient firms 
is positive and significant while that, in column (5) for liquidity constrained firms is 
negative and significant. This indicates that firms having strong repayment ability 
invest more after CDS trading but firms with limited liquidity reduce their investments 
after that. This conflict is due to the different CDS effects on liquidity sufficient and 
constrained firms in dimensions of credit supply easing and the need for storing cash. 
The coefficient on CDS Start it in column (3) is insignificant and can be attributed to the 
offset of raising both leverage and cash holding. The coefficient on CFit/TAit-1×CDS 
Start it in Column (2) is negative and statistically significant at 1% confidence level 
signifying that only liquidity sufficient firms have a lower investment-cash flow 
sensitivity and loosed financial constraints after the introduction of CDS trading. 
 
Results for the manufacturing sample are similar to findings from panel A. Liquidity 
sufficient firms implement more investment after the inception of CDS trading and 
depend less on cash flow to invest. However, we do not observe the negative and 
significant coefficient on CDS Start it in column (5) of panel B. In general, we find that, 
compared to other industries, manufacturing benefits more from the beginning of the 







4.3.3 The CDS impacts with different integrities 
Table 4.5 Using firm age as the integrity proxy 
Panel A: Broad Sample  Dependent Variable: Iit/TAit-1 
 
Integrity reliable   Integrity ordinary  Integrity suspicious    
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.353*** 0.263***  0.303*** 0.265***  0.266*** 0.253*** 
 (0.0768) (0.0948)  (0.0723) (0.0822)  (0.0915) (0.0911) 
Qit-1 0.000280 0.000193  0.000617 0.000528  -0.000435 -0.000667 
 (0.000286) (0.000240)  (0.000456) (0.000483)  (0.000422) (0.000431) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.245*** 0.273*** 
 0.339*** 0.342***  0.264*** 0.243*** 
 (0.0488) (0.0564)  (0.0650) (0.0732)  (0.0702) (0.0790) 
CDS Start it -0.00239 0.00487  -0.00152 0.000602  -0.00826* -0.0187* 
 (0.00347) (0.00478)  (0.00358) (0.00842)  (0.00459) (0.0111) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it 
 -0.0767*   -0.0233   0.0818 
  (0.0433)   (0.0802)   (0.0978) 
Observations 3,620 3,620  5,501 5,501  2,562 2,562 
M1(p) 0.000 0.000  0.005 0.046  0.011 0.011 
M2(p) 0.594 0.254  0.88 0.97  0.53 0.556 
Hansen(p) 0.787 1  1 1  1 1 
Panel B: Manufacturing 
Sample 
 Dependent Variable: Iit/TAit-1 
 
Integrity reliable  Integrity ordinary  Integrity suspicious    
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.466*** 0.438*** 
 0.487*** 0.326***  0.221*** 0.227*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0654)  (0.0647) (0.0564)  (0.0654) (0.0626) 
Qit-1 0.000108 1.95e-05  -0.000289 -0.000713  -0.000215 -0.000253 
 (0.000164) (0.000182)  (0.000470) (0.000563)  (0.000426) (0.000411) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.121*** 0.230***  0.167*** 0.241***  0.129** 0.101* 
 (0.0451) (0.0816)  (0.0342) (0.0597)  (0.0550) (0.0605) 
CDS Start it 0.00784** 0.0279** 
 -0.000857 0.00649  -0.000917 -0.00877 
 (0.00385) (0.0124)  (0.00295) (0.00826)  (0.00330) (0.00767) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it  -0.175*   -0.0517   0.0600 
  (0.0946)   (0.0734)   (0.0631) 
Observations 1,735 1,735  2,425 2,425  1,270 1,270 
M1(p) 0.000 0.001  0.000 0.000  0.001 0.000 
M2(p) 0.13 0.138  0.773 0.683  0.334 0.379 
Hansen(p) 1 0.429   1 0.999   1 1 
Table 4.5 shows results using firm age as the proxy. Iit/TAit-1 is the relative value of investment. Iit-1/TAit-2 is one lag of the relative 
value of investment. Qit-1 is the ratio of equity market value last term to book value of asset last term. CFit /TAit-1 is the ratio of the 
firm’s cash flow this term to its total assets last term. CDS Startit equals 0 for investments occurring before CDS trading, 1 otherwise. 
Observations are the numbers of observations. M1 and M2 are tests for first-order and second order serial correlation in the first-
differenced errors. Hansen is the result of Hansen test. The criterion for sample splitting has been shown in Table 1. ***,**,* indicates 
the difference is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
106 
 
Corresponding to calculations for firm liquidity, we also employ firm integrity to split 
our samples. Since the existence of information asymmetry, cash flow and coverage 
ratio sometimes do not tell the whole story and so firm integrity proxied by a firm’s age 
or credit rating could be an efficient indicator for outsiders. After CDS trading, lenders 
may treat older and younger firms differently, on the part of credit supply easing, as 
well as high-grade and low-grade firms. Simultaneously, existing creditors attributed to 
the emergence of the CDS market could also have distinct attitudes to different groups. 
As a result, the CDS effects on investment and the investment-cash flow sensitivity may 
vary across groups, which are based on firm integrity. 
 
Results of subsamples based on firm age are shown in table 4.5. We find that the 
coefficient estimate for CDS Start it in column (5) of panel A is negative and statistically 
significant, suggesting that integrity suspicious firms (younger firms) are inclined to 
reduce their investments after CDSs reference their debts. Economically, this reduction 
makes sense: compared with the sample mean of investment for younger firms (0.0728), 
the 0.00826 change in investment following CDS means an 11.35% decrease in the 
mean investment Iit /TAit-1. In contrast, the coefficients on CDS Startit in columns (1) 
and (3) are small and insignificant, which signifies that the effect of CDS on 
investments are quite weak for integrity reliable and moderate firms. In respect to the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity, we only find a significant coefficient on CF it/TAit-
1×CDS Startit for integrity reliable firms (older firms). The negative sign shows that 
financial constraints for older firms are loosed due to the inception of the CDS market. 
 
Panel B of table 4.5 reports the results when use the manufacturing sample. In column 
(1), the dummy of CDS Startit is positively correlated with investment and this 
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correlation is significant at 5% confidence level. This indicates that older manufacturing 
firms increase their investments following the onset of CDS trading. However, this 
influence is not true for middle aged or younger firms. Moreover, column (2) shows 
that the coefficient on CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it is negative and significant, which 
represents the investment-cash flow sensitivity for older manufacturing firms decreases 






















Table 4.6 Using credit rating as the integrity proxy  
Panel A: Broad Sample  Dependent Variable: Iit/TAit-1 
 
Integrity reliable   Integrity ordinary  Integrity suspicious    
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.244*** 0.239*** 
 0.320*** 0.255***  0.0470 0.181* 
 (0.0834) (0.0814)  (0.0815) (0.0923)  (0.122) (0.108) 
Qit-1 -2.49e-05 -0.000121  0.000240 -0.000171  0.000110 -0.00123 
 (0.000291) (0.000304)  (0.000453) (0.000497)  (0.00109) (0.00127) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.235*** 0.283***  0.246*** 0.289***  0.462*** 0.119 
 (0.0416) (0.0490)  (0.0521) (0.0510)  (0.143) (0.151) 
CDS Start it -0.00653 0.0138** 
 -0.00196 -0.00822  -0.0119** -0.0585** 
 (0.00416) (0.00611)  (0.00297) (0.0109)  (0.00569) (0.0247) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it  -0.121***   0.0296   0.563** 
  (0.0416)   (0.0944)   (0.277) 
Observations 2,935 2,935  5,859 5,859  2,889 2,889 
M1(p) 0.001 0.001  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.024 
M2(p) 0.118 0.126  0.366 0.24  0.702 0.916 
Hansen(p) 1 1  0.962 0.104  0.906 0.539 
Panel B: Manufacturing 
Sample 
 Dependent Variable: Iit/TAit-1 
 
Integrity reliable  Integrity ordinary  Integrity suspicious    
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.533*** 0.452***  0.222** 0.311***  0.315*** 0.299*** 
 (0.169) (0.0822)  (0.110) (0.0631)  (0.0794) (0.0765) 
Qit-1 0.000188 0.000112 
 0.000532 0.000562  -0.000496 -0.000485 
 (0.000346) (0.000159)  (0.000444) (0.000436)  (0.000503) (0.000381) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.0794 0.140*** 
 0.0985** 0.0725**  0.259*** 0.145** 
 (0.0509) (0.0393)  (0.0388) (0.0324)  (0.0373) (0.0642) 
CDS Start it 0.00766* 0.0176*** 
 -0.00271 -0.00600  -0.00186 -0.000934 
 (0.00448) (0.00623)  (0.00238) (0.00440)  (0.00521) (0.00792) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it  -0.0993**   0.0116   0.0549 
  (0.0408)   (0.0284)   (0.104) 
Observations 1,384 1,384  2,705 2,705  1,341 1,341 
M1(p) 0.002 0.001  0.001 0.000  0.004 0.004 
M2(p) 0.989 0.982  0.157 0.243  0.113 0.137 
Hansen(p) 0.347 1   0.981 1   1 1 
Table 4.6 shows results using credit raing as the proxy. Iit/TAit-1 is the relative value of investment. Iit-1/TAit-2 is one lag of the relative 
value of investment. Qit-1 is the ratio of equity market value last term to book value of asset last term. CFit /TAit-1 is the ratio of the 
firm’s cash flow this term to its total assets last term. CDS Startit equals 0 for investments occurring before CDS trading, 1 otherwise. 
Observations are the numbers of observations. M1 and M2 are tests for first-order and second order serial correlation in the first-
differenced errors. Hansen is the result of Hansen test. The criterion for sample splitting has been shown in Table 1. ***,**,* indicates 




Table 4.6 studies the CDS effects on investment and the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity conditional on firms’ credit ratings. Similar to previous findings, the 
coefficient on interested variable (CDS Start it) in column (5) of panel A is negative and 
significant at 5% confidence level. This evidence verifies that firms with low credit 
ratings have to reduce their investments for responding to the appearance of exacting 
creditors because of CDS trading. The reduction of investment is economically 
substantial. Relative to the sample mean Iit /TAit-1 of 0.0757, the 0.0119 lessening of 
investment after CDS trading represents a 15.72% decrease in the mean investment. 
Panel A of table 4.6 shows that the coefficient on CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it is negative and 
significant in column (2) but positive and significant in column (6). This indicates that 
the sensitivity of investment to cash flow decreases for firms with high credit ratings 
while it increases for firms with that low. Furthermore, it implies that creditors treat 
high and low rating firms differently when they lend and after lending. 
 
We also use the manufacturing sample to replicate the analyses showed in Panel A and 
display the results in Panel B. We find that CDS trading increases the investment for 
integrity reliable firms (high credit rating firms here) but has little effect on integrity 
moderate or suspicious firms. In addition, the dependence of investment on cash flow 
is decreased for firms with high credit ratings while that is not obviously changed for 
medium or low credit rating firms. These results are highly robust to the findings when 







4.3.4 The CDS impacts for excellent and inferior firms  
Table 4.7 Using firm age and credit rating as the proxies 
Panel A: Broad Sample Dependent Variable: Iit/TAit-1 
 
Excellent firms  Inferior firms   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.298** 0.269**  0.124 0.143 
 (0.117) (0.116)  (0.120) (0.116) 
Qit-1 3.72e-05 -0.000342 
 -0.000631 -0.000447 
 (0.000278) (0.000337)  (0.000596) (0.000555) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.238*** 0.319***  0.332** 0.365** 
 (0.0901) (0.118)  (0.163) (0.178) 
CDS Start it 0.000883 0.0255**  -0.0201** 0.00156 
 (0.00670) (0.0103)  (0.00858) (0.0148) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it 
 -0.196***   -0.195 
  (0.0731)   (0.172) 
Observations 1,647 1,647  1,157 1,157 
M1(p) 0.009 0.019  0.028 0.015 
M2(p) 0.735 0.466  0.487 0.712 
Hansen(p) 1 1  1 1 
Panel B: Manufacturing 
Sample 
Dependent Variable: Iit/TAit-1 
 
Excellent firms  Inferior firms   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.448*** 0.418***  0.330*** 0.339*** 
 (0.0731) (0.0772)  (0.0526) (0.0509) 
Qit-1 9.27e-05 6.53e-05 
 -3.29e-05 -5.26e-05 
 (0.000208) (0.000183)  (0.000370) (0.000349) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.0436** 0.0896***  0.134*** 0.121*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0290)  (0.0311) (0.0309) 
CDS Start it 0.0152** 0.0207***  -0.0127*** -0.0108* 
 (0.00646) (0.00680)  (0.00486) (0.00627) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it 
 -0.0663**   0.0313 
  (0.0313)   (0.0656) 
Observations 821 821  566 566 
M1(p) 0.015 0.018  0.001 0.001 
M2(p) 0.712 0.727  0.779 0.752 
Hansen(p) 1 1  1 1 
Table 4.7 uses firm age and credit rating to distinguish excellent and inferior firms. Excellent firms are older firms 
with high credit rating and inferior firms are younger firms with that low. Iit-1/TAit-2 is one lag of the relative value 
of investment. Qit-1 is the ratio of equity market value last term to book value of asset last term. CFit /TAit-1 is the 
ratio of the firm’s cash flow this term to its total assets last term. CDS Start it equals 0 for investments occurring 
before CDS trading, 1 otherwise. M1 and M2 are tests for first-order and second order serial correlation in the first-
differenced errors. Hansen is the result of Hansen test. ***,**,* indicates the difference is statistically significant at 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Generally speaking, external financers would not judge a firm by one dimension only. 
To relieve this concern, we construct subsamples having good or bad score in two 
dimensions. Table 4.7 uses the proxies firm age and credit rating to distinguish excellent 
and inferior firms. We define excellent firms as older firms with high credit ratings and 
inferior firms as younger firms with low ratings. Similarly, table 4.8 has excellent firms 
with high cash flows and credit ratings and inferior firms with low cash flows and credit 
ratings. 
 
As shown in panel A of table 4.7, the coefficient estimate for CDS Startit in column (3) 
is negative and statistically significant, indicating that young firms with low ratings 
reduce their investments after the inception of CDS trading. For older firms with high 
credit ratings, the CDS effect on investment is positive but not significant. A probable 
reason may be that the benefit of credit easing and the need to raise cash, which both 
result from the onset of CDS market, offset one another. However, credit default swaps 
affect the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for excellent firms. Column (2) shows 
that the coefficient on CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it is negative and significant at 1% 
confidence level. This implies that financial constraints for older and high rating firms 
are loosened somehow. 
 
Panel B reports the results for excellent and inferior firms using the manufacturing 
sample. An interesting finding is that the relationship between CDS trading and 
investment is positive and significant in column (1) but negative in column (3). These 
conflicting results reflect the different dominance in leverage increase and more cash 
reserves needed by firms. The leverage increase effect overwhelms the need for raising 
cash by excellent manufacturing firms and vice versa for inferior firms. This is because 
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excellent manufacturing firms benefit more from credit easing but suffer less of a 
burden from the outcome of exacting creditors. We also find that excellent 

























Table 4.8 Using cash flow and credit rating as the proxies 
Panel A: Broad Sample Dependent Variable: Iit/TAit-1 
 
Excellent firms  Inferior firms   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.146* 0.159* 
 0.128** 0.158** 
 (0.0823) (0.0849)  (0.0577) (0.0730) 
Qit-1 -0.000424 -0.000258  0.000307 5.51e-05 
 (0.000292) (0.000294)  (0.000542) (0.000560) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.245*** 0.235***  0.276*** 0.228*** 
 (0.0493) (0.0592)  (0.0577) (0.0811) 
CDS Start it -0.00302 0.00773 
 -0.0232** -0.0185* 
 (0.00578) (0.0102)  (0.00996) (0.0102) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it  -0.0396   -0.0208 
  (0.0570)   (0.0991) 
      
Observations 1,269 1,269  1,194 1,194 
M1(p) 0.022 0.029  0.039 0.008 
M2(p) 0.677 0.822  0.22 0.237 
Hansen(p) 1 1  1 1 
Panel B: Manufacturing 
Sample 
Dependent Variable: Iit/TAit-1 
 
Excellent firms  Inferior firms   
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.378*** 0.314** 
 0.293*** 0.322*** 
 (0.112) (0.137)  (0.0781) (0.0344) 
Qit-1 -0.000108 -0.000559  -0.000559 1.05e-05 
 (0.000199) (0.000445)  (0.000503) (0.000310) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.133*** 0.276***  0.190*** 0.103* 
 (0.0333) (0.0779)  (0.0497) (0.0600) 
CDS Start it 0.0128** 0.0374*** 
 -0.0101** -0.00580 
 (0.00617) (0.0121)  (0.00504) (0.00431) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Start it  -0.162***   0.00912 
  (0.0625)   (0.0922) 
Observations 797 797  611 611 
M1(p) 0.004 0.006  0.009 0.005 
M2(p) 0.805 0.925  0.374 0.692 
Hansen(p) 1 1  1 1 
Table 4.8 uses cash flow and credit rating to distinguish excellent and inferior firms.  Excellent firms are those with 
high cash flows and credit ratings and inferior firms are those with low cash flows and credit ratings. Iit-1/TAit-2 is 
one lag of the relative value of investment. Q it-1 is the ratio of equity market value last term to book value of asset 
last term. CFit /TAit-1 is the ratio of the firm’s cash flow this term to its total assets last term. CDS Start it equals 0 
for investments occurring before CDS trading, 1 otherwise. M1 and M2 are tests for first-order and second order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced errors. Hansen is the result of Hansen test. ***,**,* indicates the 




Table 4.8 shows the results for subsamples when use the proxies of cash flow and credit 
rating. Column (3) in panel A shows that the dummy CDS Startit is negatively and 
significantly correlated with the dependent variable, which suggests firms with both 
low cash flows and low credit ratings reduce their investments after the introducing of 
credit default swaps. Compared with the mean investment (0.0666) for inferior firms, 
the 0.0232 reduction in investment after CDS trading signifies a 34.83% decrease in the 
investment mean. The economic magnitude of this reduction is considerable. 
Unfortunately, we have not found significant coefficient on CFit/TAit-1×CDS Startit for 
either excellent or inferior firms. 
 
We show estimates for manufacturing subsamples in panel B of table 4.8. As found in 
table 4.7, column (1) shows a positive coefficient on CDS Startit while column (3) 
shows a negative. Manufacturing firms with high cash flows and credit ratings could 
improve their leverages easier after CDS trading and simultaneously they have less 
incentive to reserve cash for resisting exacting creditors. As a result, they increase their 
investments after CDSs commence to referencing their debts. However, low cash flow 
and credit rating firms experience relatively less leverage increase but have to raise their 
cash holdings leading to a decrease in their investments. We find a negative coefficient 
on the interaction of CFit/TAit-1 and CDS Startit in column (2) and it is significant at 1% 
confidence level. This negative sign indicates that the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
is decreased following CDS trading for excellent manufacturing firms.  
 
4.3.5 Does the liquidity of CDS market matter? 
 
In the previous analyses, we use CDS availability (a binary variable) to measure the 
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CDS impact on corporate investment and investment-cash flow sensitivity. The 
advantage for using that is to gauge the initiation time of each CDS clearly and focus 
on the changes this market brings to the economy. However, this key variable neglects 
the fact that liquidities of CDSs are different among our samples. If a CDS is not liquid, 
creditors cannot hedge their risks at lower cost and thus the incentive of increasing 
lending after CDS trading is weakened. Moreover, if a CDS buyer spends higher price 
to hedge his risk, he would be very tough in debt renegotiation. We re-estimate equation 
4.1 and 4.2 using different measure and display results in table 4.9.
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Table 4.9 Using CDS quotes number as the key variable  
Dependent variable:   Iit/TAit-1 
Broad Sample   Manufacturing Industry 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.242*** 0.0128  0.352*** 0.346*** 
 （0.0997） (0.0749)  (0.0541) (0.0526) 
Qit-1 -0.000605 -0.000836 
 -0.000441 -0.000179 
 （0.000968） (0.000882)  (0.000434) (0.000303) 
CFit/TAit-1 
0.354*** 0.328***  0.241*** 2.14*** 
 （0.0875） (0.0851)  (0.0368) (0.0348) 
CDS Quotes Numbertit 
-1.36e-06* -1.14e-05**  3.78e-07 -2.95e-6** 
 (7.11e-07) (4.97e-06)  (6.15e-07) (1.36e-6) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Quotes Numberit 
 
0.000104**   2.35e-05** 
 
 
(4.93e-05)   (1.15e-05) 
      
Observations 11,683 11,683  5,430 5,430 
M1(p) 0.012 0.025  0.000 0.015 
M2(p) 0.931 0.177  0.101 0.103 
Hansen(p) 0.272 0.388   0.115 0.302 
Table A.5 shows results of equation 1 and 2 for the broad sample and the manufacturing industry. Iit/TAit-1 is the 
relative value of investment. Iit-1/TAit-2 is one lag of the relative value of investment. Qit-1 is the ratio of equity 
market value last term to book value of asset last term. CFit /TAit-1 is the ratio of the firm’s cash flow this term to 
its total assets last term. CDS Quotes Numberit is the total number of CDS quotes during year t. Observations are 
the numbers of observations. M1 and M2 are tests for first-order and second order serial correlation in the first-
differenced errors. Hansen is the result of Hansen test. ***,**,* indicates the difference is statistically significant 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Because CDSs are traded over the counter, it is extremely hard to measure their liquidity. 
Following Saretto and Tookes (2013), we calculate the overall number of CDS quotes 
during year t and use the natural log of that as the liquidity proxy. This measure directly 
takes CDS liquidity into the concern and shows its influence on our study. Table 4.9 
shows that the coefficient estimate for CDS Quotes Numberit in column (1) is negative 
and statistically significant. This suggests that the investment of reference firms 
decreases when there is a liquid CDS market. Column (2) shows that the coefficient on 
interaction of CDS Quotes Numberit and CFit/TAit-1 is positive and significant at 5% 
confidence level, indicating that, when there is a liquid CDS market, the firms are more 
dependent on their cash flows for investments. For the manufacturing sample, the 
emerge of a liquid CDS market has on significant effect on firms’ investments. 
However, we still observe the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term.  
 
4.3.6 Does Financial Crisis matter? 
 
The financial crisis in 2007 has had a tremendous shock to the world’s economy. For 
the US CDS market, the nominal principle dropped dramatically from $58.24 trillion in 
2007 (the peak) to $12.29 trillion by the end of 2015 (www.bis.org). With such a big 
fall, we cannot neglect the potential influence of the financial crisis on this research. 
Investors may view CDSs differently before and after the financial crisis, so we split 
our sample into two groups that before financial crisis and after financial crisis. 
Equations 4.7 and 4.8 are re-estimated using different subsamples and we display 





Table 4.10 Using the broad sample before and after the financial crisis (2007)  
Dependent variable:   Iit/TAit-1 
Broad Sample 
 
Before 2007  After 2006 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.372*** 0.374***  0.131 0.135 
 （0.102） (0.102)  (0.102) (0.0940) 
Qit-1 -0.000232 -0.000171 
 0.00184* -0.000214 
 （0.000670） (0.000666)  (0.00109) (0.000641) 
CFit/TAit-1 
0.354*** 0.350***  0.343*** 0.504* 
 （0.0791） (0.0785)  (0.121) (0.260) 
CDS Startit 
-0.00314 -0.0146  -0.0149*** -0.00918 
 (0.00235) (0.0129)  (0.00565) (0.0308) 
CFit/TAit-1 × CDS Startit 
 
0.113   0.5436** 
 
 
(0.116)   (0.268) 
      
Observations 7,212 7,212  4,471 4,471 
M1(p) 0.005 0.004  0.000 0.004 
M2(p) 0.495 0.496  0.244 0.122 
Hansen(p) 0.146 0.172  0.249 0.103 
Table A.5 shows results of equation 1 and 2 for the broad sample and the manufacturing industry. Iit/TAit-1 is 
the relative value of investment. Iit-1/TAit-2 is one lag of the relative value of investment. Q it-1 is the ratio of 
equity market value last term to book value of asset last term. CFit /TAit-1 is the ratio of the firm’s cash flow 
this term to its total assets last term. CDS Quotes Numberit is the total number of CDS quotes during year t. 
Observations are the numbers of observations. M1 and M2 are tests for first-order and second order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced errors. Hansen is the result of Hansen test. ***,**,* indicates the difference 
is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4.11 Using the manufacturing sample before and after the financial crisis (2007)  
Dependent variable:   Iit/TAit-1 
Manufacturing Sample 
 
Before 2007  After 2006 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.319*** 0.332***  0.448*** 0.443*** 
 （0.0618） (0.0585)  (0.0602) (0.0539) 
Qit-1 -0.000234 6.38e-05  5.86e-05 4.34e-05 
 （0.000494） (0.000347)  (0.000145) (0.000143) 
CFit/TAit-1 
0.237*** 0.203***  0.126*** 0.0565 
 （0.0438） (0.0407)  (0.0360) (0.0717) 
CDS Startit 
0.00245 -0.00305  0.00159 -0.0230** 
 (0.00239) (0.00614)  (0.00302) (0.00989) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Startit 
 
0.0426   0.187** 
 
 
(0.0467)   (0.0801) 
      
Observations 3,380 3,380  2,050 2,050 
M1(p) 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
M2(p) 0.174 0.190  0.096 0.079 
Hansen(p) 0.157 0.121  0.189 0.503 
Table A.5 shows results of equation 1 and 2 for the broad sample and the manufacturing industry. Iit/TAit-1 is 
the relative value of investment. Iit-1/TAit-2 is one lag of the relative value of investment. Q it-1 is the ratio of 
equity market value last term to book value of asset last term. CFit /TAit-1 is the ratio of the firm’s cash flow 
this term to its total assets last term. CDS Quotes Numberit is the total number of CDS quotes during year t. 
Observations are the numbers of observations. M1 and M2 are tests for first-order and second order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced errors. Hansen is the result of Hansen test. ***,**,* indicates the difference 
is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4.10 shows that the coefficient on CDS Starti,t is negative and significant at 1% 
confidence level in column (3) but insignificant in column (1). This suggests that before 
the financial crisis, the increased leverage can compensate the need of adding cash 
reserves. Nevertheless, this balance is broken after the financial crisis. Firms have to 
reduce investments to adapt the situation that the increasing of needed cash holding is 
more than that of leverage. The coefficients on the interaction of CDS Start it and 
CFit/TAit-1 in column (2) and (4) tell the same story. The phenomenon that firms are 
more dependent on cash flow to invest after CDS trading is only significant for the 
period of post-financial crisis. Table 4.11 shows that the initiation of the CDS market 
has little effect on investment for manufacturing no matter before or after the financial 
crisis. However, we can readily find the coefficient estimate for the interaction term in 
column (4) of table 4.11 is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that 





In this chapter, we investigate the effects of credit default swaps (CDSs) on corporate 
investment and the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Using a CRSP-Compustat 
and Markit merged sample, we find that the investment of reference firms, on average, 
is decreased and the firms depend more on cash flow to invest after the inception of 
CDS trading. The results are generally robust no matter whether we use the 
manufacturing sample or the broad sample including all industries. Considering that 
CDS effects may vary across groups, we split the samples by a variety of firm quality 
measures. We find that liquidity sufficient firms and integrity reliable firms increase 
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their investments and have lower investment-cash flow sensitivity following the 
introduction of credit default swaps, while liquidity constrained firms and integrity 
suspicious firms reduce that and exhibit higher sensitivity. 
 
According to Augustin et al. (2016), to fully understand how CDSs affect a firm’s 
creditors and shareholders, it is essential to investigate the true impact of CDS trading 
on the firm’s behavior such as investment. This chapter fills that gap and, to our 
knowledge, we are the first to explore the CDS effects on corporate investment and the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. Moreover, we empirically examine the model 
proposed by Bolton and Oehmke (2011), which claims CDS trading generates tough 
creditors and influences a firm’s investment. Furthermore, we link the ex-ante CDS 
effect of leverage increasing verified by Saretto and Tookes (2013) and the ex-post CDS 
effect of more cash reserve needing discussed by Subrahmanyam et al. (2017) and study 
the dominance mechanism between these two effects. We find that these distinguish 
excellent firms from inferior firms and lead to different financial outcomes. This 
suggests that sometimes we cannot discuss benefits or disadvantages of CDSs simply 
on average.  
 
In general, the creation of credit derivatives is thought to be helpful in the economy. 
Greenspan (2004) concludes that credit derivatives contribute to a more efficient, 
resilient, and flexible financial system. Nevertheless, our results show the emergence 
of the CDS market reducing investment in the corporate sector. In addition, liquidity 
constrained firms and integrity suspicious firms that suffer from financial constraints 




These findings suggest a need for regulators to be flexible in making policies regarding 
credit default swaps. On the one hand, CDSs genuinely enhance welfare for some 
economic entities: increasing investments for excellent firms and loosening their 
financial constraints. Thus, it is not sensible to limit the development of the CDS market 
or deprive voting rights of CDS-protected creditors in debt renegotiation. On the other 
hand, CDSs worsen the plight of weaker firms: making it harder for them to implement 
investments and be more dependent on their cash flows. Thus, addressing the problem 
of exacting creditors is highly necessary. A balanced policy for CDSs is called for and 



















Chapter 5  
 
Credit Default Swaps, Dividend Policy and the Signaling 




The credit default swaps (CDSs) market emerged at the end of the last century and has 
attracted considerable academic interest. The effects, real or potential, of CDSs on 
corporate finance have been widely investigated. For example, CDS use is found to 
affect corporate structure (Saretto and Tookes, 2013), corporate default probability 
(Subrahmanyam et al., 2014), and corporate cash holding (Subrahmanyam et al., 2017). 
However, these studies focus only on the change of creditor-shareholder relationship 
resulting from CDS trading. As a tool for transferring risk, CDSs may also affect the 
relationship between managers and minority shareholders. In this research, we study 
the impacts of credit default swaps on dividend policy and the signaling role of 
dividends. 
 
The impetus for our study is that credit default swaps help banks to lay off their credit 
risk, thus reducing their concern for monitoring loans (Parlour and Winton, 2013). This 
variation weakens the protection from banks to minority shareholders. Easterbrook 
(1984) claims that a significant purpose of introducing external financing is to subject 
management to monitoring. Without this, outside shareholders lose the opportunity to 
be free riders and managers’ incentives are altered on dividend payments. According to 
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Jensen (1986), a rationale for paying dividends is to lessen the agency problem derived 
from the separation of control and ownership. The varying of third-party protection 
breaks the initial balance between two counterparties. La Porta et al. (2000) propose the 
substitute theory that firms under worse legal protection pay more dividends to build 
their reputations for external financing. If this theory works, we can expect that firms 
are inclined to pay, increase and continue to pay dividends after the introduction of 
CDS trading. Moreover, “empty creditors” may also help to increase the propensities 
for dividend payments following CDS trading. Bolton and Oechmke (2011) show that 
these empty creditors, who are insured against default but retain voting rights, are 
tougher in debt renegotiations, especially when they hold large CDS positions. Thus, 
following the referencing of firms’ debts by CDSs, those firms go into bankruptcy more 
easily, or offer greater compensation for financial distress, and management faces 
higher risk and cost for investing in negative NPV projects. The incentive towards 
“empire building” lessens and is replaced by a push towards cash disbursements.  
 
There may also be a CDS impact in the opposite direction. We start with the same idea 
that the emergence of a CDS market reduces third-party protection for outside 
shareholders. If the outcome theory (La Porta et al., 2000) holds, firms become less 
likely to pay, increase and continue to pay out cash. The theory suggests that firms 
under strong legal protection pay more dividends because their minority shareholders 
can readily use legal rights to pressure firms. Moreover, management caution towards 
exacting creditors reduces the probability of dividend payments, increases and 
continuities. Subrahmanyam et al. (2017) show that reference firms choose to increase 
their cash reserves after predicting the adverse effect from exacting creditors. This 
conservative practice can affect investment as well as dividend policy. Internal funds 
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are valuable due to their low costs compared with external funds. If firms would have 
to consume internal capital to build extra cash reserves, they have incentives to reduce 
cash distribution. The ultimate CDS impact on dividend policy will be determined by 
these conflicting effects and we will need to discover which dominates. Considering 
the CDS impact may vary with the severity of agency conflict, we also separately 
investigate that by groups. 
 
Why might CDSs influence the signaling role of dividends? Because they change 
managers’ incentive to pay dividends. Based on the substitute theory, after CDS trading 
has started, the underlying firm seeks to compensate for the reduced third-party 
protection by using dividend policy. Thus, compared with the situation without CDS 
trading, dividends are used less for the purpose of signaling future growth. Conversely, 
the outcome theory indicates that firms with decreased monitoring after CDS trading 
are given greater freedom to use their free cash flows. Consequently, if referenced firms 
pay dividends following the emergence of the CDS market then they must expect 
stronger income expansion in the future. In other words, the forecasting efficiency of 
dividends is strengthened. Due to the variation in dividend information content, we also 
expect a CDS effect on stock responses to dividend announcements. 
 
The substitute theory of La Porta et al. (2000) suggests that firms in a worse 
environment of investor protection are more likely to pay dividends to compensate this 
weakness. Moreover, exacting creditors accompanying with the onset of CDS trading 
(Bolton and Oechmke, 2011) put a pressure on managers keeping them from negative 
NPV projects. Thus, more free cash flows would be used to give cash disbursements. 




Hypothesis 1a: CDS reference firms are more likely to pay, increase and continue to 
pay dividends following the induction of CDSs. 
 
On the other hand, the outcome theory (La Porta et al., 2000) predicts that investors 
under poor legal protection cannot readily use rights to pressure firms. As a result, 
managers would have less incentive to give dividend payments. Additionally, 
Subrahmanyam et al. (2017) show that managers have to increase cash reserves to 
defend exacting creditors reducing the money can be used as cash disbursements. From 
this point of view, we proceed to the following alternative hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: CDS reference firms are less likely to pay, increase and continue to pay 
dividends following the induction of CDSs. 
 
CDSs change managers’ incentives to pay dividends and the connotation of that as well. 
Based on the substitute theory, dividends are used less, after CDS trading, for the 
purpose of signaling future growth. However, the outcome theory implies that if 
managers pay dividends without outside pressure, they must expect strong income 
expansion in the future. So, we have two alternative hypotheses for the CDS impact on 
the signaling role of dividends as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The signal role of dividends is weakened after the onset of CDS trading.  
 




We construct a p score matched sample to investigate the impact of CDSs on dividend 
policy and the signaling role of dividends. With the similar characters to receive CDS 
trading, p score matched non-CDS firms are more reasonable than other non-CDS firms 
using as the benchmark. We find, on average, that reference firms become more likely 
to pay, increase and continue to pay their dividends following the introduction of CDSs. 
Results are robust after controlling for firm-specific features affecting dividend policy, 
fixed firm effects and fixed time effects. We construct several subsamples for studying 
whether the CDS effects vary across groups and find that firms with higher free cash 
flows, older firms and larger firms are more affected by CDS trading. In addition, we 
find strong evidence for CDS trading reducing the signaling role of dividends.  
 
This chapter contributes to the literature in two strands. It adds to the literature on 
dividend policy by introducing the impact of CDS trading. Our results support the 
substitute theory and are in accordance with findings of Rozeff (1982), Fenn and Liang 
(2001) and Gan et al. (2011) that firms with weak protection are more willing to make 
dividend payments. Additionally, our work links to Easterbrook (1984), Grullon et al. 
(2002), Jagannathan and Stephens (2003) and DeAngelo et al. (2006), due to the 
evidence we find for the agency and the life-circle theory of dividends. This study sheds 
light on the CDS impact on corporate behavior, particularly dividend policy. Augustin 
et al. (2016) propose that a deep understanding of how CDSs affect firms’ creditors and 
shareholders is needed. Our findings suggest that CDSs affect not only the relation 
between creditors and shareholders but also that between controlling and outside 
shareholders. This relates to Bolton and Oechmke (2011), Saretto and Tookes (2013) 




The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the methodology 
of our study. Section 5.3 describes data. Section 5.4 provides empirical results and 
analyses of CDS impacts on dividend policy, the signaling role of dividends and stock 




5.2.1 The effect of CDSs on dividend policy 
 
Our main interest is to investigate the impact of CDS use on corporate payout policy. 
More specifically, we examine how probabilities of dividend payments, increases, 
continuities and decreases change after the emergence of the CDS market. To 
implement our tests, the following models are employed. 
 
Pr(Dividend payments)i,t = c + β1CDS Starti,t + Ʃ βj Control variablesj + αi + αt + εit.    (5.1) 
 
Pr(Dividend increases)i,t = c + β1CDS Starti,t + Ʃ βj Control variablesj + αi + αt + εit.    (5.2) 
 
Pr(Dividend continuities)i,t = c + β1CDS Starti,t + Ʃ βj Control variablesj + αi + αt + εit.  (5.3) 
 
Pr(Dividend decreases)i,t = c + β1CDS Starti,t + Ʃ βj Control variablesj + αi + αt + εit.    (5.4) 
 
Dividend payments is the first dependent variable that equals 1 if the firm i pays a 
dividend in the time t, 0 otherwise. Dividend increases is a binary variable that is given 
value 1 if a firm’s dividend payment this year is more than in the previous year. For 
firms continuously pay dividends in year t-1 and year t, dividend continuities equals 1, 
129 
 
0 otherwise. The variable of dividend decreases equals 1 when firms pay lower dividend 
than they did in the previous year. Our focus is the dummy variable CDS Start it, which 
equals 1 in the onset year of CDS trading and years after, 0 otherwise. 
 
Earlier studies show that a series of factors can affect firms’ dividend policy making, 
so we include control variables which are common in the literature into our 
specifications to remove potential influences. First, we include firm size (natural log of 
the firm’s total assets) to control for the general ability to distribute cash. Large firms 
can most easily obtain external financing and have probably less investment opportunity, 
so they are more likely to pay, increase and continue to pay dividends. Leverage ratio 
(total liability over total assets) is used to control for the extent of financial strain. Firms 
with high leverages facing capital pressure readily reduce or omit dividend payouts. To 
control for the influence of profitability on dividend policy, we employ ROA (operating 
income over total assets) into our models; highly profitable firms are more willing to 
pay cash to their shareholders (Shao et al., 2010). We expect ROA to be positively 
related to dividend payments, increases and continuities. 
 
We include growth (one-year sales growth) and Tobin’s q (market value to book value) 
to control for firms’ investment opportunities. Firms blessed with abundant investment 
opportunities may be reluctant to pay or continue to pay dividends because internal 
funds are so valuable for them. However, benefiting from the opportunities, they have 
high probability of investing in positive NPV projects and generate sufficient cash flows 
to increase dividends. Thus, we predict the coefficients on growth/Tobin’s q are 
negative when we use Pr(dividend payments) and Pr(dividend continuities) as 
dependent variables but positive when Pr(dividend increases) is considered. We also 
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include cash holding (cash and short-term investment over total assets) to control for 
the capital adequacy. Firms with greater cash holdings find it easier to pay, increase and 
continue to pay dividends. Following Ben-Nasr (2015), Louis and Urcan (2015), we 
use RE ratio (retained earnings over common equity) to control for the life stage of a 
firm. The life-cycle theory suggests that firms with high RE ratio are in the stage of 
maturity, with sufficient money but few investment opportunities, and thus highly likely 
to disgorge cash. Furthermore, all of our specifications include firm fixed effects and 
time fixed effects to eliminate the concern of existing year and time-invariant firm 
differences. 
 
5.2.2 Sample separation standard  
 
The agency problem between managers and outside shareholders raises the concern that 
insiders will proceed with negative NPV projects for building their own empires, 
requiring dividend payouts. An instinctive idea is that firms with higher free cash flows 
need to grant more cash disbursements than firms with lower free cash flows. For this 
reason, we expect that the impact of CDSs on dividend policy varies with different 
levels of firms’ free cash flows. Since CDSs reduce banks’ incentives to monitor lenders, 
they are seen as harmful to investor protection. If the outcome theory works, firms will 
have lower probability to pay, increase and continue to pay dividends and this effect is 
stronger for firms with lower free cash flows. However, if substitute theory works, firms 
are more inclined to pay, increase and continue to pay dividends; and this effect is 
stronger for firms with higher free cash flows. Following Lang et al. (1991) and Chan 
(2006), we calculate free cash flows as operating income before depreciation minus 
interest expense, minus taxes and minus total dividends, taken over the total assets in 
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the last year. Based on this measure, our p score matched sample is divided into two 
groups with lower free cash flows and higher free cash flows. The former group is for 
firm-year observations whose free cash flows are below the medium level of peers in 
the same industry and the same year while the latter is for firm-year observations whose 
free cash flows are above. 
 
The life-cycle theory of dividends tells us that firms in their earlier stages have few 
internal funds but numerous investment opportunities, so they are less likely to pay, 
increase and continue to pay dividends. As time goes by, firms become more profitable 
but with weaker growth momentum, not needing to hold so much capital and starting 
to distribute their cash to shareholders. Therefore, we may infer that older firms face 
higher agency costs than younger ones and this difference might affect the influence of 
CDSs on dividend policy. The first year in which financial data appear in the Compustat 
database is identified as a firm’s earliest year and we use this baseline to calculate the 
firm’s age. Then, we split the sample into groups of younger firms and older firms. 
Similar to the criterion for free cash flow, we assign firm-year observations whose ages 
are below the medium age of their peers in the same industry and year into the younger 
firm group while the rest are assigned to the older. 
 
Firm size could be another factor relevant to the agency conflict. Larger firms always 
have complex ownership structure, various investor types and many shareholders. All 
these three dimensions aggravate the conflict between insiders and outsiders. 
Conversely, managers of smaller firms hold most shares and also have close 
relationships with other investors. This must be helpful in eliminating distrusts and 
reducing agency costs. Considering this divergence, we hypothesize the impact of CDS 
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use on dividend policy may depend on firm size. A firm-year is allocated to the small 
firm group if its firm size is smaller than the medium of firm-years in the same industry 
and year and vice versa. 
 
5.2.3 The influence of CDS on the signaling role of dividends 
 
Another interest of our research is to investigate the influence of CDSs on the signaling 
role of dividend policy. The literature suggests that firms use dividends as a positive 
signal to indicate their bright futures to outsiders and, due to the high cost of dividends, 
this signal is reliable. Since CDS trading may affect firms’ behaviors in dividend policy, 
we have sufficient reason to consider its influence on the signaling role of dividend 
policy. If the outcome theory applies, firms after inception of CDS trading have less 
pressure to pay dividends and so such payments would be more correlated with the 
prediction of future earnings growth. However, if the substitute theory works, the 
signaling role of dividends after CDS trading should become weaker and less exact. To 
complement our tests, the following models are used.  
 
(Ii,t - Ii,t-1)/BVEi,t-2 = c + β1Dividend paymentsi,t-1 + β2CDS Starti,t-1 + β3Dividend paymentsi,t-
1×CDS Starti,t-1 + Ʃ βj Control variablesj + αi + αt + εit.                           (5.5) 
 
(Ii,t - Ii,t-1)/BVEi,t-2 = c + β1Dividend increasesi,t-1 + β2CDS Starti,t-1 + β3Dividend increasesi,t-
1×CDS Starti,t-1 + Ʃ βj Control variablesj + αi + αt + εit.                           (5.6) 
 
(Ii,t - Ii,t-1)/BVEi,t-2 = c + β1Dividend continuitiesi,t-1 + β2CDS Starti,t-1 + β3Dividend 




(Ii,t - Ii,t-1)/BVEi,t-2 = c + β1Dividend decreasesi,t-1 + β2CDS Starti,t-1 + β3Dividend decreasesi,t-
1×CDS Starti,t-1 + Ʃ βj Control variablesj + αi + αt + εit.                           (5.8) 
 
We use Ii,t to denote a firm’s income before extraordinary items after dividend policy 
made in the year t-1 and BVEi,t-2 to denote a firm’s book value of equity one year before. 
Dependent variable (Ii,t - Ii,t-1)/BVE i,t-2 measures changes of firms’ earnings. Dividend 
paymentsi,t-1, Dividend increasesi,t-1, Dividend continuitiesi,t-1, Dividend decreasesi,t-1 
and CDS Start i,t-1 are indicators defined in the same way as previously. We create 
interactions of CDS Starti,t-1 with four dividend indicators to investigate the change of 
dividend’s signaling role after CDS trading. Following Nissim and Ziv (2001) and 
Aggarwal et al. (2012), we use ROEt-1 (operating income over book value of equity) 
and (Ii,t-1 - Ii,t-2)/BVE i,t-2 as our control variables. Because earnings are mean-reverting, 
we predict that the coefficients on these two variables are positive. Firm fixed effects 




Markit and CRSP-Compustat are the two sources used to build our sample for studying 
the impact of CDSs on a firm’s dividend policy and its signaling role. To identify firms 
whose debts are referenced by credit default swaps and the inception times, we obtain 
daily CDS quotes from the Markit CDS database. Markit gives CDS valuations every 
day according to their survey results from different CDS broker dealers. We use the 
first appearance time of a CDS denominated in US dollars with five years maturity as 
the inception time of CDS trading for its reference firm. The CDS sample period is from 
2001, when Markit starts records, to 2014. The information on dividend, income and 
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control variables are obtained from CRSP-Compustat annual database. Following 
earlier studies on dividends, we remove financial firms from our sample. All firm-year 
observations are required to have no missing values for all interested variables. To 
eliminate concerns with outliers, we windsorize all variables at the 1th and 99th 
percentiles. 
 
Table 5.1 summarizes the statistics of the main variables for our p score matched sample. 
We display the overall statistics summary in column 1. Since subsamples are used in 
some analyses, we also give statistics summaries on different groups. Columns 2 and 3 
show means and standard deviations of variables for firms with higher free cash flows 
and firms with lower free cash flows. Columns 4 and 5 report for younger firms and 
older firms while columns 6 and 7 describe groups of smaller and larger firms.
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Table 5.1 Summary statistics  
Dependent variable:    





Cash Flows   
Younger   Older   Smaller   Larger 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 
Dividend Payments 0.6771539  0.5375169  0.7726297  0.5870333  0.7353615  0.5680236  0.7706954 
 
(0.46757)  (0.49862)  (0.41915)  (0.49239)  (0.44116)  (0.49537)  (0.4204) 
Dividend Increases 0.5669277  0.4430222  0.6364937  0.5131058  0.6041053  0.4848889  0.6372477 
 
(0.49551)  (0.49677)  (0.48103)  (0.49985)  (0.4891)  (0.4998)  (0.48081) 
Dividend Continuities 0.6571328  0.5160787  0.7517889  0.5625334  0.7196598  0.5471446  0.7514097 
 
(0.4747)  (0.49977)  (0.43199)  (0.4961)  (0.44918)  (0.4978)  (0.43221) 
Dividend Decreases 0.1313914  0.1272765  0.1420394  0.115973  0.1374714  0.1216513  0.1397401 
 
(0.33784)  (0.3333)  (0.34911)  (0.32021)  (0.34436)  (0.3269)  (0.34673) 
Firm Size 7.977989  7.203238  8.814865  7.615035  8.221406  6.987449  8.827035 
 
(1.6261)  (1.419072)  (1.3158)  (1.677842)  (1.5727)  (1.4063)  (1.2859) 
Leverage 0.5957685  0.6069688  0.5965654  0.5865096  0.5977401  0.5860532  0.6040949 
 
(0.20053)  (0.22526)  (0.18133)  (0.22358)  (0.19562)  (0.22414)  (0.17741) 
ROA 0.1416366  0.1218429  0.1569105  0.1414781  0.1429622  0.1369887  0.1456276 
 
(0.08883)  (0.09846)  (0.07658)  (0.09501)  (0.08667)  (0.10337)  (0.07387) 
Tobin's Q 2.974737  2.663707  3.370858  2.904166  3.019543  2.84674  3.084572 
 
(4.261)  (4.4328)  (4.3282)  (4.333)  (4.1321)  (4.5879)  (3.956) 
Growth 0.0886792  0.0924707  0.0840928  0.1116041  0.0729776  0.094224  0.0840141 
 
(0.23027)  (0.26042)  (0.19895)  (0.24987)  (0.21511)  (0.25047)  (0.21168) 
Cash Holding 0.0957278  0.1016214  0.091063  0.100716  0.0950737  0.1040876  0.0885616 
 
(0.1232)  (0.13793)  (0.11025)  (0.12835)  (0.12047)  (0.13908)  (0.10723) 
RE 0.4708801  0.2465016  0.6436263  0.3339936  0.5675286  0.342213  0.5811526 
 
(2.6622)  (3.2013)  (2.2901)  (2.8293)  (2.7231)  (2.9296)  (2.4041) 
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Observations 22,726   9,609   11,180   9,347   12,228   10,489   12,237 
This table displays descriptive statistics for our p score matched sample and subsamples. Column 1 gives overall statistics summary. Columns 2 and 3 report for firms with higher free 
cash flows and firms with lower free cash flows. Columns 4 and 5 report for younger firms and older firms while columns 6 and 7 describe groups of smaller and larger firms. The 
group lower cash flows is for firm-year observations whose free cash flows are below the medium level of firms’ in the same industry and the same year while the  group higher cash 
flows is for firm-year observations whose are above. The group younger is for firm-year observations whose ages are blow the medium age of their peers in the same industry and year 
while the rest firm-year observations are assigned to the older group. The group Smaller is for firm-year observations whose firm sizes are minor than that medium of firm-years in the 
same industry and year and vice versa. Dividend payments equals to 1, if the firm pays a dividend, 0 otherwise. Dividend increases gets value 1 if a firm’s dividend payment this year 
is more than that in the last year. For firms continue to pay dividends in two years, dividend continuities gets 1, 0 otherwise. Dividend decreases equals to 1 when firms pay lower 
dividend than they did in the previous year. Log (Total assets): natural log of the firm’s total assets. Leverage: total liability over total assets. Return on assets: operating income over 




Column 1 shows that the probability of paying dividends for our p score matched 
sample is about 67.72%, confirming the importance of dividends as a cash disbursement 
form. More than half of firm-years increase their dividend payouts compared to the 
previous years. Considering that CDS and their matched firms are always mature and 
superior, this number is no surprise. Large and profitable firms have high probability to 
receive CDS trading (Subrahmanyam et al. (2014). Column 1 also reports that the 
possibility of continuing to pay dividends is high, in accordance with the theory of 
sticky dividends. Firms normally do not reduce or omit dividend payments and the 
corresponding probability is only 13.14% for our sample. 
 
Subsample statistics summaries provide some crude evidence for the agency and the 
life-cycle theories. Compared to firms with lower free cash flows, firms with higher 
flows are more likely to pay, increase and continue to pay dividends; and the differences 
are quite large. This supports the idea that the significance of dividend payments is to 
remove the worry that management will misuse internal funds. Consistent with the life-
cycle theory, older firms have higher probability of dividend payments, increases and 
continuities than younger firms. Moreover, the ratio of retained earnings is much higher 
for older firms while the growth rate is substantially lower, implying that they have 
accumulated excessive profits and face high agency costs. Taking firm size into account, 
smaller firms pay and increase their dividends less frequently and are inclined to 
discontinue such payments. This is in line with our expectation that smaller firms face 
slighter information asymmetries relative to larger firms, benefitting from their simple 
ownership structures and close relationships with investors. Another interesting finding 




homogeneity of two indicators. We explain this by the “larger firm preference” of 
investors in the stock market. 
 
5.4 Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we first study the empirical relationship between the onset of CDS 
trading and corporate dividend policy. We then extend our research to whether this 
relationship is affected by different levels of free cash flows, firm ages and firm sizes, 
taking agency problem into consideration. For robustness testing, we investigate the 
impact of CDSs on dividend payouts rather than probabilities of different dividend 
policies, using a series of deflators. Moreover, we present evidence that CDSs can 
influence the signaling role of dividends. Lastly, we explore the change of stock 
responses to dividend announcements after introducing CDSs. To remove the concern 
of endogeneity, we use the method of propensity score matching.  
 
5.4.1 propensity score matching 
 
An endogeneity problem could exist in our study because we do not know whether the 
timing of CDS trading onset is exogenous or not. It is probable that CDS trading begins 
while market participants predict the future changes of firms’ dividend policies. 
Although controlling for fixed firm effects can partially solve the problem, we still need 
to attend to this issue more directly. Following Ashcraft and Santos (2009), 
Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), Arentsen et al. (2015) and Amiram et al. (2017), we use 
propensity score matching to relieve the concern of CDS self-selection. Roberts and 




methods to solve endogeneity problem because of its simple matching methodology.  
 
P score matching is used to solve self-selection bias and is popular in the research of 
studying “treatment effect”. For example, someone wants to identify the function of 
medical treatment and gets health scores for some individuals. If he compares directly 
between two groups “go to hospital” and “do not go to hospital”, he will get the biased 
conclusion that medical treatment is harmful to human health. It is because people go 
to hospital normally have lower health scores than ones do not go to hospital and there 
exists self-selection. Non-CDS reference firms are less visible and face sever 
information asymmetries than CDS reference firms (Subrahmanyam et al., 2014). Thus, 
the probability to pay dividends is higher for the former. Without p score matching, we 
may find that firms are reluctant to pay dividends after CDS trading. However, it is due 
to a self-selection bias not the true “treatment effect”. 
 
We employ a probit model to estimate the propensity to receive CDS trading. Data from 
the first quarter of 2001 to the first quarter of each CDS trading are used for CDS 
reference firms and we include all data throughout our sample period for non-CDS 
firms. The dependent variable is binary, equaling 0 before the inception of CDS trading 
and 1 thereafter. For non-CDS firms, this dependent variable is always equal to 0. 
Control variables are firm size (natural log of firms’ total assets), leverage (total liability 
over total assets), firm sales (natural log of the firm’s sales), cash holding (cash and 
short-term investment over total assets), Tobin’s q (market value to book value), ROA 
(operating income over total assets), RE (retained earnings over common equity), 
WCAP (working capital over total assets), IB (income before extraordinary items over 





We then use coefficients from the estimation of the probit model to predict propensity 
scores for firm matching. For each CDS firm, we identify one non-CDS firm that is the 
nearest neighbor using replacement and a caliper of 0.01. Compared with all non-CDS 
firms, p score matched non-CDS firms are more effective as the benchmark because 
















# Fixed firm effect logit model drops observations with all positive outcomes. Since dividend payments/continuities 
is stickier than dividend increases/decrease, the former one is dropped more and has small observations. We include 
a robustness check using fixed time effects and cluster by firm on page 215. Four columns of that have same 
observations and results are not changed. 
 
5.4.2 Empirical relationships between CDS trading and dividend policy 
Table 5.2 The CDS impact on dividend policy 












  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Firm Size 1.149***  0.717***  1.273***  -0.0316 
 (0.0553)  (0.038)  (0.0585)  (0.0419) 
Leverage -2.105*** 
 -2.120***  -1.798***  1.539*** 
 (0.213)  (0.171)  (0.217)  (0.188) 
ROA 6.438***  8.074***  5.184***  -3.527*** 
 (0.523)  (0.43)  (0.521)  (0.429) 
Tobin's Q 0.0175**  0.0140**  0.0166**  -0.00998* 
 (0.00765)  (0.00553)  (0.00778)  (0.00596) 
Growth -1.050***  0.733***  -1.120***  -1.705*** 
 (0.142)  (0.101)  (0.146)  (0.121) 
Cash Holding -0.21  -0.243  -0.745*  -0.284 
 (0.413)  (0.31)  (0.435)  (0.367) 
RE 0.0644*** 
 0.0423***  0.0640***  0.00493 
 (0.0113)  (0.00921)  (0.0116)  (0.00914) 
CDS Start 0.500***  0.236***  0.612***  0.0501 
 (0.112)  (0.0766)  (0.114)  (0.0858) 
        
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 







Observations 9,487#   18,138   9,015   17,222 
This table shows the impact of CDSs on firms’ dividend policies. Dividend payments equals to 1, if the firm pays a 
dividend, 0 otherwise. Dividend increases gets value 1 if a firm’s dividend payment this year is more than that in 
the last year. For firms continue to pay dividends in two years, dividend continuities gets 1, 0 otherwise. Dividend 
decreases equals to 1 when firms pay lower dividend than they did in the previous year. Log (Total assets): natural 
log of the firm’s total assets. Leverage: total liability over total assets. Return on assets: operating income over total 
assets. Tobin’s Q: market value to book value. Growth: one-year sales growth. Cash: cash and short-term investment 
over total assets. RE: retained earnings over common equity. CDS Start equals to 1 in the onset year of CDS trading 
and years after, 0 otherwise. We control for firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. Observations are the numbers 




Table 5.2 presents our main results for the impacts of CDSs on firms’ probabilities of 
dividend payments, increases, continuities and decreases. Column (1) shows that the 
coefficient on CDS Start is positive and significant at 1% confidence level. This 
indicates that firms are more likely to pay dividends after introducing CDSs compared 
to matched non-CDS firms and themselves before CDS trading. Moreover, the 
coefficient estimate for CDS Start in column (2) is positive and statistically significant 
too, which suggests that the probability of dividend increases goes up after the onset of 
CDS trading. These two pieces of evidence support the substitute theory and imply that 
firms use dividends to relieve the concern of inadequate bank monitoring due to CDS 
trading. The other possible explanation could be that the existence of “empty creditors” 
scares managers and takes them away from negative NPV projects, leading to more 
willingness towards cash distribution. The coefficient on CDS Start in column (3) hints 
that dividends become stickier once credit default swaps are involved, despite already 
being sticky at first. The CDS influence is not obvious on the probability of dividend 
decrease since the coefficient on CDS Start in column (4) is not significant even at 10% 
confidence level. 
 
Coefficients on other factors are mostly as expected in section 5.2. Firms with bigger 
size, higher return on assets and larger RE ratio are more likely to pay, increase and 
continue to pay their dividends. Leverage is negatively related with the probability of 
dividend payments, increases and continuities but positively with that of decreases. 
Sales growth does reduce the propensity for dividend payment and continuing payment 
while simultaneously raising that for dividend increase. This is consistent with the 
theory that internal funds are more valuable for firms having abundant investment 
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opportunities and the firms are given more power to generate cash for increasing 
dividends. The effect of cash and short-term investment on dividend policy is 
insignificant. The one surprising finding is that coefficients on Tobin’s Q are positive 
for dividend payments, increases and continuities. Reasons could be that firms with 
superior market valuation also have higher free cash flows and we have already 
controlled for sales growth in our specifications.
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Table 5.3 The CDS impact on dividend policy with different free cash flows 
































  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Firm Size 1.194***  1.121***  0.822***  0.718***  1.368*** 
 1.149***  -0.0382  -0.115 
 (0.0886)  (0.106)  (0.0687)  (0.0644)  (0.096) 
 (0.107)  (0.0731)  (0.0748) 
Leverage -2.301*** 
 -2.202***  -2.208***  -2.092***  -2.006*** 
 -1.770***  1.189***  2.170*** 
 (0.314)  (0.407)  (0.268)  (0.282)  (0.332) 
 (0.412)  (0.289)  (0.324) 
ROA 4.771***  8.602***  6.739***  8.255***  3.713*** 
 5.915***  -3.429***  -3.210*** 
 (0.795)  (0.998)  (0.726)  (0.663)  (0.821) 
 (0.957)  (0.67)  (0.693) 
Tobin's Q 0.0233*  0.0143  0.0166*  0.0123  0.0242* 
 0.0178  -0.0071  -0.0209** 
 (0.012)  (0.0129)  (0.00939)  (0.00784)  (0.0126) 
 (0.013)  (0.00977)  (0.00861) 
Growth -1.125***  -1.200***  0.226  1.268***  -1.033*** 
 -1.502***  -0.992***  -2.414*** 
 (0.2)  (0.267)  (0.156)  (0.161)  (0.211) 
 (0.269)  (0.177)  (0.199) 
Cash Holding -2.075***  1.233*  -0.765  0.226  -2.869*** 
 0.568  -0.755  0.0911 
 (0.644)  (0.708)  (0.489)  (0.48)  (0.702) 
 (0.726)  (0.558)  (0.594) 
RE 0.0626*** 
 0.0478**  0.0525***  0.0284**  0.0521*** 
 0.0591***  -0.00113  0.00279 
 (0.0161)  (0.0186)  (0.0158)  (0.0125)  (0.0168) 
 (0.0188)  (0.0136)  (0.013) 
CDS Start 0.123  0.644***  0.0101  0.338***  0.196 
 0.861***  0.148  -0.127 
 (0.173)  (0.19)  (0.131)  (0.112)  (0.181) 
 (0.19)  (0.145)  (0.126) 
        
 
       
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 













Observations 3,975   3,649   6,444   9,103   3,700   3,602   6,132   8,533 
The table displays the CDS impacts on firms’ dividend policies based on different free cash flows. The group lower cash flows is for firm-year observations whose free cash flows are 
below the medium level of firms’ in the same industry and the same year while the group higher cash flows is for firm-year observations whose are above. Dividend payments equals to 1, 
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if the firm pays a dividend, 0 otherwise. Dividend increases gets value 1 if a firm’s dividend payment this year is more than that in the last year. For firms continue to pay dividends in two 
years, dividend continuities gets 1, 0 otherwise. Dividend decreases equals to 1 when firms pay lower dividend than they did in the previous year. Log (Total assets): natural log of the 
firm’s total assets. Leverage: total liability over total assets. Return on assets: operating income over total assets. Tobin’s Q: market value to book value. Growth: one-year sales growth. 
Cash: cash and short-term investment over total assets. RE: retained earnings over common equity. CDS Start equals to 1 in the onset year of CDS trading and years after, 0 otherwise. We 




Managers may have stronger incentive to invest unprofitable projects for empire 
building when their firms have higher free cash flows. Outsiders exhibit deeper concern 
for firms under this condition. As a result, if investors deem that CDSs are averse to 
investor protection because of a lack of bank monitoring, this perspective will be 
confirmed particularly for firms with higher free cash flows. 
 
Table 5.3 presents empirical results for our models for firms with lower and higher free 
cash flows. Table 5.3 shows that the coefficient on CDS Start in column (1) is 
insignificant while that in column (2) is positive and significant at 1% confidence level. 
This apparent inconsistency suggests that the propensity for paying dividends does not 
change for firms with lower free cash flows but increases for firms with higher cash 
flows after the inception of CDS trading. This is in line with our expectation, higher 
free cash flows firms facing severer outside distrust are more easily affected by CDS 
trading. Similarly, the coefficient on CDS Start in column (4) is very significant while 
that in column (3) is not. This finding indicates that firms with higher free cash flows, 
following the emergence of named firm CDSs, tend to increase their dividend payouts 
but firms with lower flows do not. Coefficients on the CDS Start in columns (5) and (6) 
tell us that dividends only become stickier for higher free cash flow firms when credit 
default swaps are involved. The influence of CDS use on firms’ probability of dividend 
decreases is not obvious, although it is positive for firms with lower free cash flows but 
negative for firms with higher free cash flows.
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Table 5.4 The CDS impact on dividend policy with different firm ages 
Dependent variable:    Dividend Payments   Dividend Increases   Dividend Continuities   Dividend Decreases 
  Younger  Older   Younger  Older 
 
 Younger  Older   Younger  Older 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Firm Size 1.236***  1.486***  0.742***  0.795*** 
 
1.383***  1.490***  0.101  0.0815 
 (0.106)  (0.0839)  (0.0745)  (0.054)  (0.112) 
 (0.0842)  (0.08)  (0.0617) 
Leverage -2.834*** 
 -2.165***  -2.483***  -2.294***  -2.292*** 
 -1.917***  1.044***  1.762*** 
 (0.386)  (0.302)  (0.307)  (0.24) 
 
(0.385)  (0.308)  (0.329)  (0.267) 
ROA 4.825***  7.889***  5.916***  9.246***  3.500*** 
 6.545***  -1.395**  -5.302*** 
 (0.901)  (0.811)  (0.746)  (0.604)  (0.906) 
 (0.792)  (0.63)  (0.63) 
Tobin's Q 0.018  0.0347***  0.0199**  0.00799 
 
0.0155  0.0422***  -0.0175  -0.0103 
 (0.0124)  (0.0129)  (0.00997)  (0.00794)  (0.0126) 
 (0.0134)  (0.0106)  (0.00863) 
Growth -0.996***  -1.114***  0.672***  0.954***  -0.953*** 
 -1.142***  -1.759***  -1.894*** 
 (0.232)  (0.213)  (0.168)  (0.144)  (0.24) 
 (0.214)  (0.202)  (0.168) 
Cash Holding -1.260*  1.243**  -0.7  0.0762 
 
-1.938**  0.4  -0.146  -0.0391 
 (0.749)  (0.571)  (0.568)  (0.422)  (0.775) 
 (0.58)  (0.65)  (0.516) 
RE 0.0426*** 
 0.0726***  0.0499***  0.0290**  0.0287* 
 0.0848***  -0.017  0.013 
 (0.0165)  (0.0179)  (0.0164)  (0.0116) 
 
(0.0167)  (0.0187)  (0.0171)  (0.0117) 
CDS Start -0.234  0.503***  -0.0512  0.268**  0.0204 
 0.621***  -0.166  0.0156 
 (0.194)  (0.165)  (0.146)  (0.107)  (0.196) 
 (0.166)  (0.166)  (0.119) 
        
 
       
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 















Observations 3,508   4,863   6,198   10,184   3,401   4,625   5,692   9,639 
The table displays the CDS impacts on firms’ dividend policies based on different firm ages. The group younger is for firm-year observations whose ages are blow the medium age of their 
peers in the same industry and year while the rest firm-year observations are assigned to the older group. Dividend payments equals to 1, if the firm pays a dividend, 0 otherwise. Dividend 
increases gets value 1 if a firm’s dividend payment this year is more than that in the last year. For firms continue to pay d ividends in two years, dividend continuities gets 1, 0 otherwise. 
Dividend decreases equals to 1 when firms pay lower dividend than they did in the previous year. Log (Total assets): natural log of the firm’s total assets. Leverage: total liability over 
total assets. Return on assets: operating income over total assets. Tobin’s Q: market value to book value. Growth: one-year sales growth. Cash: cash and short-term investment over total 
assets. RE: retained earnings over common equity. CDS Start equals to 1 in the onset year of CDS trading and years after, 0 otherwise. We control for firm fixed effects and time fixed 
effects. Observations are the numbers of observations. ***,**,* indicates the difference is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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Compared with younger firms, older firms have regular profits but fewer investment 
opportunities, leading to superior capability for cash distribution. Facing the adverse 
impact of CDSs on investor protection, younger firms may be unable to frequently pay 
or increase their dividends for hedging while older firms can. It is reasonable, then, to 
predict that the CDS effect on dividend policy is more pronounced for older firms. 
 
Table 5.4 reports the results for the subsamples based on firms’ ages. We find that the 
coefficient, in column (1), on CDS Start for younger firms is negative while that, in 
column (2) for older firms is positive and highly significant. This signifies that older 
firms having sufficient retained earnings more frequently pay dividends after CDS 
trading but younger firms with limited paying ability even reduce the frequency after 
that. This divergence is caused by the varying of firm status with firm age and is 
consistent with the life cycle theory. The coefficient on CDS Start in column (3) is 
insignificant but that in column (4) is positively significant implying that only older 
firms have higher probability of increasing dividends after the CDS market appears. 
Younger firms’ internal funds are insufficient to finance their investing opportunities 
so it is hard to increase dividend payouts despite showing CDS impact. On the 
perspective of dividend continuities, older firms are more willing to continue paying 
dividends after CDS trading while this behavior is not obvious for younger firms. The 
coefficients on CDS Start in columns (7) and (8) are both insignificant, showing the 
probability of dividend decreases is not changed after the onset of CDS trading.
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Table 5.5 The CDS impact on dividend policy with different firm sizes 
Dependent variable:    Dividend Payments   Dividend Increases   Dividend Continuities   Dividend Decreases 
  Smaller  Larger   Smaller  Larger 
 
 Smaller  Larger   Smaller  Larger 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Firm Size 1.222***  1.177***  0.715***  0.795***  1.419*** 
 1.158***  0.0254  -0.0785 
 (0.0916)  (0.0994)  (0.0673)  (0.0623)  (0.0988) 
 (0.0993)  (0.0742)  (0.0729) 
Leverage -2.197*** 
 -2.552***  -2.060***  -2.547*** 
 
-2.027***  -2.175***  1.260***  2.275*** 
 (0.311)  (0.361)  (0.262)  (0.266)  (0.329) 
 (0.356)  (0.292)  (0.297) 
ROA 4.975***  7.310***  5.991***  9.874***  3.862*** 
 5.446***  -2.922***  -5.130*** 
 (0.74)  (0.869)  (0.635)  (0.649)  (0.757) 
 (0.818)  (0.608)  (0.673) 
Tobin's Q 0.00845  0.0168  0.0108  0.0143*  0.00252 
 0.0264*  -0.0019  -0.0224** 
 (0.0111)  (0.0129)  (0.00839)  (0.00825) 
 
(0.0116)  (0.0136)  (0.00895)  (0.00878) 
Growth -1.104***  -1.059***  0.274*  1.162***  -1.127*** 
 -1.258***  -1.077***  -2.212*** 
 (0.213)  (0.219)  (0.159)  (0.143)  (0.221) 
 (0.223)  (0.182)  (0.177) 
Cash Holding -0.713  0.489  0.0707  0.0375  -1.484** 
 -0.171  -1.354**  0.219 
 (0.605)  (0.697)  (0.458)  (0.481)  (0.658) 
 (0.704)  (0.546)  (0.567) 
RE 0.0676*** 
 0.0604***  0.0431***  0.0388*** 
 
0.0628***  0.0749***  -0.00261  0.00324 
 (0.0177)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.0124)  (0.0188) 
 (0.0186)  (0.0151)  (0.012) 
CDS Start 0.146  0.630***  0.00447  0.375***  0.131 
 0.850***  0.209  -0.198 
 (0.182)  (0.178)  (0.133)  (0.11)  (0.19) 
 (0.178)  (0.148)  (0.123) 
        
 
       
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 















Observations 4,089   4,257   7,048   9,960   3,846   4,044   6,591   9,341 
The table displays the CDS impacts on firms’ dividend policies based on different firm sizes. The group Smaller is for firm-year observations whose firm sizes are minor than that medium 
of firm-years in the same industry and year and vice versa. Dividend payments equals to 1, if the firm pays a dividend, 0 otherwise. Dividend increases gets value 1 if a firm’s dividend 
payment this year is more than that in the last year. For firms continue to pay dividends in two years, dividend continuities  gets 1, 0 otherwise. Dividend decreases equals to 1 when firms 
pay lower dividend than they did in the previous year. Log (Total assets): natural log of the firm’s total assets. Leverage: total liability over total assets. Return on asse ts: operating income 
over total assets. Tobin’s Q: market value to book value. Growth: one-year sales growth. Cash: cash and short-term investment over total assets. RE: retained earnings over common equity. 
CDS Start equals to 1 in the onset year of CDS trading and years after, 0 otherwise. We control for firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. Observations are the numbers of observations. 
***,**,* indicates the difference is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
152 
 
Firm size can also affect the impact of CDS use on a firm’s dividend policy. Relative 
to smaller firms, larger firms face higher agency costs due to their decentralized 
ownership structures and more distant relationships with outside investors. In the 
absence of bank monitoring, larger firms can find it hard to use their private channels 
to appease all investors, as smaller firms do, and a simpler way for them is to choose 
dividend payments as an alternative. Consequently, the impact may be heavier on larger 
firms than on smaller firms. 
 
We display empirical results depending on different firm sizes in table 5.5. We find that 
the coefficient estimate for CDS Start in column (1) is insignificant but in column (2) 
is positively significant at 1% confidence level. This suggests that larger firms are more 
inclined to pay dividends after CDSs commence to reference their debts. Smaller firms 
do not behave in the same way. A probable reason is that smaller firms can exploit their 
close ties with outsiders to eliminate adverse CDS shocks and do not need to use 
dividends. The coefficient on CDS Start in column (4) is significant while that in 
column (3) is not, which indicates that the effect of CDS on dividend increases in 
probability is quite weak for smaller firms but strong for larger firms. In respect to 
dividend continuities, we only find a significant coefficient on CDS Start in column (6) 
for larger firms. The positive sign shows that larger firms find it even harder to omit 
dividend payments following the onset of CDS trading. According to columns (8) and 
(9), the initiation of the CDS market neither affects the probability of dividend 






Table 5.6 The CDS impact on dividend payout ratio 
Dependent variable:    DIV/TA   DIV/MV   DIV/SHO   DIV/NI 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Firm Size 0.00199***  0.00257***  0.206***  0.0504*** 
 (0.000254)  (0.000565)  (0.011)  (0.0157) 
Leverage 
0.00833  0.0423  0.361  0.264 
 (0.00608)  (0.0287)  (0.231)  (0.271) 
ROA 0.0974***  0.0312*  1.418***  -0.0466 
 (0.0102)  (0.0162)  (0.273)  (0.369) 
Tobin's Q 0.000711***  -0.00110**  -0.00615  -0.00576 
 (0.0002)  (0.000533)  (0.00733)  (0.0111) 
Growth -0.0205***  -0.0235***  -0.528***  -0.311* 
 (0.00189)  (0.00452)  (0.0799)  (0.167) 
Cash Holding 0.0103**  0.00377  -0.206  -0.0993 
 (0.00476)  (0.0197)  (0.196)  (0.377) 
RE 
0.00109***  0.000268  0.0231  0.0270** 
 (0.000303)  (0.00045)  (0.0145)  (0.0121) 
CDS Start 0.00104**  0.00139**  0.0750***  -0.0189 
 (0.000439)  (0.000671)  (0.0216)  (0.0332) 
CDS Firm -0.00143*  -0.000403  -0.0496  0.0642 
 (0.000803)  (0.0023)  (0.0344)  (0.0584) 
        
R-squared 0.188  0.126  0.181  0.022 
Observations 21,487   21,487   21,487   21,486 
This table presents the CDS impact on corporate payout ratio. We employ four measures for the ratio that DIV/TA (dividend 
amounts over total assets), DIV/MV (dividend amounts over market value of equity), DIV/SHO (dividend amounts over 
common shares outstanding) and DIV/NI (dividend amounts over net income). Log (Total assets): natural log of the firm’s 
total assets. Leverage: total liability over total assets. Return on assets: operating income over total assets. Tobin’s Q: 
market value to book value. Growth: one-year sales growth. Cash: cash and short-term investment over total assets. RE: 
retained earnings over common equity. CDS Start equals to 1 in the onset year of CDS trading and years after, 0 otherwise. 
CDS Firm takes 1 for CDS firms, 0 otherwise. The Fama-Macbeth approach is used for estimations. ***,**,* indicates the 




For robustness testing, we investigate the impact of CDS use on firms’ dividend payout 
ratios. Following the literature, we employ four measures for the ratio that DIV/TA 
(dividend amounts over total assets), DIV/MV (dividend amounts over market value of 
equity), DIV/SHO (dividend amounts over common shares outstanding) and DIV/NI 
(dividend amounts over net income). Control variables are as defined previously and 
the variable of interest is still CDS Strat that equals 0 before CDS trading, 1 for other 
situations. We apply the Fama-Macbeth approach, which estimates regressions year by 
year using cross-sectional data and we calculate the average slope for each regressor to 
obtain our results. The binary variable CDS Firm that takes 1 for CDS firms, 0 
otherwise is included to control for time-invariant difference between CDS and non-
CDS firms. 
 
Table 5.6 displays the CDS effect on firms’ dividend payout ratios using different 
deflaters. Column (1) in table 5.6 shows that the coefficient on CDS Start is positive 
and statistically significant. This evidence verifies that firms pay more dividends after 
CDSs commence to reference their debts than before and their matched non-CDS firms. 
Similarly, the coefficient on CDS Start, in column (2), is significant and we use the 
same symbol. The increase in this ratio of dividend payout is economically substantial. 
Relative to the sample mean DIV/MV of 0.0196, the 0.0014 rise after the emergence of 
the CDS market represents a 7.14% growth in the mean dividend payout. The 
coefficient estimate for CDS Start in column (3) is still positive and significant at 1% 
confidence level, which suggests that dividends per share are increased following the 
onset of CDS trading. These are in accordance with the finding in table 2 and support 
the dividend substitute theory. However, the effect of CDS use on dividend deflated by 
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net income is obscure because the coefficient on CDS Start in column (4) is 
insignificant. 
 
We obtain similar estimates for control variables as in table 5.2. Larger firms and firms 
with strong profitability pay more dividends. Sales growth that represents a firm’s 
investment opportunity is negatively correlated with dividend payouts. Mature firms 
with substantial retained earnings distribute more cash to their shareholders. The 
influences of other variables Leverage, Tobin’s Q and Cash on dividend payouts are 
mixed and opaque. Coefficients on CDS Firm are either insignificant or weakly 


















5.4.3 Results for the CDS impact on the signaling role of dividends 
Table 5.7 The CDS impact on the signaling role of dividends 
Dependent variable:    Ii,t-Ii,t-1/BVEi,t-2 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
ROEt-1 0.0139***  0.0139***  0.0139***  0.0139*** 
 (0.00386)  (0.00386)  (0.00386)  (0.00386) 
Ii,t-1-Ii,t-2/BVEi,t-2 -0.169*** 
 -0.169***  -0.169***  -0.169*** 
 (0.00369)  (0.00369)  (0.00369)  (0.00369) 
CDS Starti,t-1 0.184*  0.0904  0.151  -0.00977 
 (0.108)  (0.0913)  (0.105)  (0.0755) 
Dividend Payments i,t-1 0.0442       
 (0.0798)       
Dividend Payments i,t-1 × CDS Starti,t-1 -0.290**       
 (0.114)       
Dividend Increases   0.0629     
   (0.0588)     
Dividend Increasesi,t-1 × CDS Starti,t-1   -0.197**     
   (0.0979)     
Dividend Continuities     0.0373   
     (0.0803)   
Dividend Continuitiesi,t-1 × CDS Starti,t-1     -0.251**   
     (0.111)   
Dividend Decreasesi,t-1       -0.00158 
       (0.0692) 
Dividend Decreasesi,t-1 × CDS Starti,t-1       -0.0665  
       
       (0.133) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 







R-squared 0.099  0.098  0.098  0.098 
Observations 20,718   20,718   20,718   20,718 
This table shows the impact of CDS on dividend’s signaling role. Ii,t denotes a firm’s income before extraordinary items 
after dividend policy made in the year t-1 and BVEi,t-2 to denote the firm’s book value of equity one year before. Dependent 
variable (Ii,t - Ii,t-1)/BVEi,t-2 measures changes of firms’ earnings. ROEt-1 is operating income over book value of equity. (I i,t-
1 - Ii,t-2)/BVEi,t-2 is earning changes in the year t-1 over book value of equity in the year t-2. Dividend paymentsi,t-1, Dividend 
increasesi,t-1, Dividend continuitiesi,t-1, Dividend decreasesi,t-1 and CDS Starti,t-1 are indicators defined same as previously. 
We create the interactions between dividend policies and CDS Start that Dividend Payments × CDS Start, Dividend 
Increases × CDS Start, Dividend Continuities × CDS Start and Dividend Decreases × CDS Start. Firm fixed effects and 





Our previous empirical results show that firms are more inclined to pay, increase and 
continue to pay dividends after the inception of CDS trading. However, this effect is 
due to the incentive of hedging reduced third-party protection resulting from lack of 
bank monitoring. Since dividends can also be used as signaling devices to show firms’ 
bright futures, we are interested to explore whether the signaling role of dividends is 
weakened by the changed incentive following CDS trading. To study the impact of CDS 
use on the signaling role of dividends, we create the interactions between dividend 
policies and CDS Start: Dividend Payments × CDS Start, Dividend Increases × CDS 
Start, Dividend Continuities × CDS Start and Dividend Decreases × CDS Start. 
 
As shown in column (1) of table 5.7, the coefficient on Dividend Payments × CDS Start 
CDS Start is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the signaling role of 
dividend payments is attenuated after the onset of CDS trading. This is consistent with 
our expectation that after CDS trading has commenced, dividends act more as 
compensations for reduced protection rather than as signaling devices and thus the 
relation between dividend payment and future earnings growth becomes impotent. 
Dividend increase is another signal for firms’ coming excellent performances but we 
discover that this forecasting function has also been weaken following the start of the 
CDS market. The coefficient estimate for Dividend Increases × CDS Start is negative 
and significant at 5% confidence level proposing direct evidence. Simultaneously, we 
find that the coefficient on Dividend Continuities × CDS Start uses the same symbol 
and is significant as well supporting the argument of decreasing signaling role. The 
coefficient estimate for Dividend Decreases × CDS Start implies that the effect of CDS 




5.4.4 Does the liquidity of CDS market matter? 
 
In the previous analyses, we use CDS availability (a binary variable) to measure the 
CDS impact on dividend policies. The advantage for using that is to gauge the initiation 
time of each CDS clearly and focus on the changes this market brings to the economy. 
However, this key variable neglects the fact that liquidities of CDSs are different among 
our samples. If a CDS is not liquid, buyers may have to spend higher price to hedge his 
risk and would be very tough in debt renegotiation making exacting creditor more 
“exacting”. We re-estimate equation 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 using different measure and 


















Table 5.8 Robustness check using CDS quotes number as the key variable for the chapter 5 












  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Firm Size 1.138***  0.715***  1.258***  -0.0328 
 (0.0551)  (0.0379)  (0.0582)  (0.0419) 
Leverage 
-2.096***  -2.120***  -1.785***  1.542*** 
 (0.213)  (0.171)  (0.217)  (0.188) 
ROA 6.397***  8.054***  5.137***  -3.545*** 
 (0.522)  (0.430)  (0.521)  (0.429) 
Tobin's Q 0.0175**  0.0140**  0.0167**  -0.00996* 
 (0.00765)  (0.00552)  (0.00778)  (0.00596) 
Growth -1.041***  0.736***  -1.106***  -1.703*** 
 (0.141)  (0.101)  (0.145)  (0.121) 
Cash Holding -0.200  -0.227  -0.726*  -0.263 
 (0.411)  (0.310)  (0.434)  (0.367) 
RE 
0.0646***  0.0422***  0.0645***  0.00498 
 (0.0113)  (0.00920)  (0.0116)  (0.00915) 
CDS Quotes Number 0.0578***  0.0284***  0.0700***  -0.000392 
 (0.0152)  (0.0103)  (0.0153)  (0.0116) 
        
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 








Observations 9,487   18,138   9,015   17,222 
This table shows the impact of CDSs on firms’ dividend policies. Dividend payments equals to 1, if the firm pays a 
dividend, 0 otherwise. Dividend increases gets value 1 if a firm’s dividend payment this year is more than that in 
the last year. For firms continue to pay dividends in two years, dividend continuities gets 1, 0 otherwise. Dividend 
decreases equals to 1 when firms pay lower dividend than they did in the previous year. Log (Total assets): natural 
log of the firm’s total assets. Leverage: total liability over total assets. Return on assets: operating income over total 
assets. Tobin’s Q: market value to book value. Growth: one-year sales growth. Cash: cash and short-term investment 
over total assets. RE: retained earnings over common equity. CDS Start equals to 1 in the onset year of CDS trading 
and years after, 0 otherwise. We control for firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. Observations are the numbers 
of observations. ***,**,* indicates the difference is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
160 
 
Because CDSs are traded over the counter, it is extremely hard to measure their liquidity. 
Following Saretto and Tookes (2013), we calculate the overall number of CDS quotes 
during year t and use the natural log of that as the liquidity proxy. This measure directly 
takes CDS liquidity into the concern and shows its influence on our study. Column (1) 
of table 5.8 shows that the coefficient on CDS Quotes Number is positive and 
significant at 1% confidence level. This indicates that firms are more likely to pay 
dividends when there is a liquid CDS market. Moreover, the coefficient estimate for 
CDS Quotes Number in column (2) is positive and statistically significant too, which 
suggests that the probability of dividend increases goes up if CDSs can be easily traded. 
The coefficient on CDS Quotes Number in column (3) hints that dividends become 
stickier once a liquid CDS market emerges. 
 
5.4.5 Does Financial Crisis matter? 
 
The financial crisis in 2007 has a tremendous shock to the world’s economy. For the US 
CDS market, the nominal principle dropped dramatically from $58.24 trillion in 2007 (the 
peak) to $12.29 trillion by the end of 2015 (www.bis.org). With such a big fall, we cannot 
neglect the potential influence of the financial crisis on this topic. Investors may view CDSs 
differently before and after the financial crisis, so we split our sample into two groups that 
before financial crisis and after financial crisis. Equations 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 are re-
estimated by including the interaction of CDS Start and the period after the financial crisis. 






Table 5.9 The CDS impact on dividend policies considering the financial crisis (2007) 












  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Firm Size 1.178***  0.730***  1.308***  -0.0391 
 (0.0559)  (0.0382)  (0.0593)  (0.0420) 
Leverage -2.128*** 
 -2.106***  -1.816***  1.519*** 
 (0.213)  (0.171)  (0.217)  (0.188) 
ROA 6.477***  8.070***  5.233***  -3.511*** 
 (0.522)  (0.430)  (0.520)  (0.429) 
Tobin's Q 0.0176**  0.0140**  0.0162**  -0.00969 
 (0.00769)  (0.00555)  (0.00781)  (0.00596) 
Growth -1.074***  0.723***  -1.144***  -1.701*** 
 (0.142)  (0.101)  (0.146)  (0.121) 
Cash Holding -0.222  -0.272  -0.736*  -0.268 
 (0.413)  (0.311)  (0.436)  (0.367) 
RE 0.0654*** 
 0.0428***  0.0647***  0.00498 
 (0.0114)  (0.00926)  (0.0117)  (0.00916) 
CDS Start 0.0331  -0.0398  0.113  0.251** 
 (0.143)  (0.0963)  (0.144)  (0.116) 
After 2006 -2.744***  -2.361***  -3.237***  1.653** 
 (0.623)  (0.463)  (0.629)  (0.759) 
CDS Start × After 2006 0.881***  0.527***  0.951***  -0.337** 
 (0.167)  (0.113)  (0.168)  (0.132) 
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 







Observations 9,487   18,138   9,015   17,222 
This table shows the impact of CDSs on firms’ dividend policies. Dividend payments equals to 1, if the firm pays a 
dividend, 0 otherwise. Dividend increases gets value 1 if a firm’s dividend payment this year is more than that in 
the last year. For firms continue to pay dividends in two years, dividend continuities gets 1, 0 otherwise. Dividend 
decreases equals to 1 when firms pay lower dividend than they did in the previous year. Log (Total assets): natural 
log of the firm’s total assets. Leverage: total liability over total assets. Return on assets: operating income over total 
assets. Tobin’s Q: market value to book value. Growth: one-year sales growth. Cash: cash and short-term investment 
over total assets. RE: retained earnings over common equity. CDS Start equals to 1 in the onset year of CDS trading 
and years after, 0 otherwise. We control for firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. Observations are the numbers 
of observations. ***,**,* indicates the difference is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 5.9 shows that the coefficient on the interaction of CDS Start and the period after 
2006 is positive and significant at 1% confidence level. This indicates that compared to 
the period before the financial crisis, firms whose debts are referenced by CDSs are 
more likely to pay dividends in the period after. This is consistent with the fact that 
creditors are become more cautious after the financial crisis and the concern of reduced 
third-party protection is aggravated. As a result, managers have to increase the 
frequency of cash disbursement to relieve this worrying. Coefficients on the interaction 
term in column (2) and (3) tell the same story. CDS reference firms have higher 
propensities to increase and continue to pay dividend during the period of post-financial 
crisis. The coefficient estimate for the interaction term in column (4) suggests that CDS 
reference firms has lower probability to reduce dividends after the financial crisis 




This chapter adds to the literature on dividend policy by investigating the impact of 
introducing named firm credit default swaps (CDSs). In the conflict between managers 
and outside shareholders, creditors can protect shareholders, as free-riders, by 
monitoring managers’ misuse of internal funds. However, creditors entering into CDSs 
have reduced interest in monitoring. This weakening of third-party protection might 
influence dividend policy. Indeed, we find exactly that, with firms more likely to pay, 
increase and continue to pay their dividends following the introduction of named firm 
CDSs. The evidence is robust even after controlling for firm-specific characters that 




Agency conflicts appear to exert considerable influence on the CDS effect, with firms 
having higher free cash flows, older firms and larger firms being more severely affected 
by credit default swaps. We also find that firms pay more dividends after the start of 
CDS trading no matter whether we use total assets, market value of equity, or common 
shares outstanding as the deflator. Notably, the signaling role of dividends is weakened 
after CDSs commence to reference firms’ debts. 
 
Our results may be interpreted according to several previously proposed mechanisms 
explaining behaviors of firms. Thus, reduced creditor monitoring that results from CDS 
trading leads to weaker third-party protection. To ease the worry of outside shareholders 
facing this change, firms can use dividends as a hedging measure, consistent with the 
substitute theory. Moreover, we present evidence that firms with larger agency costs 
and ages are more sensitive to the possibility of negative shocks, in line with agency 
theory and life-cycle theory. Dividends are effectively commitments not to misuse 
internal funds, which is amplified for CDS reference firms. Then, after CDS trading has 
been initiated, dividends are used more for increasing trust among shareholders.  
 
This chapter indicates that the emergence of the CDS market brings about higher cash 
disbursement. This helps to redistribute wealth in the society and improves the 
efficiency of capital conducing to a more healthy, flexible and strong economy. 
However, due to the high cost of dividends, using them to hedge the negative shock 
towards investor protection could be a heavy burden for some firms. It is advisable for 
regulators to introduce policies to balance the trade-off between benefits and costs 










This chapter is to present our findings and contributions of investigating the effects of 
CDS availability on debtors, borrowers and the economy they compose. The rest of 
chapter is organized into three sections as follows. Section 6.2 gives a summary of our 
research findings. Section 6.3 shows contributions of this study. Section 6.4 provides 
policy implications of our work. 
 
6.2 Summary of our findings  
 
Table 6.1 summarizes the questions and answers of this study and we show our main 
findings below: 
 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of CDS trading on the yield spread between corporate 
and Treasury bonds. Our results suggest that CDSs affect the yield spread both 
negatively and positively. The overall impact is correlated with firms’ credit conditions 
when they issue bonds. This finding is robust no matter what credit proxy is used. This 
means that, on average level, the CDS impact is hard to identify. To separate these two 
opposite impacts, we split the samples by firms’ leverages or credit rating numbers at 
bond issue times. In accordance with our theoretical model, we find that after CDS 
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trading begins, the yield spread decreases when firms issue bonds during good credit 
periods but increases during bad credit periods for the firms. We also consider the 
potential endogeneity problem that CDS trading may begin while market participants 
predict the future changes of the yield spread. Propensity score matching is employed 
and we obtain similar results.
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Table 6.1 Research questions and answers 
 
 
Research Questions Answers 
How do the negative and the positive CDS channels 
affect the yield spread? 
The negative CDS channel affects the yield spread through providing a new hedging opportunity while the positive 
one comes to force by creating empty creditors and reducing bank monitoring. 
Does the CDS effect on the yield spread vary with 
firms’ credits on issue times? 
Yes. Using leverage and rating numbers as the proxy, we find the CDS effect significantly interacts with firms' 
credits when they issue bonds. 
Does the negative CDS effect outweigh the positive 
during good credit periods and vice versa? 
Yes. During good credit periods, lenders would view CDS availability as a candy because the new hedging 
opportunity is the dominant force. Nevertheless, during bad credit periods, lenders would view CDS trading as a 
shock since empty creditor problem and less bank monitoring are more noticeable. 
Is the emergence of the CDS market conducive to 
increasing private sector investment? 
No. Reference firms reduce their investments, on average, after the beginning of the CDS market.  
Does the increase of corporate leverage after CDS 
trading really loosen financial constraints faced by 
firms? 
No. The increased leverage after CDS trading has not been effectively used to relieve financial constraints. We find 




Do CDSs affect investment and the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity differently towards to good and bad 
liquidity/integrity firms? 
Yes. Liquidity sufficient and integrity reliable firms increase their investments and have lower investment-cash 
flow sensitivity following the introduction of credit default swaps, while liquidity constrained and integrity 
suspicious firms reduce that and have higher sensitivity.  
Do CDSs change the relationship between managers 
and outside shareholders? 
Yes. CDSs weaken banks' incentives to monitor borrowers making outside shareholders lose the opportunity to be 
free riders. It actually undermines their third-party protections and amplifies the agency problem. 
How the reduced third-party supervision affects 
managers’ incentives towards dividend policy? 
If the outcome theory holds, reduced third-party supervision will give managers more freedom to use internal funds 
leading to low interest to pay dividends. However, if the substitute theory works, managers would try to 
compensate minority shareholders contributing to high propensity to distribute cash. 
Have CDSs altered the purpose of dividend payments? 
Yes. Compared to dividends before CDS trading, that after more act as compensations for reduced third-party 
protection rather than signals of future earnings growth. 
Do investors in the stock market care about the change 
of dividends’ information content?   
No. After CDS trading, stock responses to dividend announcements have not significantly changed. Investors in the 





Chapter 4 studies whether corporate investment and the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity change following the emergence of a CDS market. We find that reference 
firms, on average, reduce their investments and rely more heavily on cash flow to invest 
after the onset of CDS trading. The manufacturing sample and the broad sample of all 
industries exhibit generally consistent results. Considering that CDS effects on 
investment and the sensitivity may vary across groups, we split the samples by a variety 
of firm quality measures. The results show that decreased investment and the higher 
sensitivity following the introduction of CDSs are more pronounced for firms with 
lower cash flows or coverage ratios. Additionally, we find that older firms and firms 
owning better credit ratings, compared with their counterparties, are less likely to 
reduce investments and less dependent on internal funds after the beginning of CDS 
trading. Our findings also suggest that CDSs can increase investment and loosen 
financial constraints for a part of firms, which have good liquidity or integrity, 
especially using the manufacturing sample. 
 
Chapter 5 investigates the effect of credit default swaps (CDSs) on corporate dividend 
policy. The results show that firms after CDSs commence to reference their debts have 
higher propensity to pay, increase and continue to pay dividends. This is robust after 
controlling for firm-specific dividend related characters, firm fixed effects and time 
fixed effects. Due to the significance of agency conflict to dividend policy, we expect 
the CDS effect could also be affected by the severity of that conflict. Three proxies, 
firms’ free cash flows, ages and sizes, are used to divide the sample. We find that firms 
with higher free cash flows, older firms and larger firms are heavily affected by credit 
default swaps while firms with lower free cash flows, younger firms and small firms 
are not. Our research extends to study of the effect of CDSs on firms’ dividend payouts 
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afterwards. The results suggest that firms pay more dividends following CDS 
availability no matter whether we use total assets, market value of equity, or common 
shares outstanding to be the deflator. Moreover, our analysis indicates that the signaling 
role of dividends is weakened after the commencement of CDS trading. 
 
6.3 Contributions of this thesis 
 
The objective of our research is to explore how the emergence of the CDS market affect 
incentives and behaviors of participants in the economy. The specific contributions can 
be found in chapter 3, 4 and 5. In this section, we stress the main contributions of this 
thesis. 
 
First, the thesis links the CDS market to the bond issue market and shows opposing 
choices of lenders facing different credits of issuers at issue time. This contributes to a 
better understanding that the impact of CDSs on debt pricing is multifaceted and hard 
to identify in a single way. Our findings suggest that if firms issue bonds during their 
good credit periods, CDS availability affects yield spread through the negative channel 
due to the creation of new hedging opportunity. This is consistent with the expectation 
that CDSs benefit the economy by reducing financing costs. However, if firms issue 
bonds during their bad credit periods, the CDS impact acts contrarily because investors 
are concerned about the adverse outcome of the empty creditor problem and less bank 
monitoring. This supports the literature proposing that CDS trading increases the 
system risk of the whole financial market. 
 
To fully understand the impact of CDS availability, you have to focus on changes in 
170 
 
firms’ behaviors after the beginning of the market (Augustin et al., 2016). Our study 
pays attention to how CDSs affect firms’ investment behaviors and their dependences 
on internal funds which, to our knowledge, has never been accessed before. It directly 
tests the model proposed by Bolton and Oehmke (2011), which implies a change of 
corporate investment after the inception of the CDS market. Moreover, our study 
contributes to Saretto and Tookes (2013) and Subrahmanyam et al. (2017) since we link 
the two CDS effects that both increased leverage and cash reserve and examine the 
dominance mechanism between them. Our findings indicate that increased cash reserve 
requirement overwhelms increased leverage on average. 
 
Our research not only studies the influence of CDSs on debtors and creditors but also 
that on managers and minority shareholders. For their own safety, banks seek to prevent 
managers from taking overly risky or unprofitable investments. This potentially gives 
minority shareholders a third-party protection that managers cannot unscrupulously 
misuse internal funds. However, CDS availability changes banks’ incentives for 
monitoring, weakening the protection. Our study specializes in this alteration and adds 
to the literature by introducing CDS use to the investigation of firms’ dividend policies. 
Our results support the substitute theory that managers use dividends as compensation 
for weaker outside protection. Moreover, our work is in line with the agency theory and 
the life-cycle theory due to the evidence that firms with larger agency costs and ages 
are more sensitive facing negative shocks. Furthermore, this thesis emphasizes the 
importance of dividend as commitments of not misusing internal funds, especially for 
CDS reference firms. 
 
CDSs, as financial innovations, are expected to construct a better economy. Greenspan 
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(2004) concludes that credit derivatives contribute to a more efficient, resilient, and 
flexible financial system. However, criticisms of the emergence of the CDS market have 
not eased since the financial crisis of 2007. This thesis provides a multidimensional 
view of CDS impacts on the economy and its participants, contributing to a better 
understanding how a financial innovation brings both benefits and costs to the real 
world. 
 
6.4 Policy implications 
 
This study has several implications for policy makers. To start with, the impacts of CDS 
availability on the economy and financial markets are manifold. It is unwise to make a 
coarse decision to promote or suppress the development of the CDS market. On the one 
hand, CDSs create a new hedging opportunity, build an information channel, increase 
credit supply and reduce financing costs that helps to improve welfares of some 
economic entities. On the other hand, they weaken bank monitoring, generate empty 
creditors, aggravate agency conflicts and diminish corporate investments, leading to 
high risk of reference assets and firms. We suggest regulators make a balanced policy 
for the CDS market considering both its pros and cons and use flexible regulations for 
CDS buyers and sellers according to different reference bodies. 
 
Second, policy makers should understand that all CDS impacts originate from the 
alteration of participants’ behaviors after CDS trading. To make correct policy, 
regulators need to pay attention to changes in incentives of economic entities. As 
instruments for transferring risk, CDSs break the unity of beneficial right and risk 
exposure. This affects creditors’ payoffs when a default happens. Creditors become 
172 
 
reluctant to supervise borrowers and even prefer to see them go into bankruptcy. 
Borrowers, in turn, have different choices in daily operation and corporate governance. 
These changes are worth reading in depth. An ideal policy is to keep advantageous 
effects but peel off adverse ones, such as limiting vote weights of creditors whose CDS 
positions are over debts they hold. 
 
Third, financial innovations like CDSs have characters of producing risks and bubbles. 
Although promoting the business economy, they always exceed the equilibrium for a 
social planner who attempts to maximize profits for all parties. For example, the buyer 
does not need to own the reference asset while doing a particular CDS transaction. This 
encourages speculation and may lead to huge amounts of trades not for hedging. In the 
end, it is not just a risk shift but a risk amplification. Bankruptcy of CDS sellers will 
cause a chain reaction in the financial market, greatly increasing the system risk. 
Moreover, CDS sellers are not required to hold reserves for protections they sell and 
even be qualified financial institutions. This will increase the level of risk preference 
and generate a series of irrational behaviors. For regulators, it is advisable to supervise 
a financial innovation at the first time and do necessary experiments on it for finding 
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Date  Single-name Notional  Multi-name Notional  In Total   
12/2004  5.12   1.28   6.40    
06/2005  7.31   2.90   10.21    
12/2005  10.43   3.48   13.91    
06/2006  13.87   6.48   20.35    
12/2006  17.88   10.77   28.65    
06/2007  24.24   18.34   42.58   
12/2007  32.49  25.76  58.25   
06/2008  33.41  24  57.41   
12/2008  25.74  16.14  41.88   
06/2009  24.17  11.93  36.1   
12/2009  21.92  10.78  32.7   
06/2010  18.5  11.77  30.27   
12/2010  18.14  11.75  29.89   
06/2011  18.12  14.29  32.41   
12/2011  16.87  11.76  28.63   
06/2012  15.57  11.36  26.93   
12/2012  14.31  10.76  25.07   
06/2013  13.14  11.21  24.35   
12/2013  11.32  9.7  21.02   
06/2014  10.84  8.62  19.46   
12/2014  9.041  7.36  16.401   
06/2015  8.21  6.39  14.6   
12/2015  7.18  5.11  12.29   
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Table A.2 Variable definitions for the chapter 3 
 
Variables Variable Description Computation/WRDS mnemonic 
Yield Spreadi,j,t 
The difference between returns of a corporate bond j at the issue time t of the firm i 
and the Treasury with the same maturity as the bond. 
treasury_spread 
Log Sales i,t-1 Natural log of sales of the firm i in the quarter just before issuing t-1. Log(SALEQ) 
Profitabilityi,t-1 Net income over sales of the firm i in the quarter just before issuing t-1. NIQ/SALEQ 
Leveragei,t-1 Total liability over total assets of the firm i in the quarter just before issuing t-1. LTQ/ATQ 
Ratingi,t-1 The firm’s credit rating in the quarter just before issuing t-1. SPLTICRM 
Log Amounti,t Natural log of the bond’s issue amount Log(offering_amt) 
Log Maturityi,t Natural log of the bond’s maturity 
Log(maturity-offering_date) 
Enhancementi,t The dummy variable equals 1 for bonds with enhancement terms, 0 otherwise. 
enhancement 
Convertiblei,t The dummy variable equals 1 for convertible bonds, 0 otherwise. 
convertible 
Redeemable i,t The dummy variable equals 1 for redeemable bonds, 0 otherwise. 
redeemable 





Table A.2 Variable definitions for the chapter 3 (continued) 
 
CDS Starti,t 
The dummy variable equals 1 for bonds issued by a reference firm i after the beginning 
date of the firm’s CDS trading, 0 otherwise. 
DATE 
CDS Companyi,t The dummy variable equals 1 for CDS reference firms, 0 otherwise. REDCODE 
Goodi,t-1&CDS Starti,t 
The dummy variable equals 1 if a bond is issued after CDS trading and during good 
credit periods, 0 otherwise.    
/ 
No Goodi,t-1&No CDS Starti,t 
The dummy equals 1 for a bond is issued without CDS trading and during no good 
credit periods, 0 otherwise. 
/ 
No Goodi,t-1&CDS Starti,t 
The dummy equals 1 for a bond is issued after CDS trading and during no good credit 
periods, 0 otherwise. 
/ 
Badi,t-1&CDS Starti,t 
The dummy variable equals 1 if a bond is issued after CDS trading and during bad 
credit periods, 0 otherwise.    
/ 
No Badi,t-1&No CDS Starti,t 
The dummy equals 1 for a bond is issued without CDS trading and during no bad credit 
periods, 0 otherwise. 
/ 
No Badi,t-1&CDS Starti,t 
The dummy equals 1 for a bond is issued after CDS trading and during no bad credit 





Table A.2 Variable definitions for the chapter 3 (continued) 
 
Log Assetsi,t-1 Natural log of total assets of the firm i in the term t-1. Log(ATQ) 
ROAi,t-1 Income over total assets of the firm i in the term t-1. OIADPQ/ATQ 
PPENT i,t-1 Property, plant and equipment over total assets of the firm i in the term t-1.    PPENTQ/ATQ 
REi,t-1 Retained earnings over total assets of the firm i in the term t-1. REQ/ATQ 
Ratedi,t-1 The dummy variable equals 1 for rated company, 0 otherwise. / 
IGi,t-1 The dummy variable equals 1 for investment grade company, 0 otherwise. / 






Table A.3 Variable definitions for the chapter 4 
 
Variables Variable Description Computation/WRDS mnemonic 
Iit/TAi,t-1 
Defined as the fixed investment, Iit, of the firm divided by its total assets in last 
period, TAit-1. 
CAPX/Lag of AT 
Ii,t-1/TAi,t-2 One lag of the relative value of investment. Lag of (CAPX/Lag of AT) 
CFi,t/TAi,t-1 The ratio of the firm’s cash flow, CFit, to its last period total assets, TAit-1. OANCF/Lag of AT 
Qi,t-1 Equity market value to book value of asset in the last period. PRCC_F*CSHO/BKVLPS*CSHO 
CDS Startit 
The dummy variable equals 0 for investments occurring before the onset of CDS 
trading, 1 otherwise. 
DATE 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Startit The interaction of investment-cash flow sensitivity and CDS availability indicator.   / 




Table A.4 Variable definitions for the chapter 5 
 
Variables Variable Description Computation/WRDS mnemonic 
Dividend Payments i,t The dummy variable equals 1 if the firm i pays a dividend in the time t, 0 otherwise. 
DVC 
Dividend Increasesi,t 
The dummy variable that is given value 1 if a firm’s dividend payment this year is 
more than in the previous year. 
Dividend Continuitiesi,t 
The dummy variable equals 1 for firms continuously pay dividends in year t-1 and 
year t, 0 otherwise. 
Dividend Decreasesi,t 
The dummy variable equals 1 when firms pay lower dividend than they did in the 
previous year, 0 otherwise.  
Firm Sizei,t-1 Natural log of the firm’s total assets. Log(AT) 
Leveragei,t Total liability over total assets. LT/AT 
ROAi,t Operating income over total assets. OIBDP/AT 
Growthi,t One-year sales growth. Log(SALE) - Log(Lag of SALE) 
Qi,t Equity market value to book value of assets. PRCC_F*CSHO/BKVLPS*CSHO 
Cash Holdingi,t Cash and short-term investment over total assets. CHE/AT 
REi,t Retained earnings over common equity. RE/CEQ 




Table A.4 Variable definitions for the chapter 5 (continued) 
 
DIVi,t/Tai,t Dividend amounts over total assets. DVC/AT 
DIVi,t/Mvi,t Dividend amounts over market value of equity. DVC/PRCC_F*CSHO 
DIVi,t/SHOi,t Dividend amounts over common shares outstanding. DVC/CSHO 
DIVi,t/NIi,t Dividend amounts over net income. DVC/NI 
CDS Firmi,t The dummy variable equals 1 for CDS reference firms, 0 otherwise. REDCODE 
(Ii,t - Ii,t-1)/BVEi,t-2 The variable measures changes of firms’ earnings. (IB-Lag of IB)/Twice Lag of CEQ 
ROEi,t-1 Operating income over book value of equity. IB/CEQ 
(Ii,t-1 - Ii,t-2)/BVEi,t-2 Earnings changes in the term t-1 over book value of equity in the term t-2. 
(Lag of IB- Twice Lag of IB)/Twice 
Lag of CEQ 
Dividend Payments i,t-1 × CDS 
Starti,t-1 
The interaction of the dummy Dividend Payments and the CDS availability indicator. / 
Dividend Increasesi,t-1 × CDS 
Starti,t-1 
The interaction of the dummy Dividend Increases and the CDS availability indicator. / 
Dividend Continuitiesi,t-1 × 
CDS Starti,t-1 
The interaction of the dummy Dividend Continuities and the CDS availability 
indicator. 
/ 
Dividend Decreasesi,t-1 × CDS 
Starti,t-1 




Table A.4 Variable definitions for the chapter 5 (continued) 
 
Three days abnormal stock 
returns i,t 
Calculated as the sum of raw stock returns of firm i on days t-1, t and t+1 around 
dividend announcement day t minus the sum of market index returns on days t-1, t 
and t+1. 
The change rate of prc - the change of 
sprtrn 
Dividend Changes i,t Computed as dividend amounts in the quarter t minus that in the t-1. divamount - Lag of divamount 
Earning Changesi,t 
Operating income over common equity in the quarter t minus that in the quarter t-1. 
OIBDPQ/CEQQ - Lag of 
(OIBDPQ/CEQQ) 
Dividend Changes i,t × CDS 
Starti,t 
The interaction of Dividend changes and CDS availability indicator. / 
Firm Salesi,t-1 Natural log of the firm’s sales. Log(SALE) 
WCAPi,t-1 Working capital over total assets. WCAP/AT 
IBi,t-1 Income before extraordinary items over total assets. IB/AT 
EBIT i,t-1 Earnings before interest and tax over total assets. EBIT/AT 
# For variables defined by information of other variables, we use the symbol “/” in the column of Computation/WRDS mnemonic. 
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The ratio of all firms with different ratings
AAA AA- ~ AA+ A- ~ A+
BBB- ~ BBB+ BB- ~ BB+ B- ~ B+
CCC- ~ CCC+ CC Unrated
The ratio of CDS firms with different ratings
AAA AA- ~ AA+ A- ~ A+
BBB- ~ BBB+ BB- ~ BB+ B- ~ B+
CCC- ~ CCC+ CC Unrated
The ratio of non-CDS firms with different ratings
AAA AA- ~ AA+ A- ~ A+
BBB- ~ BBB+ BB- ~ BB+ B- ~ B+
CCC- ~ CCC+ CC Unrated
Figure A.9 The ratio of all firms with different ratings 
Figure A.10 The ratio of CDS firms with different ratings Figure A.11 The ratio of non-CDS firms with different ratings 
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Table A.5 Does CDS effect vary? Including cash flow as control variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Spread Spread Spread 
Log Sales -23.93*** -8.017** -33.97*** 
 (2.768) (3.386) (3.044) 
Profitability -187.0*** -103.3*** -165.4*** 
 (20.01) (11.66) (20.05) 
Leverage 67.91*** 102.2*** 85.12*** 
 (18.36) (14.55) (18.55) 
Cash Flows -123.3*** -103.4*** -207.6*** 
 (45.88) (38.25) (48.97) 
Rating 28.44*** 7.241*** 19.13*** 
 (2.192) (1.661) (2.062) 
Log Amount 16.99*** 13.84*** 9.040*** 
 (3.290) (2.451) (2.775) 
Log Maturity -5.015 16.57*** 4.925* 
 (3.290) (3.108) (3.491) 
Enhancement 8.101 -24.45*** -15.79 
 (9.493) (6.283) (9.010) 
Convertible -182.1*** -155.2*** -166.5*** 
 (13.98) (16.36) (15.80) 
Redeemable -3.610 -4.857 -17.87*** 
 (5.629) (4.251) (5.474) 
Puttable -19.10 -20.03* -13.87 
 (11.87) (12.14) (11.66) 
CDS Start -242.5*** -262.2*** -248.1*** 
 (28.46) (13.85) (23.06) 
CDS Start × Rating 56.45*** 62.09*** 52.74*** 
 (6.954) (3.018) (5.706) 
CDS Company -21.99  -8.221 
 (27.586)  (7.073) 
Constant -19.39 -39.20 -230.8*** 
 (41.86) (78.23) (50.47) 
Observations 5,651 5,651 5,651 
R-squared 0.586 0.841 0.693 
Column (1) is estimated with robust standard error and clustered by company. Column (2) is estimated 
with robust standard error and firm-fixed effects. Column (3) controls industry-fixed effects and clusters 
standard error at the firm level. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-fixed effects. CDS 
start: dummy variable that is equal to one for bonds after the beginning date of the firm’s CDS trading. 
Rating is the number linked to the firm’s credit rating. The conversion is AAA = 1, AAA- = 1.33,…, C- 
= 9. Log Amount: natural log of the bond’s issue amount. Log Maturity: natural log of the bond’s maturity. 
Enhancement: bonds with some enhancement terms. Convertible: convertible bond. Redeemable: 
redeemable bonds. Puttable: bonds with put option. See table 1 for definitions of remaining variables. 




Table A.6 P score matched sample using time of issue as the extra covariate for matching 
  The Yield Spread 
 Negative CDS Effect  Positive CDS Effect 
  (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
        
Good & CDS Start -27.06** -49.07*** -31.91***     
 
(10.79) (7.957) (8.874) 
    
No Good & No CDS Start -2.904 -4.888 -6.605     
 
(9.491) (7.102) (9.112) 
    
No Good & CDS Start 27.89*** 22.19*** 16.81     
 
(12.35) (8.620) (11.42) 
    
Bad & CDS Start 
    
92.11*** 96.13*** 84.21*** 
 
    
(17.29) (8.612) (15.86) 
No Bad & No CDS Start 
    
-106.1*** -33.64*** -76.24*** 
 
    
(13.62) (9.021) (13.80) 
No Bad & CDS Start 
    
-110.8*** -55.29*** -90.95*** 
     
(15.38) (9.568) (15.27) 
        
CDS Company -6.292 
 -2.712 
 
-10.09  -14.50 
 
(16.97)  (15.92) 
 
(15.90)  (17.57) 
Constant -101.3* 7.263 124.2  
132.1*** 105.1 273.1*** 
 
(51.79) (99.46) (78.88) 
 
(49.86) (97.26) (74.79) 
Observations 4,337 4,337 4,337  
4,337 4,337 4,337 
R-squared 0.585 0.763 0.683   0.645 0.776 0.714 
Column (1), (4) are estimated with robust standard error and clustered by company. Column (2), (5) are estimated with robust 
standard error and firm-fixed effects. Column (3), (6) controls industry-fixed effects and clusters standard error at the firm 
level. All three columns are estimated with controlling time-fixed effects. CDS company: dummy variable that equals to one 
for companies referenced by CDS. Good & CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and 
during good credit periods. No Good & No CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued without CDS trading 
and during no good credit periods. No Good &CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading 
and during no good credit periods. Bad & CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and 
during bad credit periods. No Bad & No CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued without CDS trading and 
during no bad credit periods. No Bad &CDS start: dummy variable that equals one for bonds issued after CDS trading and 
during no bad credit periods. See table 1 and 2 for definitions of remaining variables. ***,**,* indicates the difference is 




















FOR THE BROAD SAMPLE FOR THE MANUFACTURING 
SAMPLE
Investment Rate
Before CDS trading After CDS trading
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Table A.7 GMM estimation including Sales Growth for the chapter 4 
Dependent variable:   Iit/TAit-1 Broad Sample   Manufacturing Industry 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Iit-1/TAit-2 0.293*** 0.000456  0.373*** 0.143 
 （0.099） (0.0721)  (0.0425) (0.105) 
Qit-1 0.000219 -0.0011 
 0.0000516 -0.000324 
 （0.00053） (0.00081)  (0.0002) (0.000368) 
CFit/TAit-1 0.212*** 0.207*** 
 0.143*** 0.0587 
 （0.0712） (0.0768)  (0.0249) (0.0973) 
Sales Growthit-1 0.0607*** 0.0296*  0.0173** 0.0236** 
 (0.019) (0.0168)  (0.00793) (0.012) 
CDS Startit -0.00594*** -0.0316** 
 0.00272 -0.0206** 
 (0.0022) (0.0152)  (0.00234) (0.00808) 
CFit/TAit-1×CDS Startit  0.254* 
  0.206** 
 
 (0.144) 
  (0.0823) 
      
Observations 11683 11683  5430 5430 
M1(p) 0.000 0.039  0.000 0.015 
M2(p) 0.729 0.151  0.101 0.477 
Hansen(p) 0.146 0.111   1 0.604 
Table A.5 shows results of equation 1 and 2 for the broad sample and the manufacturing industry. Iit/TAit-1 is the relative value of investment. Iit-1/TAit-2 is one lag of the relative 
value of investment. Qit-1 is the ratio of equity market value last term to book value of asset last term. CFit /TAit-1 is the ratio of the firm’s cash flow this term to its total assets 
last term. Sales Growth it-1 is one year sales growth. CDS Startit equals 1 for investments occurring after CDS trading, 0 otherwise. Observations are the numbers of observations. 
M1 and M2 are tests for first-order and second order serial correlation in the first-differenced errors. Hansen is the result of Hansen test. ***,**,* indicates the difference is 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
208 
 
Table A.8 Statistics comparison of average leverage/cash holding before and after CDS trading for high and low 
liquidity firms 
Panel A: Broad sample using cash flow as the liquidity proxy 
  High Liquidity   Low Liquidity 
  CDS Start=0 CDS Start=1 Increasing Ratio   CDS Start=0 CDS Start=1 Increasing Ratio 
Leverage 0.55436 0.66827 20.54801934  0.66526 0.71602 7.63009951 
Observation 1,858 1,746 3,604  1,919 1,515 3,434 
Cash Holding 0.13401 0.15042 12.24535482  0.05714 0.07681 34.42422121 
Observation 1,498 1,450 2,948  1,569 1,247 2,816 
Panel B: Broad sample using coverage ratio as the liquidity proxy 
  High Liquidity   Low Liquidity 
  CDS Start=0 CDS Start=1 Increasing Ratio   CDS Start=0 CDS Start=1 Increasing Ratio 
Leverage 0.47073 0.57672 22.51609203  0.73166 0.79073 8.073422081 
Observation 1,499 1,447 2,946  1,569 1,247 2,816 
Cash Holding 0.11174 0.13072 16.98586003  0.05979 0.09434 57.78558287 
Observation 1,438 1,509 2,947  1,488 1,287 2,775 
Panel C: Manufacturing sample using cash flow as the liquidity proxy 
  High Liquidity   Low Liquidity 
  CDS Start=0 CDS Start=1 Increasing Ratio   CDS Start=0 CDS Start=1 Increasing Ratio 
Leverage 0.51667 0.59158 14.49861614  0.65656 0.71389 8.731875228 
Observation 813 824 1,637  907 711 1,618 
Cash Holding 0.12364 0.13766 11.33937237  0.09513 0.12123 27.43614002 
Observation 813 824 1,637  908 711 1,619 
Panel D: Manufacturing sample using coverage ratio as the liquidity proxy 
  High Liquidity   Low Liquidity 
  CDS Start=0 CDS Start=1 Increasing Ratio   CDS Start=0 CDS Start=1 Increasing Ratio 
Leverage 0.46243 0.55002 18.94124516  0.71688 0.75747 5.662035487 
Observation 776 767 1,543  828 702 1,530 
Cash Holding 0.14595 0.17755 21.65125043  0.04885 0.084181 72.32548618 




Table A.9 Robustness check for chapter 4 using CDSit-1 as the interested variable 
Dependent variable:   Iit/TAit-1 
Broad Sample   Manufacturing Sample 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 Iit-1/TAit-2 0.344*** 0.0385 
 0.129*** 0.254* 
 (0.0934) (0.104)  (0.0507) (0.128) 
 Qit-1 
0.000696 -0.00227  0.000644 -0.000157 
 (0.000645) (0.00160)  (0.000715) (0.000446) 
 CFit/TAit-1 0.307*** 0.323*** 
 0.237*** 0.00656 
 (0.0956) (0.104)  (0.0638) (0.102) 
 CDS Startit-1 
-0.01765** -0.0484**  -0.00298* -0.0158** 
 (0.00738) (0.0205)  (0.00173) (0.00798) 
 CFit/TAit-1×CDS Startit-1  0.405**   0.116** 
  (0.198)   (0.059) 
      
Observations 11,683 11,683  5,430 5,430 
M1(p) 0.000 0.026  0.044 0.006 
M2(p) 0.624 0.215  0.288 0.363 
Hansen(p) 0.181 0.781  0.171 0.168 
Table 4.2 shows results of equation 1 and 2 for the broad sample and the manufacturing industry. Iit/TAit-1 is the relative value 
of investment. Iit-1/TAit-2 is one lag of the relative value of investment. Q it-1 is the ratio of equity market value last term to book 
value of asset last term. CFit /TAit-1 is the ratio of the firm’s cash flow this term to its total assets last term. CDS Startit equals 
0 for investments occurring before CDS trading, 1 otherwise. Observations are the numbers of observations. M1 and M2 are 
tests for first-order and second order serial correlation in the first-differenced errors. Hansen is the result of Hansen test. 




















The probability of payments










The probability of payments
CDS start=0 CDS start=1
Figure A.13 The probability of payments for 
CDS firms and matched non-CDS firms 
Figure A.14 The probability of payments for 




















The probability of dividend increases











The probability of dividend increases
CDS start=0 CDS start=1
Figure A.16 The probability of increases for 
CDS Start=0 and CDS Start=1 
Figure A.15 The probability of increases for 



















The probability of dividend continuities










The probabilityof dividend continuities
CDS start=0 CDS start=1
Figure A.17 The probability of continuities for 
CDS firms and matched non-CDS firms 
Figure A.18 The probability of continuities 


















The probability of decreases









The probability of decreases
CDS start=0 CDS start=1
Figure A.19 The probability of decreases for 
CDS firms and matched non-CDS firms 
Figure A.20 The probability of decreases 
for CDS Start=0 and CDS Start=1 
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Table A.10 Robustness check for chapter 5 adding firm age, credit rating and coverage ratio 
as covariates for matching 












  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Firm Size 1.251***  0.728***  1.340***  -0.0245 
 (0.0585)  (0.0389)  (0.0604)  (0.0418) 
Leverage -2.360*** 
 -2.551***  -2.163***  1.696*** 
 (0.210)  (0.171)  (0.215)  (0.183) 
ROA 7.029***  7.971***  5.578***  -3.528*** 
 (0.544)  (0.433)  (0.540)  (0.416) 
Tobin's Q 0.0207**  0.0118**  0.0231**  -0.0117* 
 (0.00823)  (0.00590)  (0.00843)  (0.00605) 
Growth -1.072***  0.769***  -1.103***  -1.752*** 
 (0.139)  (0.101)  (0.141)  (0.117) 
Cash Holding -0.408  -0.577*  -1.032**  -0.405 
 (0.411)  (0.318)  (0.427)  (0.361) 
RE 0.0586*** 
 0.0466***  0.0623***  -0.00494 
 (0.0121)  (0.00998)  (0.0125)  (0.00893) 
CDS Start 0.436***  0.144***  0.548***  0.0150 
 (0.114)  (0.0672)  (0.115)  (0.0859) 
        
Firm Fixed Effect Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 







Observations 9,161   17,697   8,836   17,145 
This table shows the impact of CDSs on firms’ dividend policies. Dividend payments equals to 1, if the firm pays a 
dividend, 0 otherwise. Dividend increases gets value 1 if a firm’s dividend payment this year is more than that in 
the last year. For firms continue to pay dividends in two years, dividend continuities gets 1, 0 otherwise. Dividend 
decreases equals to 1 when firms pay lower dividend than they did in the previous year. Log (Total assets): natural 
log of the firm’s total assets. Leverage: total liability over total assets. Return on assets: operating income over total 
assets. Tobin’s Q: market value to book value. Growth: one-year sales growth. Cash: cash and short-term investment 
over total assets. RE: retained earnings over common equity. CDS Start equals to 1 in the onset year of CDS trading 
and years after, 0 otherwise. We control for firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. Observations are the numbers 




Table A.11 Robust test for chapter 5 using fixed time effects and clustered by firm 












  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Firm Size 0.663***  0.447***  0.657***  0.116*** 
 (0.0458)  (0.0304)  (0.0454)  (0.0240) 
Leverage -1.814*** 
 -1.613***  -1.833***  0.326* 
 (0.292)  (0.227)  (0.293)  (0.182) 
ROA 5.377***  5.451***  5.060***  -0.493 
 (0.740)  (0.562)  (0.722)  (0.372) 
Tobin's Q 0.0245**  0.0231***  0.0261***  -0.0158** 
 (0.00987)  (0.00734)  (0.00974)  (0.00734) 
Growth -1.791***  -0.304***  -1.857***  -2.049*** 
 (0.124)  (0.100)  (0.127)  (0.130) 
Cash Holding -5.099***  -4.596***  -5.364***  -0.537* 
 (0.500)  (0.408)  (0.513)  (0.301) 
RE 0.0837*** 
 0.0675***  0.0873***  0.0185* 
 (0.0146)  (0.0111)  (0.0154)  (0.0102) 
CDS Quotes Number 0.496***  0.390***  0.547***  0.0357 
 (0.122)  (0.0923)  (0.121)  (0.100) 
        
Cluster Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 







Observations 21,569   21,569   21,569   21,569 
This table shows the impact of CDSs on firms’ dividend policies. Dividend payments equals to 1, if the firm pays a dividend, 
0 otherwise. Dividend increases gets value 1 if a firm’s dividend payment this year is more than that in the last year. For 
firms continue to pay dividends in two years, dividend continuities gets 1, 0 otherwise. Dividend decreases equals to 1 
when firms pay lower dividend than they did in the previous year. Log (Total assets): natural log of the firm’s total assets. 
Leverage: total liability over total assets. Return on assets: operating income over total assets. Tobin’s Q: market value to 
book value. Growth: one-year sales growth. Cash: cash and short-term investment over total assets. RE: retained earnings 
over common equity. CDS Start equals to 1 in the onset year of CDS trading and years after, 0 otherwise. We control for 
firm fixed effects and time fixed effects. Observations are the numbers of observations. ***,**,* indicates the difference is 
statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respective. 
 
